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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore a specific feature of post-Cold War Italian foreign 
policy, throwing light from a perspective blending Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and 
other International Relations (IR) insights, on the interactions occurred in the 1990s 
between the Italian state institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio (CSE), a 
Catholic lay organisation, one of the most influential non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) based in Italy, with a remarkable level of international activity. 
Firstly, this work offers a detailed account of the Italian “Foreign Policy Community” 
(Santoro 1991; Hilsman 1967 and 1993) and of the Community of Sant’Egidio, taking 
into consideration the international and domestic changes occurred after the demise 
of the Cold War, in order to understand where foreign policy governmental actors 
and a non state actor (NSA) such as Sant’Egidio fit within the bigger picture of the 
foreign policy process in Italy. This mapping exercise demonstrates that the country’s 
foreign policy setting is rather fragmented, featuring a) centres of power and 
influence scattered along different “rings”, according to the different issues and sub-
policies at stake, on a case-by-case basis; and b) an institutional “inner ring” with a 
relatively high number of “access points” for external actors, i.e. a proactive NGO 
such as Sant'Egidio, which is located in the “second ring”. 
Secondly, after identifying slowly emerging “policy subsystems” (Verbeek and van 
Ufford 2001) in the specific foreign policy subfields of a) preventive diplomacy/crisis 
management and b) peace-making, in which the Italian governmental foreign policy 
machinery and the Community are among the extremely small number of actors 
playing a role and enjoying a certain degree of policy autonomy, this thesis focuses 
on these two foreign policy areas, in order to try to understand how relations 
unfolded between the two actors in the cases of the Algerian crisis of 1994-1998 and 
of the Mozambican peace process of 1990-1992.  
The examination of these events has showed both competitive (even conflicting) and 
cooperative relations, respectively on the Algerian dossier and in the Mozambican 
case. This thesis argues therefore that “coopetition”, a concept borrowed from 
literature on regulatory theory, and defined as “a flexible mix of competition and 
cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors” (Esty and 
Geradin 2000), is – with some modifications – possibly the most accurate definition 
to capture the nature of interactions analysed. 
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Introduction  
 
The international activism of the Community of Sant’Egidio1, a lay Catholic-
oriented non governmental organization (NGO) based in Italy, in the post-Cold 
War era is rather often reported in the news. In certain cases, it has been argued 
that the Community ‘was making foreign policy instead of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’, acting ‘on behalf of’ or anyway more rapidly and effectively than it, while 
on other occasions it seemed to play a more assertive role behind the scenes. The 
foreign policy areas in which this NGO is particularly proactive are preventive 
diplomacy and crisis management, peace-making, humanitarian emergencies 
and human rights advocacy, development cooperation.  
A significant number of scholars in the academic literature have suggested that 
the Community both carries out a host of autonomous initiatives on the 
international scene and, more specifically, plays a important role in Italian 
foreign policy, on different issues and in different stages of the foreign policy 
process (Hume 1994; Ferraris 1996; Dottori 1997; Ajello 1999 and 2010; Bartoli 
1999; Romano 2002; Berridge 2005; Hill 2003 and 2015; Roberts 2009; Carbone 
2011; Carbone, Coralluzzo, Del Sarto and Tocci 2011). But what is the actual role 
of the Community and the scope of the international activities of this non state 
actor? Does the Community interact with the Italian foreign policy institutional 
apparatus? Does Italy informally or accidentally ‘delegate’ some classic state 
foreign policy activities to this proactive NGOs? Or do these relations unfold in 
different ways? Are such interactions cooperative or competitive and why?  
The goal of this thesis is to shed light on a specific aspect of post-1989 Italian 
foreign policy, combining different insights from International Relations (IR) 
and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). In greater detail, the aim is to try to 
understand what type of relations – and why – have developed in the 1990s 
between the Italian state foreign policy institutions and the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. To this end, I have analysed the two foreign policy cases in which 
both of them, at the same time, played the most significant role: the Algerian 
crisis (1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992).  
                                                 
1 In Italian “Comunità di Sant’Egidio”; “Community of Sant’Egidio” is the English translation 
commonly used by the organisation itself in their publications and on their website. 
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Plan of the thesis  
 
Part I of the thesis is aimed at placing the thesis in the context of the wider, 
relevant literature, presenting research questions and the analytical framework, 
addressing methodological concerns and mapping the object of inquiry.  
 
In Chapter 1, in particular, after explaining the reasons for focusing on Italian 
foreign policy, the research questions underpinning this work and 
methodological issues, a review is offered of the existing International Relations 
and Foreign Policy Analysis literature on non state actors (NSAs) and NGOs and 
their role in the context of foreign policy of states, in order to understand where 
this thesis fits into the academic literature. In addition, I clarify the analytical 
framework of this work, including definitions of the objects of inquiry, tools used 
to analyse the interactions between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio, and 
the criteria for selecting the cases of the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the 
Mozambican peace process (1990-1992). Finally, the Chapter illustrates the 
contribution of this thesis to the existing research. 
 
Chapter 2 offers firstly a discussion on the main features of the belated and slow 
process of establishment of the discipline of International Relations in Italy, in 
order to shed light on the neglected history of this research field in the country, 
and try to understand the effects of this state of affairs on the study of Italian 
foreign policy, as well as on foreign policy itself, to a lesser extent. Secondly, I 
present a brief overview of the literature (International Relations, Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Political Science and History, to some extent) produced on Italian 
foreign policy after the Second World War, focusing on works specifically 
dedicated to the post-1989 period, where possible. Thirdly, this Chapter shows 
the gaps in the literature on Italian foreign policy and explains the contribution 
of this thesis, placing it in the broader picture of the works produced on this topic. 
In closing, I try to sum up the basic features of Italian foreign policy between 1989 
and 2001, in particular in the subfields (‘sub-policies’) of preventive 
diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making. 
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Chapter 3 is focused on mapping the landscape where the interactions between 
Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio take place. In greater detail, the Chapter 
offers a brief assessment of the Italian Foreign Policy Community, starting from 
the model first developed by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993), and then modified 
in part and applied by Santoro (1990 and 1991) to the Italian case, in the time 
frame going from 1861 to 1989. The goal of this Chapter is twofold: firstly, it tries 
to place foreign policy state actors and non-state actors in the broader framework 
of the Italian Foreign Policy Community and process; secondly, it aims at offering 
a first, preliminary attempt to build on the illustration of the Italian Foreign 
Policy Community presented by Santoro twenty-five years ago, of course in a 
much less ambitious way, and to update it in the light of changes occurred over 
the last twenty years. At the end of the Chapter, some preliminary remarks are 
offered on where the internationally active NGO Sant’Egidio and other similar 
NGOs operate, and on the state branches and other non state actors they appear 
to engage the most with. 
 
Chapter 4 offers a brief account of the establishment, structure, functioning, and 
international activities of the Community of Sant’Egidio, Firstly, it looks at the 
historical, political and cultural milieu the CSE originated from, at the end of the 
1960s. Secondly, it elucidates the main activities conducted from its inception to 
the end of the Cold War in the religious, social and voluntary work fields. Thirdly, 
the chapter evaluates the projects of the Community in the international arena 
after 1989, especially in the subfields of preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution 
and peace-making, trying to look at how it has worked – particularly when also 
Italian government institutions were involved – in what areas of the world, and 
with what results. Fourth, some remarks are offered on the inner workings of the 
CSE and on its main leaders from the 1990s to present day. In closing, some 
reflections are articulated on policy subsystems emerging in the subfields of 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making – policy 
subsystems, as explained later in the thesis, are situations in which policy 
autonomy is enjoyed by a small number of state and non state actors in a specific 
policy field (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001). 
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In Part II of the thesis I present the empirical research conducted on two selected 
foreign policy cases related to Post-Cold War Italian foreign policy, and in 
particular to the decade of the 1990s, which are relevant to the issue of relations 
between Italy and Sant’Egidio: the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the 
Mozambican peace process (1990-1992). In greater detail, these two cases have 
been drawn from the two aforementioned foreign policy subfields, where policy 
subsystems are seemingly materializing in the Italian context.  
 
Chapter 5 assesses how relations between Italian foreign policy institutional 
actors and the Community of Sant’Egidio developed in the case of the Algerian 
crisis of 1994-1998 (subfield of a) ‘preventive diplomacy’/ ‘crisis management’). 
First, the Chapter presents a concise account of Italian foreign policy towards 
Algeria from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the crisis in the 
1990s, and on the activities conducted on and/or in the country by Sant’Egidio 
since its establishment. Second, it casts light on how relations have developed 
between the state institutions and the CSE during the different phases of the 
crisis. Third, it attempts to understand what type of interactions (competitive) 
and why the two actors set up with each other in this case, by analysing how 
events have unfolded in this foreign policy issue. 
 
Chapter 6, according to a similar structure, addresses the case of relations 
between Italy and the Community during the Mozambican peace process of 1990-
1992 (subfield of b) peace-making). First, it offers a brief summary of the basic 
features of Italian foreign policy towards Mozambique from the early 1970s until 
the launch of the peace process, and of the activities concerning the country 
carried out by the Community. Second, it shows how relations have unfolded 
between the two actors during the three main stages of the peace process. Finally, 
it offers an assessment of the events occurred during the Mozambican peace 
process, in order to understand what kind of relations (cooperative) and why 
have unfolded between Italian state institutions and the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. 
 
In Part III, I sum up the results of the empirical research in the light of the 
research questions suggested at the beginning of this work, and try to evaluate 
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their relevance to the theoretical and empirical scholarship on the subject matter. 
Finally, some remarks are suggested on possible further research developments, 
emerged during different stages of this work. 
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Part I - Research outline, analytical framework, 
literature review and mapping of the object of inquiry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
19 
Chapter 1. Research questions, literature review, 
analytical framework and methodology 
 
 
1.1 Chapter outline 
 
First, this Chapter presents the reasons why I have decided to focus on Italian 
foreign policy, the main research question this thesis tries to address and some 
related ones. Second, it tackles methodological issues and third, it includes a 
literature review on the role of non state actors and non governmental 
organisations in IR and FPA literature, and on Catholic NGOs and foreign policy. 
Fourth, I clarify in this Chapter the analytical framework of the thesis, illustrating 
definitions of the objects of inquiry, insights from the literature on how relations 
develop between states and NGOs in foreign policy, tools used to assess the 
interactions between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio, and the criteria for 
selecting the cases of the Algerian crisis (1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace 
process (1990-1992). Finally, the Chapter shows the contributions offered by this 
thesis to the existing literature. 
 
1.2 Why studying post-1989 Italian foreign policy? 
 
The decision to focus on Italian foreign policy in this thesis is based on a number 
of reasons: 
 
a) the rather underdeveloped state of the art of the theoretical and empirical 
reflections on Italian foreign policy, especially those focusing on the period 
following the end of the Cold War, and in particular from an IR/FPA perspective;  
 
b) the significant changes occurred in the external environment of Italian foreign 
policy during the last twenty years, which have led to the slow emergence of an 
increasingly assertive foreign policy, favoured by a larger room for autonomous 
manoeuvre cleared by the end of the bipolar confrontation between 1989 and 
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1991 (see for example Santoro 1991; Andreatta and Hill 2000 and 2001; 
Andreatta 2001b; Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009; Carbone 2011; Molinari 2000, 
in terms of quality journalistic analyses); 
 
c) the importance of the domestic political crisis unfolded between 1992 and 1994 
in huge sectors of Italian political parties (key actors in foreign policy, as well as 
in the Italian political system in general), business and society, as a consequence 
of a large-scale judicial inquiry into cases of widespread corruption, and of the 
effect on the Communist Party of the collapse of the Eastern bloc. This crisis has 
resulted in the introduction of some, although limited, institutional reforms and 
in the formation of a new party system2. These changes were expected to 
overturn, to some extent, the tendency for Italian foreign policy to be hostage of 
domestic politicking and, at the same time, to open up new opportunities for 
other societal actors in the domain of foreign policy (see for instance IAI 1993; 
Hill 2003 and 2015; Brighi 2005; Carbone 2011; Pons et al. 2014)3; 
 
d) the representativeness of Italy as a member of the group of Western European 
countries, which a) are part of an extensive network of regional and international 
institutions, and are home to societal actors involved in foreign policy; b) share 
some typical foreign policy objectives and predicaments of democratic regimes, 
particularly with reference to the use of force in the international arena (Brighi 
2005: 19); c) have been conducting a more active foreign policy since the end of 
the Cold War.  
 
                                                 
2 This crisis has brought about what has been defined the ‘Second Republic’. Although it is not 
used by all analysts, this definition refers to the new political system established in the first half 
of the 1990s, mentioned earlier in the text, in an attempt to distinguish it from the one in place 
from the end of the Second World War (see for example Sartori 1992; Pasquino and McCarthy 
1993; Mershon and Pasquino 1995; Katz and Ignazi 1996). Moreover, the term and the 
classification in ‘First Republic’ (1943-1992) and ‘Second Republic’ (1992-present) is now widely 
accepted and used among scholars of Italian foreign policy (see for instance Coralluzzo 2000; 
Walston 2007).  
 
3 The international changes and the domestic political crisis just mentioned have been also 
defined by international affairs analysts and experts as the two components of a “dual crisis” that 
has enormously affected Italian foreign policy to the same extent as its political system (see for 
example IAI 1993).  
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Reasons a), b) and c) also explain why I have decided to focus on the post-1989 
time frame. In particular, the cases analysed in this work are related to the decade 
of the 1990s. 
 
1.2.1 Why Italy as a single case study? 
 
Reflecting on single-case research design, Bennett argues that “[i]diographic 
studies, while often disdained, may provide data for later, more theoretically 
oriented case studies. Also, a study of a newly defined puzzle or phenomenon 
might begin with a fairly open-ended effort – sometimes called ‘soaking and 
poking’ in the data – to generate hypotheses that can then be tested more 
systematically” (George and Bennett 2005: 30). I have decided to concentrate on 
Italy as a single case study mainly because the very underdeveloped state of the 
theoretical literature on Italian foreign policy, in general terms4,  does not allow 
yet for “a fully comparative exercise, while it can benefit from the study of so-
called ‘heuristic cases5’” (Brighi 2005: 23), let alone on the specific issue of the 
role of the NGO Sant’Egidio and its interactions with Rome’s foreign policy. 
Furthermore, also the empirical analysis of specific sectors of Italian foreign 
policy is less advanced if compared to similar studies concerning other Western 
European countries. 
 
1.3 Main research question 
 
The main research question this thesis tries to address is the following:  
 
                                                 
4 “The discussion of Italian foreign policy, academic or otherwise, is perhaps nowhere more 
frustrating than in Italy. To start with, the analysis of foreign policy as an academic discipline is 
utterly non-existent, with the result that its study is often left to historians and jurists, if not 
journalists or former diplomats themselves. [...] political science [...] has made virtually no 
contribution to the field of foreign policy analysis. Two consequences follow directly from this 
state of affairs: on the one hand, the tone of much of the debate is rather impressionistic; on the 
other, there is almost a default reliance on a ‘matter-of-fact realism’ that naturally discourages 
more critical engagements with the subject matter” (Brighi 2005: 20). 
  
5 See Eckstein 1975: 104. 
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– Why were relations between the Italian state institutions and the Community 
of Sant’Egidio different (cooperative or competitive), in different foreign policy 
cases? What can explain this variation?  
 
1.3.1 Related research questions 
 
A number of related research questions have emerged – and have been addressed 
– in different phases of this work, when dealing with specific aspects. These are 
the following: 
 
– What are the main features of the Italian Foreign Policy Community? 
 
– Where in the Italian Foreign Policy Community and foreign policy process do 
usually interactions between the state institutions and the Community of 
Sant’Egidio take place? 
 
– Are policy subsystems emerging in any Italian foreign policy subfields? 
 
– What are the main features of these policy subsystems, if any? 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
This thesis aims at offering a theoretically-informed empirical account of the 
subject matter. The research design I have devised for this work is qualitative. For 
Part I of the thesis have used mainly secondary sources, i.e. academic literature 
produced in the fields of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Political Science and History, where relevant, and contributions by experts 
outside the academia, and primary sources, where available, i.e. official websites 
and official documents. For the empirical research, covered in Part II, I have used 
a mix of a) (a limited number of) primary sources, that is official documents 
publicly available, official press statements and communiqués; b) secondary 
sources, i.e. works published by academic scholars, think tank analysts, 
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practitioners and journalists6. The methods and techniques I have employed are 
the following: 
– process-tracing7: micro and medium level of analysis to observe the behaviour 
of such actors in the cases of interest and to explore the nature of relations and/or 
possible causal mechanisms connecting the actions performed by the two actors, 
namely the Italian state institutions and Sant’Egidio; 
 
- ‘attributed influence’ (March 1995)8: study of actors’ perceptions of influence by 
analysing self-, peer- and expert-assessments in order to identify different 
channels of influence; 
 
- interviews: unstructured élite interviews9 with retired diplomats, experts, think 
tanks analysts and journalists working on Italian foreign policy10. Interviews have 
                                                 
6 For an overview of the available sources on Italian foreign policy and the problems related see 
Nuti L. (2002) ‘Sources for the Study of Italian Foreign Policy, 1861-1999’, in Cold War History, 
2, 3, pp. 93-110, and Chapter 2. 
 
7 Process tracing is useful for “identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a 
given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context” (George and 
Bennett 2005: 6). It differs from historical narrative because it is aimed at transforming “a purely 
historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched 
in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design” (George and Bennett 
2005: 225). By employing process-tracing “the researcher examines histories, archival 
documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory 
hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening 
variables in that case. […]” (George and Bennett 2005: 176) (process verification). In addition, 
“[p]rocess-tracing can perform a heuristic function as well, generating new variables or 
hypotheses on the basis of sequences of events observed inductively in case studies” (George and 
Bennett 2005: 7) (process induction). 
 
8 The ‘attributed influence’ (March 1955) method consists of measuring influence on the basis of 
the actors’ own perceptions of their influence, the perception of other actors and the researcher’s 
own assessment, usually centered on secondary sources and process tracing. (Arts and 
Verschuren 1999).    
 
9 “Elite interviewing is characterized by a situation in which the balance is in favour of the 
respondent” (Burnham et al. 2004: 205), “and this can lead to additional challenges in gaining 
access and the respondents’ tendency to seek to control the agenda” (Burnham et al. 2004; Bygnes 
2008), both quoted in Morris 2009: 209. 
    
10 During the very first phase, interviewees have been selected through purposive sampling, based 
on the author’s knowledge and on a preliminary assessment of available documents and sources. 
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been conducted in the interviewees’ and author’s mother tongue (Italian). Most 
people interviewed have preferred not to be cited here for anonymity reasons. 
 
1.5 Literature review  
 
1.5.1 Non State Actors in International Relations 
 
Non State Actors (NSAs) matter in international relations. NSAs as an 
object of inquiry have received initial attention from International Relations 
scholars during the early 1970s, before being pushed again to the background 
until the end of the Cold War, to the advantage of the state-centred approaches 
dominating the academic scene. Slightly preceded by an article written by Kaiser 
(1971), one of the first major works in the field of NSAs – Transnational Relations 
and World Politics – has been published in 1972 by Kehoane and Nye. They 
feature among the first scholars who have stressed the need for rethinking the 
state-centric paradigm of IR. In this work they have defined the concept of 
‘transnational interaction’ as “the movement of tangible or intangible items 
across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government” 
(1971: 332), and that of ‘transnational relations’ as consisting in “contacts, 
coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the 
central foreign policy organs of government” (1971: xi). Resting upon different 
cases studies (foundations, multinational companies, churches, revolutionary 
movements, labour unions and scientific networks), the authors have stressed the 
importance of NSAs in a growing number of subfields ofs international politics. 
One should not consider the nation-state as the only relevant actor in world 
politics nor the “gatekeeper between intra-societal and extra-societal flows of 
actions” (1971: 722-3). In their conclusion Kehoane and Nye have proposed a path 
for future research based on a plurality of actors, “to transcend the level of 
analysis […] by broadening the conception of actors to include transnational 
actors and by conceptually breaking down the hard shell of the nation-state” 
(1971: 730).  
By considering the state as the all-powerful, most important actor in international 
politics, realist and neo-realist approaches – the latter probably being the most 
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prominent school of thought in IR in the 1980s and the 1990s – have always 
dismissed the relevance of NSAs as such, let alone their theoretical importance.  
The role of NSAs in the collapse of the former Soviet bloc, during the last part of 
the Cold War, has promoted a renewed interest in the study of NSAs. Scholars 
have thus attempted to go beyond the ‘black box’ – to cite a popular quote in IR 
and FPA – of the state. Different streams of literature have since then challenged 
realist and neorealist strongholds in different ways. For example, neo-liberal 
institutionalists have stressed the need for analysing international institutions, 
while not rejecting the idea of states as the most important actors. 
Transnationalists have placed a special emphasis on the role of transnational 
networks and NSAs, downplaying at the same time the role of states (see, for 
example, among the most recent works, Weenink 2001; Arts and Van Roozendal 
1999). Weenink (2001), for instance, has challenged the very Waltz’s neo-realist 
assumptions on the irrelevance of NSAs (Waltz 1979), from both a theoretical and 
methodological perspective, up to the point that “any actor can be considered 
relevant theoretically, however ‘unimportant’ they might be empirically”. “The 
fact that ‘the lion is the king of the jungle’ does not stop biologists from studying 
frogs”. For an actor being relevant in the light of the question one attempts to 
answer, “the choice of this actor or that one is methodological in nature”. 
However, the same author – consistently with his ultimate claim that NSAs do 
not really pose a serious threat to the state as the basic unit of analysis in 
international politics – warns, on the other hand, of the risk of being too empirical 
in nature that is associated with most transnationalist arguments (Weenink 2001: 
5, 80 and 90).  
On the relations between the state and NSAs, in Bringing Transnational 
Relations back in. Non-state actors, Domestic structures, and International 
institutions (1995), Risse-Kappen has argued that “[c]onfusing the impact of 
transnational relations on world politics with a ‘society-dominated’ view of 
international relations leads one to overlook the more interesting question of how 
inter-state and transnational relations interact. One does not have to do away 
with the state to establish the influence of transnational relations in world 
politics” (1995: 15).  
In a book published in 2001, Non-state actors in world politics, Josselyn and 
Wallace have suggested the definition of Non State Actors used in this thesis. 
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According to these scholars, NSAs are organizations “largely or entirely 
autonomous from central government funding and control [...], operating as or 
participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of two or more 
states, thus engaging in ‘transnational’ relations [...] [and] acting in ways which 
affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international 
institutions” (Josselyn and Wallace, 2001: 3-4).  
On the one hand, the question of autonomy of NSAs deserves close attention. The 
complexity of the real world does not allow for a clear-cut opposition between 
states and NSAs, public and private; the picture is much more nuanced, with 
several overlapping areas. Therefore, defining NSAs only according to their 
autonomy and independence from the states would be oversimplified and 
misleading (this point in fact is made also by Josselyn and Wallace 2001). It is 
worth recalling here the issue of the alleged independence of certain NSAs raised 
by Halliday. Providing a brilliant example – “was Christopher Columbus a 
Genoese non state actor or an agent of the Spanish state?” –  he has stressed that 
in some cases NSAs, especially many NGOs, are so close to the state that can be 
considered as “contractors for states” (Halliday 2001: 26). 
On the other hand, too broad definitions risk of becoming extremely vague. For 
instance, with reference to the German case, Le Gloannec et al. have opted for a 
rather broad definition of NSAs which brings into even sub-national regional 
units (Länder) and political party foundations, both of which seem not to be 
consistent with the most common accounts of what NSAs are in terms of legal 
status and funding, above all (see, for example, Risse-Kappen 1995; Josselyn and 
Wallace 2001: 3-4). Following this line of reasoning, some authors have gone 
even further, arguing that the very label ‘non-state actor’ may not be the correct 
one, the most appropriate probably being ‘actors outside central government’ 
(Jeffery 2007: 4 specifically on the case of German Länder; on the German 
political foundations active abroad see also Poppen 2007). In all probability, such 
a comprehensive definition goes too far from the intentions of the author and the 
scope of this thesis.  
In Non-State Actors in International Relations (2001), the editors Arts, 
Noortmann and Reinalda have offered an interdisciplinary, wide-ranging outlook 
of NSAs, benefiting from political science/international relations, policy studies 
and international law perspectives. The authors have argued that NSAs are 
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relevant because they both directly influence international relations (‘strategic 
mattering’, on processes and/or outcomes) and have become institutionalised in 
international political, legal and policy settings (‘institutional mattering’). In the 
opening Chapter the scholars have effectively illustrated three main reasons why 
NSAs matter: 1) they have information and expertise useful for states; 2) they 
exert influence on political discourse, agenda setting, law making and decision 
making, as well as they play a public role in implementation procedures; 3) they 
are part of political, policy and institutional arrangements in the international 
system (2001: 3).  
 
Non State Actors and (‘their’) state. Several works have investigated many 
aspects related to NSAs, e.g.: ethical problems, lack of democracy, autonomy. Not 
surprisingly, most scholars – especially the first generations, but not only (see for 
example Alston 2005) – have defined NSAs in contrast to the state. Furthermore, 
authors generally tend to stress the extreme diversity and the lack of homogeneity 
of the galaxy of NSAs, in terms of their nature, organization, functions and 
funding, but they appear to have paid considerably little attention to a crucial 
aspect, that is the diversity of patterns of relations with states. By ‘patterns of 
relations’ I mean here the “ways [NSAs] are integrated in national frameworks 
and in international networks, and the ways they interact with other non-state 
and state actors” (Le Gloannec 2007: 1).  
Some specific patterns have been certainly investigated, yet they seem to concern 
mostly the dynamics of NSAs challenging and contesting the states activity, 
according to a confrontational logic. Other patterns, such as cooperative 
relations, have instead received less attention from the scholars, even with 
reference to the relations between NSAs and their state of origin11 – although, 
                                                 
11 I am certainly aware that the link NSAs/’their’ state is not always relevant when considering 
every single type of non state actor, this being in fact one of the reasons why this work does not 
intend focus on a comprehensive and exhaustive list of all the different NSAs a government 
cooperates with, when conducting its foreign policy. Let alone this is an attempt to overstretching 
the concepts of cooperative relations in a way somehow suggested by some authors. According to 
these scholars, even in the specific case of NSAs embedded in a transnational world since the very 
beginning (e.g.: on the one hand certain epistemic communities or advocacy coalitions, on the 
other one illegal traffics organizations), one may argue that the country of origin is a key element 
to assess them (see for instance Le Gloannec (ed.) 2007). Nevertheless, I believe that also the 
issue of non conflicting patterns of relations between NSAs and ‘their’ state deserves closer 
attention. 
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after all, “not all NSAs are engaged primarily in a world-wide dimension which 
transcends all borders” (Le Gloannec 2007: 3).  
Diplomacy studies scholars – particularly from post-globalist perspectives – have 
paid some attention to non conflicting patterns of relations between governments 
and NSAs, when dealing with the transformations of diplomacy (Hemmati 2002; 
Langhorne 2005 and 2007; Cooper et al. 2008; Khagram 2006; Murray 2008). 
One pattern focuses on the ‘supportive role’ NSAs, mainly NGOs, play as 
intermediaries in peacebuilding and peace-maintenance activities, especially in 
the field of international development. Another mode of interaction is that of 
‘joint-management’, in which NSAs engage with states through partnerships or 
cooperative arrangements with different degrees of institutionalization, as it is 
the case with the management of humanitarian emergencies assistance (Cooper 
and Hocking 2000; Hocking 2004 and 2011).  
Going beyond the field of diplomacy studies, other scholars working on non 
competitive patterns of relations between governments and NSAs have focused 
mainly on international development aid (see, for example, Hulme et al. 1997; 
Tvedt 1998; Smillie 1999; Reimann 2000) and humanitarian emergencies (see, 
for instance, Goodhand 2006; Stoddard 2006; Mingst 2008), then followed by 
preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding (see, for example, Gerstbauer 2005; 
Krahmann 2005; Richmond and Carey 2005). More ‘classic’ diplomatic activities, 
such as international crisis/conflict resolution (peace-making activities such as 
provision of good offices, mediation and negotiation), traditionally conducted by 
states, have been less examined. 
At any rate, the studies mentioned so far have not looked specifically at NSAs as 
entities based in a specific state, with the implications this may have for their 
interactions with the state of origin and its foreign policy. As far as the relations 
between NSAs and ‘their’ state are concerned, very little attention has been paid 
to them in the literature. The book edited by Le Gloannec (2007) on the case of 
Germany and mentioned before is among the few significant exceptions. Building 
on the definition proposed by this scholar, what I mean here by ‘their’ state is the 
state where NSAs are originally embedded, have their headquarters and their 
‘constituencies’ of supporters among the general public, and with whose 
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institutions, social fabric and culture enjoy particular relations. Furthermore, 
another interesting feature to take into account is the institutionalized, physical 
presence of branches and subsidiaries of a NSA12 based in one country in a second 
country, which is relevant to the foreign policy of the former, that is the ‘host’ 
state (Gardner Feldman 2007: 16).  
Another exception, illuminating the patterns of interaction between the state and 
the NSA based in its territory, is the work of Tvedt on NGOs in Norway. He has 
argued that in the case of Norway, functionalist theories do not carefully account 
for the long history and growth of NGOs in the foreign aid field, as they “cannot 
meaningfully be explained as the result of an adaptive response from society or 
groups in society to market or state failures, or as a functional response to social 
diversity, or as innovative response on the part of the society to novel problems” 
(Tvedt 1998: 53). Such functionalist theoretical approaches, however, may prove 
useful in some countries and for some issue-areas, but provide little insight for 
assessing NGOs in contexts which are similar to the Italian one. The explosion of 
the number of NGOs in Norway has indeed been deliberately boosted by 
government decisions and initiatives (Tvedt 1998: 53), a phenomenon that has 
not occurred in all European/Western countries.  
 
1.5.2 State and Non State Actors (NSAs) in Foreign Policy Analysis  
 
Problematizing the state. Quite paradoxically, FPA scholarship has not 
developed a clear-cut conception of the state, although it has extensively 
contributed to the unfolding of what realists considered as a ‘black box’. The state 
has been considered indeed as the sum of its human or bureaucratic parts, an 
arena or the sum of external and domestic pressure; it has not been systematically 
defined as an actor. This failure has undermined the intellectual gains of the 
middle-range FPA theories with epistemological, ontological and 
conceptual/analytical problems: to provide an example which is particularly 
relevant to this work, “FPA recognizes that the state enjoys a degree of autonomy 
from the society it rules and external actors. However, since the concept of state 
                                                 
12 For the sake of accuracy, the author uses the term ‘Transnational Actor’ (TNA). 
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is not explicitly developed, this autonomy cannot be discussed in either 
conceptual or analytical terms” (Alden and Aran 2011: 9-10 and 62-77). This 
problem is all the more evident when assessing the interactions of the state with 
NSAs rooted in its society. 
 
“Foreign policy begins at home”13. NSAs as domestic sources of 
foreign policy. With the exception of some strands of the “domestic structure 
approach” (see for example Risse-Kappen and Muller 1993; Hill 2000) and of 
certain pluralist accounts, most Foreign Policy Analysis scholars seem to have 
rather neglected the role of NSAs in foreign policy formulation and 
implementation14. According to Verbeek and van Ufford, the main reason for the 
lack of studies on this topic is the inappropriateness of the analytical frameworks 
available to the discipline, which do not facilitate the accumulation and 
consolidation of knowledge in the field. The authors have identified four main 
drawbacks of FPA scholarship in dealing with NSAs: 1) the focus limited to 
traditional issues, mainly trade and security, with little attention to areas such as 
development aid, human rights and social policies; 2) the idea that power in 
foreign policy making still remains exclusively with state officials, such as 
politicians and civil servants; 3) the emphasis on major decisions and crisis 
situations instead of routine daily policy making; 4) the basic idea that foreign 
policy is conducted only by the state, therefore assuming that NSAs could not play 
any role in implementing foreign policy. Resting upon these arguments, indeed, 
FPA students have often left NSAs out or on the margins of the big picture of 
state-centred foreign policy. (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001: 127-130). All these 
assumptions seem relevant to this thesis, especially points number 2), on the 
argument that some form of power is today enjoyed in the realm of foreign policy 
also by actors operating outside the state machinery, and number 4), on the 
                                                 
13 This is the title of a book on U.S. foreign policy written in 1944 by James P. Warburg.  
 
14 Perhaps surprisingly, Foreign Policy Analysis has paid very little attention to policy 
implementation in general. After the seminal work on this topic by Smith and Clarke (1984), this 
stage of the foreign policy process has been substantially dismissed, despite the well-established 
argument of the importance of bureaucratic impact on policy (Stern and Verbeek 1998: 208). 
Among the exceptions there are some works more focused on military aspects and Brighi and Hill 
(2008). 
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importance of the role of NSAs in foreign policy implementation. The authors 
have then gone further, introducing and applying (with reference to Dutch 
foreign policy) a policy subsystem theoretical framework15 to be used in Foreign 
Policy Analysis. This is one of the analytical tools I have tried to use in this work 
(see following sections). 
The domestic domain is populated with a variety of actors, which can be 
conceptualized in terms of concentric circles, introduced for the first time by 
Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993)16 with reference to foreign policy making. At the 
heart of the system lies the government executive, while moving towards 
domestic society there are further circles of actors and activity for intra-
governmental politics, competing elites, bureaucratic interests, parliaments, and 
then public opinion, pressure and interest groups, media, etc. (Hill 2003: 223). 
It is precisely in one of the peripheral circles where one can find NGOs. This 
model has been used in this thesis to map the Italian Foreign Policy Community 
(see later in the text). 
 
1.5.3 Catholic NGOs and foreign policy 
 
Most academic studies focus on the role of religion in world politics, rather than 
on the specific issue of Christian NGOs – let alone Catholic ones. Another 
common example of a topic explored by scholars is provided by the studies on the 
Roman Catholic Church as both one of the oldest transnational religious actors, 
with its increasingly decentralised network spreading in civil society, and a state-
actor internationally recognized as a participant of international forums, i.e. the 
Vatican City State, from 1929 (Vallier 1972; Hanson 1987; Kent and Pollard 1994; 
Reese 1996; Casanova 1997; Rudolph 1997; Haynes 2001; Ryall 2001; Alvarez 
2002; Böllmann 2010; Graziano 2010; Madeley and Haynes 2011).  
On the contrary, religious NGOs have drawn less attention (Jeavons 1994). As 
pointed out by Tvedt, who has authored some of the few works on this topic, 
“[m]any NGOs, especially in certain regions and in some countries, are mission 
                                                 
15 For its use in FPA see also Stern and Verbeek 1998. 
 
16 Hilsman’s concentric circles model of foreign policy making draws in turn on Almond's account 
of public opinion and foreign policy (1950). 
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organizations, both Christian and Muslim, although literature tends to ignore this 
fact” and not to consider them as proper NGOs as they are involved with spiritual 
matters (Tvedt 1998: 216). The writer has added also that “[…] it is important to 
underline that the grand era of Western missions in terms of activities of 
missionaries was not in the last century or during colonial times. It is now, during 
the era of development aid in the period after World War II” (Tvedt 1998: 217). 
Assessments of internationally active Catholic NGOs in general, and of their 
relations with the foreign policy of the states they are based in (often Catholic 
majority countries), in particular, are therefore still missing in the literature.  
 
1.6 Analytical framework 
 
1.6.1 Definitions of the objects of inquiry 
 
In the following section I briefly present the conceptual definitions employed in 
the thesis and a description of the object of inquiry. 
 
Foreign policy. It is “the sum of total decisions made on behalf of a given 
political unit (usually a state) entailing the implementation of goals with direct 
reference to its external environment. Foreign policy inputs are those many 
factors that influence foreign policy decision-making, whilst the observable 
outputs of foreign policy are a feature of the state (and non-state) behaviour 
within the international system” (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2008: 392). In this 
thesis I consider preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making as 
as different areas (‘sub-policies’) of foreign policy. Other subfields in which both 
Italy and Sant’Egidio have worked after 1989 are development aid (also known as 
foreign aid in the literature and in the practitioners’ jargon), humanitarian 
emergencies and human rights advocacy. 
 
Preventive diplomacy/crisis management. Academic literature on conflict 
prevention, conflict resolution and peace processes has flourished since the 
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1960s, triggered by the work of its ‘founding father’, Johan Galtung17, and by the 
articles published on the ‘Journal of Peace Research’, which he founded in 196418. 
Over the decades, the growing scholarly interest in how to prevent and end 
different types of conflicts, involving all kinds of actors, has led to the 
establishment of an autonomous field of social science called ‘peace studies’ or 
‘peace and conflict studies’ (for an assessment of the state of the art of the 
discipline, see for instance Webel and Galtung 2007). Peace studies have 
contributed a substantive body of work on the definition and the different facets 
of preventive diplomacy and peace-making (the latter being covered in the next 
section), but as this thesis is not focused on assessing such activities in first place 
(i.e.: examining their features in terms of techniques employed, their ability to 
deliver good results, etc.), but rather on how Italian state institutions and 
Sant’Egidio have interacted in a specific case in this context, in this work I will 
not expand on literature from this stream of research. The debate on the concepts 
of preventive diplomacy and peace-making is rich and interesting, but for the 
purpose of this work I have decided to use as a footprint the ‘official’ United 
Nations definitions. Most activities in these field take indeed place either with 
some form of UN involvement (or at least blessing), or according to principles 
and methods enshrined in the UN Charter or in other documents produced by the 
UN family organizations and bodies (Ramcharan 2008). 
Therefore, ‘preventive diplomacy’ here is “action to prevent disputes from arising 
between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to 
limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (United Nations 1992: 20). “While 
it is conducted in different forms and forums, both public and private, the most 
common expression of preventive diplomacy is found in the work of diplomatic 
envoys dispatched to crisis areas to encourage dialogue, compromise and the 
peaceful resolution of tensions [...]” (United Nations - Department of Political 
Affairs: 2016). Because it has not always been easy to draw lines between the 
different types of activities performed by both Italy and the Community of 
                                                 
17 Galtung’s production (books, book Chapters, articles, etc.) is so huge that an overview here 
would go well beyond the scope of this section. For a comprehensive review of its contribution to 
the establishment of the peace studies academic field, see for instance Galtung 1985. 
 
18 Galtung also established the Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo in 1959 and the 
International Association for Peace Research (IPRA) in 1964. 
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Sant’Egidio, I have decided to adopt an extensive interpretation of the concept, 
covering also more ‘classic’ diplomacy tools such as official visits (both high and 
low level), economic ties, or political pressure exerted through official 
declarations and public speeches. As such a wide-ranging interpretation verges 
on that of ‘crisis management’, I have decided to add the term ‘crisis 
management’ to that of ‘preventive diplomacy’.  According to a widely known 
definition, ‘crisis management’ is considered in this thesis as “[t]he conduct of a 
crisis by diplomacy, normally in order to dampen it down. The term was 
popularized by US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, formerly a 
businessman, following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962” (Berridge 2001: 56). 
A further clarification is needed here. Preventive diplomacy and more ‘classic’ 
crisis management initiatives can sometimes overlap with peace-making efforts, 
as the very academic literature on conflict resolution points out. Boundaries 
between the two fields can be blurred at times, therefore it must be highlighted 
here that I have used in thesis a distinction based on the object these activities 
aim to have an impact on, as an operational guiding tool. On the one hand we 
have full blown conflicts, which peace-making activities are intended to work on; 
on the other, we observe politically strained situations, conflicts on the verge of 
breaking out and/or low-intensity unrest, which preventive diplomacy and more 
‘classic’ crisis management deal with.  
No specific mention of the involvement of NSAs/NGOs in preventive diplomacy 
and crisis management is included in the UN definition, but there is today a 
widespread agreement both in academia and among practitioners over the 
growing role and importance of such actors in these fields (for an assessment of 
research on this topi, see for instance Jentleson 2000; Hackett 2000; Lund 1996; 
Richmond and Carey 2005; Ramcharan 2008; Bartoli 2011; Stephenson 2011). 
 
Peace-making. For the reasons explained in the previous section, in this thesis 
I have decided not to review the rich academic literature on the definition and 
characteristics of peace-making and preventive diplomacy/crisis management.  
To mention just an example of an overview of the academic field defined as ‘peace 
studies’ or ‘peace and conflict studies’, I refer again to Webel and Galtung 2007. 
Because the majority of peace-making initiatives are carried out with the UN 
participation or support, to varying degrees, or following its principles, the 
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definition I use here as a background concept is the one suggested by the United 
Nations, as in the case of ‘preventive diplomacy’ (see previous section). 
The UN describes ‘peace-making’ as an “action to bring hostile parties to 
agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter 
VI of the Charter of the UN, ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’” (United Nations 
1992: 20). The goal of this activity is therefore “to end the violence between the 
contending parties. Peace-making can be done through negotiation, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration and international courts” (Ouellet 2003). In some cases, 
peace-making activities seem to overlap with preventive diplomacy efforts; this is 
a problem acknowledged also by the academic literature itself. For the sake of 
clarity, it needs to be stressed again also here in this Chapter that it is not easy to 
draw clear dividing lines in this domain: as a point of reference in dealing with 
this issue, the reader can use the distinction between fully fledged conflicts (which 
peace-making applies to) on the one side, and political tense situations and/or 
low-intensity unrest (which preventive diplomacy is concerned with) on the 
other. 
As argued when discussing preventive diplomacy, NSAs/NGOs are not included 
in the UN definition of peace-making, but there is today a common 
understanding among both scholars and practitioners on the fact that the 
burgeoning role of such actors in these fields is now an established reality (for an 
overview of the debate on this see for example Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999; 
Hocking 2011; Stephenson 2011). Aall, for instance, points to the four types of 
activities NGOs are better suited than governmental actors to perform in peace-
making processes: traditional relief tasks; human rights abuse monitoring; early 
warning of violent conflicts on the verge of erupting; conflict resolution activities 
(Aall: 1996). As in the case of preventive diplomacy, it is important to stress that 
this Chapter is not aimed at evaluating the characteristics of the peace-making 
activities described per se, their quality, or their outcome, but rather at assessing 
the relations between the Italian foreign policy institutions and Sant’Egidio on a 
given occasion.  
 
Foreign policy executive and the state. Building upon Hill’s definition of 
‘foreign policy executive’ (2003: 56), the foreign policy executive is meant here in 
principle as composed of the Prime Minister (in Italy the ‘President of the Council 
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of Ministers’) and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, both of which with their 
bureaucratic ministerial apparatus (central headquarters in Rome and relevant 
diplomatic representations abroad) and their external advisors, to be 
complemented with other Ministers and Departments (e.g.: Defence, Economic 
Development) and other political actors (e.g.: parliamentary committees), 
whereas relevant. In the cases analysed in this work, as it will be elucidated later, 
the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister were the most active cabinet 
members most of the times, because of the specific features of foreign policy 
decisions and activities at issue. 
An important clarification is needed here. In this work I use also the expression 
‘foreign policy institutional system’/’machinery’ as a less sophisticated synonym 
to refer to the foreign policy executive, or the more generic terms ‘state’ or 
‘government’, to convey a similar meaning. Concerning the concept of ‘state’, in 
previous sections I have touched upon the crucial problem of the lack in Foreign 
Policy Analysis of a clear idea of what ‘state’ means, especially when it comes to 
trying to understand where to draw a line between it and the society it regulates. 
Although FPA does not clearly sketches out a definition of ‘state’, and therefore 
does not expand on the type of autonomy the state has, it acknowledges that the 
state does enjoy some form of autonomy (Alden and Aran 62-77). Starting from 
this assumption, ‘state’ is used here to refer to the set of institutions, mostly 
pertaining to the executive power, entrusted with an institutional mandate to 
conduct foreign policy in a clearly autonomous way from non state actors and 
other societal actors. In addition, it is interesting to take into account that in 
Italian the term ‘state’ (‘stato’) is commonly used, in the everyday language, to 
refer specifically to public institutions and public administration. Because the 
idea of ‘state’ is limited in this thesis only to the executive branch, the expression 
‘government’ is considered as another synonym. Finally, as in title of the thesis, 
also the term ‘Italy’ is used here as a synonym for the aforementioned concepts. 
As far as the more ‘administrative’ aspects of daily management of foreign policy 
are concerned, what I mean are “the continuous administrative and legal systems 
that attempt to structure the relationships between NGOs and public authority 
within the [given] field”, with a view to avoid limiting the focus only to a 
restrictive set of formal organizations and rules (Tvedt 1998: 95). Some of the 
interactions between different actors in the realm of foreign policy are indeed of 
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a flexible and informal nature, and this aspect is especially relevant to the events 
analysed in this thesis). In the cases assessed in this work, as mentioned before, 
due to the predominantly political nature of the events administrative structures 
of interest are mainly that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Non Governmental Organization (NGOs). Following the basic 
categorization proposed by Willets (1982, 1997), NSAs can be divided into NGOs, 
business groups, political organizations, religious entities and criminal 
organizations. The main feature of proper NGOs is that they result from private 
initiatives; are public in purpose; on principle they act independently of 
governments (Reinalda 2001: 12, emphasis added). Most of the IR literature on 
these burgeoning actors19, especially in the first years, has portrayed them as 
autonomous societal actors, acting as standard-bearers for the emerging ‘global 
civil society’. As previously mentioned with reference to NSAs in general, also in 
the more specific domain of NGOs the role of the state has been underestimated, 
notwithstanding the crucial importance of governments in fuelling the expansion 
of all types of new NGOs, especially during the past two decades. According to 
Gerstbauer (2005: 25), many authors have basically focused on the advocacy role 
of these organizations (Risse-Kappen 1995; Willets 1995; Weiss and Gordenker; 
Willetts 1982 and 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998), rather than on the role of 
providers of services/foreign policy actions. 
The proliferation of such actors in the recent past increasingly raises several 
questions about the complex interaction between NGOs and states and/or 
international organizations. They appear to work against, but also with and for 
governmental actors (Weiss and Gordenker 1996: 209-210, emphasis added). 
NGOs with different degrees of institutionalized relations with governments may 
play an important role in contexts/issue areas where states cannot operate, on 
certain occasions compensating for governments’ shortcomings, while on others 
almost replacing them (Gardner Feldman 2007). NGOs explored in the academic 
literature are particularly those that are active as agent of the states in the fields 
of international development and humanitarian emergencies. 
                                                 
19 An evocative image of the contemporary blossoming NGOs landscape is sketched out by West: 
it is “like a pyramid that has a few big multinational NGOS at the top, thousands of small local 
NGOs at the bottom, and a number of medium-sized NGOs in the middle” (West 2001: 217). 
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Internationally active national Non Governmental Organizations: 
such NGOs are actors, substantially rooted in the domestic societal and political 
system of ‘their’ state20, which are so organised and powerful that they are able to 
act internationally. Nevertheless, they are not: a) included in a network of similar 
NGOs in other countries – this being the case of national NGOs operating across 
national boundaries, so acting as transnational actors; b) embedded in an 
International Non Governmental Organization (INGO) – this being the case of 
various NGOs from three or more countries with similar features and aims, 
establishing a mechanism for co-operation, so acting as international actors. “In 
international relations the term NGO mostly equates with the term of INGO” […] 
but “the difference between an INGO and such a national NGO acting as an 
international actor is that the latter only represents its national views and 
preferences, while the views and preferences of the INGO are the result of 
compromises between its national affiliates” (Reinalda 2001: 12). 
 
Internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy - The Community 
of Sant’Egidio. This is a composite group of NGOs based in Italy (or whose 
central headquarters are on Italian territory) which define themselves ‘Catholic-
inspired NGOs’. Such organizations, which in principle operate largely 
independently from the government, feature several differences in terms of legal 
status, mission, structure, activities, funding, etc. but are all active both in Italy 
and abroad, often participating also in broader non Catholic NGOs networks. 
Their distinctive location between the Italian state and the Vatican, to which they 
are somehow bound to different degrees, adds an interesting and challenging 
dimension to the issue. More specifically, some of these NGOs are Catholic lay 
ecclesial movements and associations and are defined ‘private’ or ‘public’ 
according to the Code of Canon Law. Others have no formal ties with the Vatican 
but, of course, share with it a strong ideational common ground and take 
                                                 
 
20 As specified before, ‘their’ state is the state where NSAs are originally embedded, have their 
headquarters and their ‘constituencies’ of supporters among the population, and with whose 
institutions, social fabric and culture enjoy particular relations, and sometimes are dependent on, 
for some aspects. 
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advantage of Parish churches networks on the Italian territory. However, they are 
all subject to Italian law and their embeddedness in the Italian society - in other 
words, their ‘Italian-nes’, is rather clear21. The most important NGOs in this 
group are: Community of Sant’Egidio (that, as it will be explained later in this 
thesis, was particularly active in the Mozambique’s peace process, in Algeria, in 
Kosovo and Albania), FOCSIV network of Catholic-inspired NGOs, AVSI (a 
partner of Communion and Liberation), Focolare Movement, all extensively 
committed to humanitarian assistance and development aid, especially in Africa 
and Latin America. These NGOs also enjoy full ‘access’ to funds and projects 
supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the Italian law on 
development cooperation (Law 49/1987 and now 125/2014). 
The reason why I have decided to focus on the Community of Sant’Egidio in this 
thesis is that it is undoubtedly the most prominent among Italian NGO with a 
clear international vocation. While arguing that in Italy “Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), which in other European/Western countries, especially in 
the development and environment field, are very vocal, [...] have failed to make a 
difference, particularly in policy advocacy”, Carbone has underscored that “[t]he 
only exception, probably, is the Community of Sant’Egidio, which played a widely 
acknowledged role in Mozambique in the 1990s, but has been very active in other 
areas of the world, especially in the Mediterranean” (Carbone 2011: 10; see also 
Ferraris 1996: 478-480; Carbone, Coralluzzo et al. 2011: 202; Barbato, De Franco 
and Le Normand 2012). Drawing on a useful comparison, Walston has added that 
“[t]here is nothing based in Italy of the influence of Amnesty, Greenpeace or 
Médecins Sans Frontières but there is one NGO, the Community of Sant’Egidio, 
which has a substantial international role” (Walston 2011: 74). Also scholars in 
the field of diplomacy studies have underlined the energetic role of this NGO –  
defined by a prominent Italian journalist as the “UN of Trastevere”22, after the 
                                                 
21 As one of the senior members of Sant’Egidio has explicitly pointed out, the international 
activism of the Community “is also a product of the city in which the Community is located –   
Rome. In addition to being the Italian capital and typically Italian, Rome is a crossroads for 
international relations linked to the foreign policies and the development activities of both the 
Italian government and the Vatican. St. Egidio has grown and thrived in this urban context open 
to international relations and has been favoured by the potentialities offered by the city” (Giro 
1998: 86). 
 
22 In Italian “ONU di Trastevere” (Man: 1995). 
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name of the historical neighbourhood in the heart of Rome where the Community 
is based – when providing examples of religious bodies active in ‘track-two’ 
diplomacy (see for example Berridge 2005: 202; Roberts 2009: 20 and 517).  
As it will be showed later in Chapter 2, it is worth noting Sant’Egidio is the most 
prominent of all internationally active Catholic NGO based in Italy in the 
literature.  
As a consequence of its action in Italy and abroad, the CSE was also able, in recent 
times, to enter, to some extent, the political arena in Italy; this has of course 
further increased its embeddedness in the country23. 
An important clarification is needed here. The fact that the Community of 
Sant’Egidio features a strong Catholic orientation is not considered here as a 
decisive factor per se. The Catholic inspiration of Sant’Egidio, in the two cases 
analysed in this thesis, can be treated only as a further sign of its embeddeddness 
in the Italian social and cultural make-up – the country has indeed a well-known 
history of Catholic civil society organisations. The Community cannot be 
oversimplified as a civil society ‘arm’ of the Vatican in the international arena, 
even more so taking into account the fact that their agenda and that of the Holy 
See has sometimes diverged (also in the Algerian case, to some extent, looking at 
the deterioration of Sant’Egidio’s ties with the archbishop of Algiers; see more on 
this in Chapter 4). Therefore, it is not possible to argue that Sant’Egidio’s Catholic 
principles and its official recognition by the Vatican as a ‘public lay ecclesial 
movement’ somehow imply that the Vatican plays a substantial role in the 
Community activities, that would heavily interfere also in the Italian state-NGO 
relations. In addition, adding the Vatican to the picture, even only to assess a 
possible, limited influence on these interactions, would have complicated this 
research excessively both from theoretical point of view and in terms of practical 
feasibility (on this issue see also the Implications for further research at the end 
of the thesis). 
 
                                                 
 
23 As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, the founder and senior member of the Community of Sant’ 
Egidio, Andrea Riccardi, was appointed in November 2011 as Minister for International 
Cooperation and Integration in the technocratic government formed by PM Mario Monti. In 
addition, Mario Giro, the CSE’s board member responsible for international relations, was 
appointed as Undersecretary (i.e. junior Minister) for Foreign Affairs in the Enrico Letta 
government in April 2013 and reconfirmed in his role in the two next cabinets. 
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1.6.2 Relations between states and NGOs 
 
In this section I try to sum up some basic assumptions offered in the IR and FPA 
literature on the relations between states and NGOs which can provide a useful 
background for this work.  At the end of this work, such hypotheses will be tested 
on the findings of the two cases analysed in Part II of the thesis. 
 
a) NGOs as interesting partners for national governments - sources of 
influence. NGOs have a number of influence tools at their disposal which make 
them attractive partners for governments. These are: a) expertise: many NGOs 
have more specialized knowledge on issues that a national government may have, 
which enables them to affect agenda setting and makes them interesting partners 
in the implementation of international policies; b) resources: NGOs, especially in 
the recent years, have been capable of attracting additional resources from 
international organizations and networks of private donors which governments 
are not always entitled to receive; c) closeness to target groups: NGOs are often 
in close contact with, and recruit their members from, target groups of 
international policies, both from their headquarters or directly in the field. In 
some cases NGOs benefit from an institutionalized physical presence of branches 
and subsidiaries in other countries (see again Gardner Feldman 2007: 16 on this 
point). Again, this further enhances the NGOs capacities of participating in 
agenda setting, formulation and implementation of policies; d) domestic political 
constituencies: NGOs rooted in their domestic political environment have 
significant chances to influence support of like-minded sections of public opinion 
for governmental policies and may use this potential leverage over national 
governments; e) access to the media: NGOs attract the attention of national and 
international media, which furthers their agenda-setting capacities and their 
leverage power over governments through domestic channels of support. 
(Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150-151). 
 
b) National NGOs and ‘their’ state. “National NGOs will lend their national 
leverage to external actors if that is in their interest. Although national NGOs will 
seek freedom of manoeuvre, e.g. from their national governments, in order to put 
pressure on those governments by an international route, they will remain largely 
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dependent on their national governments for regulation (and also for funding, 
political and technical support in specific cases, added by the author)”. This is the 
reason why unlike International NGOs, they can therefore never fully ignore 
national government’s interests. (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150). 
 
c) Collaborative model of state-NGO interactions. “Collaborative model 
is most common in Western welfare states” (Kramer 1981 and Salamon 1981 
quoted in Tvedt 1998: 96). According to some authors, this tendency seems to 
have prevailed over conflictual patterns of relations. Development aid in general 
is a field in which donor governments and donor NGOs increasingly collaborate 
and in many cases states have used NGOs to enhance foreign policy interests in 
other countries (Tvedt 1998: 95), while in other domains this trend is less clear. 
 
1.6.3 Assessing relations between Italy and the Community of 
Sant'Egidio 
 
In the following section I try to sketch out the main concepts that I have used in 
this research, to understand the nature of the relations between Italy and the 
Community of Sant'Egidio. 
 
‘Coopetition’. This term is used in this thesis in inverted commas because, 
similarly to the idea of informal/accidental ‘delegation’, it is borrowed from 
another body of literature, namely that on regulation in domestic policies and at 
the international level, and it is employed here with a slightly different nuance. 
According to the approach that Esty and Geradin, with reference to regulatory 
systems, have defined as “co-opetition”, “[...] optimal governance requires a 
flexible mix of competition and cooperation between governmental actors, as well 
as between governmental and non-governmental actors” (2000: 237; mentioned 
also in Hocking 2011: 231). In this thesis I use this definition, deprived of the 
prescriptive nuance it has in the Esty and Geradin original application, and I 
argue that the concept of such a mix of competition and cooperation is probably 
the more accurate definition to capture the nature of interactions Italy has had 
with the Community of Sant’Egidio in the realm of foreign policy, in the cases 
analysed here. 
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Informal/accidental ‘delegation’. In the early phases of this thesis, the idea 
of informal/accidental ‘delegation’ emerged as the most appropriate to describe 
relations between Italy and Sant'Egidio. When conducting the in-depth analysis 
of the empirical material, however, this concept gradually lost ground in favour 
of that of ‘coopetition’. Nevertheless, I have decided to keep it in the set of 
analytical tools because when assessing the interactions between the Italian state 
institutions and the Community in Chapters 4 and 5, I have tried to explain also 
why the idea of this kind of ‘delegation’ is not the most feasible to interpret them.  
The concept of ‘delegation’ has been used by IR scholars with reference to 
international cooperation and the process of states delegating certain powers, 
functions and competencies to international organizations (Pollack 1997; Epstein 
and Halloran 1999; Hawkins et al. 2006; Koremenos 2007; Lake 2007; Bradley 
and Kelley 2008; Joachim et al. 2008), also discussing in some cases the limits 
of principal-agent theory (Moore 2004; Vaubel 2006; Tierney 2008), and 
providing a highly formalized quantitative index to measure delegation (Brown 
2010). Green 2008 is among the few scholars who has paid attention also to 
NSAs, with reference to the field of multilateral environmental treaties. In the 
literature on delegation to international organizations, delegation is defined as “a 
conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the 
latter to act on behalf of the former. [...] [It] is limited in time or scope and must 
be revocable by the principal” (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7)24.  
In the academic world there is no general and well-established understanding of 
‘delegation’ in the domain of foreign policy other than the formal/rule-based one 
descripted above. Therefore, by informal and/or accidental ‘delegation’ I do not 
                                                 
24 A similar concept, that of ‘outsourcing’, has been employed in the literature with reference to 
the subcontracting of military services to private military companies (see, for example, Kinsey 
2006; Verkuil 2007; Freeman and Minow 2009). In a work on the foreign policy of United States, 
Stanger (2011) extends her focus beyond the military and the homeland security domains, 
exploring the privatization of diplomacy. Building upon the assumptions that a) the public sector 
expertise does not stand as a requisite anymore in drafting and implementing foreign policy, and 
that b) it is impossible for the government simply to appropriate again of functions successfully 
outsourced by this time to NSAs as NGOs, multinational corporations, etc., the author argues that 
the state should make the most of this state of affairs and better understand how to manage 
effectively such public-private partnerships. In addition, the concept of ‘outsourcing’ to NSAs has 
been touched upon in the field of diplomacy studies, but no extensive and operationalized 
definition of the idea has been put forward, let alone tested on empirical material so far (Hocking 
2011). 
 
  
44 
mean here the formal process of subcontracting public functions and/or services 
to one or more third-party(ies), which to a certain degree has become a rather 
common practice in the contemporary world of international affairs, but a sort of 
more informal – and in some cases accidental –  ‘delegation’ to some NSAs of 
foreign policy formulation and implementation activities, traditionally conducted 
by state institutions25. This is the reason why I have decided to put the word in 
inverted commas. 
Such definition is to some extent close, although not identical, to the idea of 
delegation proposed by some scholars of Italian foreign policy. Romano (2002) 
has argued that Italy, in practice, has renounced an autonomous foreign policy 
by delegating major choices to NATO and the European Union. On the same note, 
Fossati has written that the foreign policy of Italy between the end of the Second 
World War and the 1980s, defined as one of ‘low profile’, has relied on a ‘double 
delegation’. An external one to NATO and the European Economic 
Community/European Union; and an internal one to the Catholic Church with its 
missions abroad in the field of foreign aid, and to big and medium-sized business 
firms in the domain of political and diplomatic support to Italian economic 
interests in foreign countries (Fossati 1999: 26-35; 2008). Some commentators 
have termed the Italian diplomatic machinery acting in such context a 'grey area 
diplomacy'26 (Incisa di Camerana 1996: 68; Romano 2002: 253)27. As far as the 
‘Second Republic’ (1992-present) is concerned, Carbone has argued that “the 
process of delegation to major groups in foreign economic policy that 
                                                 
25 It is worth mentioning here that, if the idea of informal/accidental ‘delegatio’' had proved to be 
the best concept to understand the relations between Italy and Sant’Egidio, insights from 
principal-agent approaches would have been used, drawn again from the literature on delegation 
to international organisations (without their formal, legal element also in this case), to assess the 
nature of the actors, reasons for delegating or not and the problems of ‘agency loss’ associated 
with it (especially cases of ‘agency slack’, Hawkins et al. 2006: 8). 
 
26 In Italian ‘diplomazia sommersa'’ This metaphor refers, to a certain extent, to the ideas of black 
market, grey area economies, although not in their illegal sense. 
 
27 Also Panebianco has mentioned the idea of delegation, but with reference to the delegation of 
foreign policy from citizens to the élites (government, pressure groups and parties) during the 
‘First Republic’ (1943-1992). According to the author, such delegation in the foreign policy 
domain was far-reaching and more extensive than the one in the realm of domestic politics, due 
to the low level of interest in international affairs showed by the citizens and the resulting scarce 
salience of foreign policy as an electoral issue (1977: 859 etc.). 
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characterized the first republic has continued during the second republic. 
Undeniably, ENI and ENEL, Finmeccanica, and FIAT28 have been able to shape 
decisions respectively in the energy, defence and automobile sector” (Carbone 
2011: 10, emphasis in the original). 
 
1.7 Case selection 
 
A small-N comparative analysis is conducted in this thesis through a qualitative 
approach (see for instance Ragin 1987 and 2014). The cases of the Algerian crisis 
(1994-1998) and of the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992) have been chosen 
for two main reasons.  
First, they are drawn from two different foreign policy subfields in which policy 
subsystems seem to be slowly emerging, and shed light on different types of 
foreign policy activities. In other words, in the light of the assessment of Italian 
foreign policy after 1989, these are two domains in which, especially after the end 
of the Cold War, it seems that a small number of actors, state and non state actors, 
enjoy some degree of policy autonomy (see more on this in the following section, 
where the definition of policy subsystems is presented, and in Chapter 4). 
Development cooperation is another subfield where a policy subsystem is 
emerging, maybe with an even higher degree of development and consolidation. 
The reason why I have decided not to cover it is that in that domain the state is so 
dominant that the subsystem itself could hardly exist without it: in Italy, NGOs 
working on development cooperation projects abroad are so dependent on 
institutional funding and political/technical support that they do not really enjoy 
proper policy autonomy. 
Second, after a preliminary assessment of all the occasions in which Italian state 
institutions and the Community of Sant’Egidio were involved in the same foreign 
policy matter, these two cases turned out to be not only among the most 
                                                 
28 ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), national oil and gas company; formerly state-owned, now 
only in part (30%); ENEL (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica): energy provider company, once a 
state-owned monopoly, today only partially (30%); Finmeccanica: hi-tech industrial group 
working in the sectors of defense, security, aerospace, transport; owned in part by the state (30%); 
FIAT (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino): the biggest Italian industrial group active in the 
automotive sector. 
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significant in terms of relations between the two actors, but also to feature two 
rather different types of interactions. 
Third, in both cases events took place approximately in the same years – the 
decade of the 1990s – shortly after the “dual crisis” (IAI 1993), mentioned earlier 
in this Chapter, i.e. the simultaneous international and domestic crises 
materialized between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (see 
Chapter 2). These events have hugely impacted on Italian foreign policy – and the 
international activities of Italian non state actors – offering new opportunities for 
them to act in the international arena. 
Fourth, none of them had been analysed before in depth in the literature, 
especially the Algerian case, so I believed this would be a further way to offer a 
contribution to the scarce literature on Italian foreign policy and Italian NGOS 
with an international inclination. The very Mozambican case, that has drawn 
some attention by scholars, has been looked at mainly from the point of view of 
the peace-making process, negotiation theory, but not from the perspective of the 
interactions between Italy and Sant’Egidio. 
 
Policy subsystem theory. In order to understand where relations between 
Italy and Sant'Egidio fit into the interactions the state has with other NSAs in the 
realm of foreign policy and, specifically, in which domains, I have employed the 
analytical tool proposed by Verbeek and van Ufford (2001) and applied to Dutch 
foreign policy. The concept of policy subsystem, unlike those of ‘policy 
networks’29 and ‘iron triangles’30, “refers explicitly to [situations in which, added] 
policy autonomy is enjoyed by a small number of actors in a specific policy field” 
(Verbeek and van Ufford 2001: 131). According to the authors, it includes all 
combinations of actors, across different levels of government. Policy subsystems 
can come in three forms: a) dominant, with stable relations among the small 
                                                 
29 Unlike policy subsystems, ‘policy networks’ have been considered as less structured and stable 
policy arenas (see also Peterson 1995: 390). This concept is used also in diplomacy studies, 
underlying the ideas of ‘horizontal’ subsidiarity and of ‘loose couplings’, i.e. sparse and 
unstructured interactions between transnational and governmental actors (Coleman and Perl 
1999). 
 
30 Unlike policy subsystems, ‘iron triangles’ have been described as including actors who all 
operate at the same level of government (see also Smith 1988). 
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group of actors and generally a significant degree of control of issues and 
programs by the government; b) competitive: with (coalitions of) actors who 
permanently compete with each other and the field is open to new actors; c) 
disintegrated: with many actors, loose relationships between them and huge 
interference from outside. Moreover, policy subsystems are useful for capturing 
evolutions of pattern over time, as they are subject to change due to variations in 
the external political environment, decisions of actors outside the subsystem to 
intervene or to be included, and the introduction of new issues the actors have to 
deal with.  
 
1.8 Contribution of the thesis to the existing literature 
 
This thesis aims at contributing to the existing literature in different ways. First, 
by presenting an empirical account of the relations between a state and a non 
state actor – specifically an NGO – in the realm of foreign policy, it tries to feed 
into the IR and FPA theoretical and empirical literature on this topic, and 
especially to the works dealing with interactions between NGOs and ‘their’ state. 
In particular, this thesis also looks at competitive/conflicting relations, which 
have been less studied by scholars than cooperative ones. Second, this work 
attempts to employ a concept borrowed from another body of literature, that of 
‘coopetition’ (Esty and Geradin 2000), in a different field, and in the assessment 
of a different type of policy. Third, the thesis offers an empirical application of the 
theoretical tool of policy subsystems, that has been employed so far only in the 
case of Dutch foreign policy (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001). Fourth, it similarly 
tries to put in practice, from an empirical perspective, the model of Foreign Policy 
Community (Hilsman 1971, 1987, 1993), originally suggested for another state, 
the US, and, in particular, it aims at updating to the post-1989 period a previous 
application of the model to the Italian case (Santoro 1991). 
As far as the literature on Italian foreign policy is concerned (see also Chapter 2 
on this), generally speaking this work is aimed first of all at contributing to the 
limited body of literature on this topic, with special reference to the post-1989 
era, by offering an original assessment of a specific issue, i.e. Italy-Sant’Egidio 
relations in foreign policy, that has never been examined before. As mentioned 
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earlier in the text, this thesis tries to apply, for the first time, the policy subsystem 
theory (Verbeek and van Ufford 2001) to given domains of Italian foreign policy, 
and to update, with some modifications, the model of the Italian Foreign Policy 
Community (Santoro 1991) to the post-Cold War context.  
Regarding the study of internationally active NGOs based in Italy, the gaps this 
thesis intends to fill concern both this category of NGOs in general, that 
sometimes cut across the trajectory of foreign policy made by the state, and the 
Community of Sant’Egidio in particular. 
 
Chapter 2. Italian foreign policy after the Second 
World War. Literature review 
 
 
 “[...] Italian foreign policy  
as a field of scientific inquiry  
is still a mysterious object.”  
 
(Carlo Maria Santoro 1991: 20)  
 
 
2.1 Chapter outline31 
        
Firstly, this Chapter presents the main features of the establishment of IR as a 
discipline in Italy, in order to briefly throw light on the overlooked history of this 
research field in the country and to understand its effects on the study of Italian 
foreign policy. 
Secondly, it offers a concise overview of the literature (IR, Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Political Science and History, to some extent) produced on Italian 
foreign policy after the Second World War, with a view to focus on works 
specifically devoted to the post-Cold War period, where available. Thirdly, this 
Chapter illustrates the gaps in the literature and the contribution of this thesis, 
placing the latter in the broader picture of the works produced on Italian foreign 
policy. In closing, it sketches out the main features of Italian foreign policy 
between 1989 and 2001, providing the context for the material presented in later 
Chapters. 
 
2.2 Background: remarks on the study of IR in Italy  
 
2.2.1 The belated and difficult establishment of IR in Italy 
 
                                                 
31 Note to the reader: English translations of quotes in Italian in this thesis have been provided by 
the author. 
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The discipline ‘International Relations’ was included for the first time in a few 
Italian university degree programmes only after the university reform of 196832, 
and the first three professors33 to be granted a ‘chair’ (professorship) of 
International Relations were appointed only in 1975 (Bonanate 1990: 9). The first 
degree programmes in International Relations were introduced only at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and until the first years of the 2000s international 
history, law and economics courses still had the lion’s share of the modules taught 
in many IR degrees (Andreatta and Zambernardi 2010: 2-3). 
What are the causes of the belated and difficult institutionalization of IR in Italy, 
if compared to other European countries? First of all, Italian IR has come across 
the same hurdles Political Science had run into when trying to settle in Italy, 
starting from the 1940s and 1950s. These are the following: (a) the prevalence of 
Marxist and Catholic political cultures and thought, considering politics – and 
international politics – as “ancillary to other more crucial fields of human 
activity” (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 127); (b) the consequent predominance of 
law, history and political philosophy, overshadowing any attempts to analyse 
politics from a political science perspective (Morlino 1991; Pasquino, Regalia e 
Valbruzzi 2013; Bonanate 1990: 17); (c) the reluctance of scholars to accept what 
was seen from part of the Italian ‘intelligentsia’ as another form of academic 
imperialism coming from the United States (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 127).  
Secondly, IR has encountered in Italy some additional problems, namely the (d) 
constraints imposed by the Cold War on Italian foreign policy and the (e) 
controversial historical legacy of the Fascist international posture34. Concerning 
point (d), towards the end of the 1970s an Italian leading political scientist, 
Gianfranco Pasquino, wrote that “the more dynamic the foreign policy of a state 
is, the higher will probably be the demand for scholars and experts on 
international studies and, consequently, the higher will be also the offer thereof” 
                                                 
32 The first IR chair had been established exactly fifty years earlier at the then University of Wales 
(now University of Aberystwyth), and was assigned to Alfred Zimmern. 
33 These three professors were Luigi Bonanate (University of Turin), Umberto Gori (University of 
Florence) and Antonio Papisca (University of Catania). 
 
34 As a matter of fact, also Political Science had to struggle with the cumbersome Fascist past, also 
because the first Political Science departments had been established on the initiative of the Fascist 
regime itself (Morlino 1991: 96). 
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(1977: 2735). In this view, the challenging inception of IR scholarship in Italy (and 
consequently the scarcity of studies on Italian foreign policy), at least during the 
Cold War, should be explained by the substantial irrelevance and vagueness of 
the object of inquiry (see also Friedrichs 2004: 49). In contrast to this argument, 
another scholar, Luigi Bonanate, has suggested that this perspective, that he 
defined the “Pasquino-Hoffman36 law”, as if it was a sort of ‘economic law’, raises 
some doubts. For instance, if this assumption is applied in a comparative way, 
France should have witnessed a particularly flourishing tradition of International 
Relations scholars, consistently with its high-profile foreign policy and its 
imperial past. With the notable exception of Raymond Aron, this had not 
occurred, nor had France produced a considerably more developed IR research 
community than the Italian one (Bonanate 1984: 63; 1990: 18).  
Whatever the most accurate evaluation of the impact of the quality of a state’s 
foreign policy on the IR scholarship in that country may be, it can be reasonably 
argued that when a country conducts an active foreign policy (or has an historical 
record thereof), provided that it is perceived in a positive way by politicians and 
intellectuals within the country, it is likely that “the tradition this past creates and 
the demand for policy responses it poses create the conditions for the easier 
flourishing of IR as a recognised discipline” (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002: 129). 
Therefore, in the case of Italy, a low-profile foreign policy combined with (e) the 
need for distancing from the Fascist era, after the end of the Mussolini’s era, have 
influenced (at least) the founding years of the discipline in the country (Lucarelli 
and Menotti 2002: 129), i.e. the time frame going from 1968 to the end of the 
1980s. In addition, the marginal position of Italy in world affairs and the limited 
                                                 
35 Emblematically, the title of Pasquino’s Chapter where such argument is presented is 
“International Relations in a country without foreign policy”. This ‘law’ is mentioned also in 
Friedrichs 2004: 49. 
 
36 According to the American scholar Stanley Hoffman, the main reason for the great success of 
international studies in the United States is the country’s centrality in international politics. In 
particular, Hoffman argued that “when political élites are concerned/oppressed only with what 
occurs in their country, because it does not have the capacity of influencing and shaping what 
happens elsewhere, or because such lack of power has produced the habit of depending on other 
states (such as the US), or because very strict constraints limit the use of their power on the global 
scene, it is likely that scholars do not have enough motivations, nor the necessary inputs to 
transform their individual efforts into a proper scientific endeavour” (quoted in Bonanate 1984: 
62-63).  
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room for manoeuvring left by the bipolar structure have also resulted in a 
presumed lack of interest in international affairs on the part of public opinion, 
seemingly more interested in domestic politics matters (Friedrichs 2004: 48).  
In conclusion, (d) a weak and erratic foreign policy can tell just one part of the 
story, and needs to be completed with different explanations – (a), (b), (c) and (e) 
– that are more “national” in nature, all contributing to elucidate why the 
discipline has encountered many obstacles in taking roots in the Italian academia 
(2002: 129). 
 
2.2.2 IR in Italy after the end of the Cold War 
 
While the ‘pioneering’ phase of the institutionalization of IR in Italy (Bonanate 
1990: 15) can be considered today as concluded, the state of the academic 
discipline has continued to suffer from some relative weaknesses also from the 
1990s onwards, that still hamper the present-day development of IR research in 
Italy. Indeed, if factors like a limited foreign policy (d) and the (e) historical 
heritage of Fascism today do not appear decisive anymore, and elements such as 
the (a) prevalence of Marxist and Catholic traditions of thinking politics, the (b) 
predominance of other internationalist specialties, and the (c) resistance to the 
import of a social science branch seen as essentially ‘American’, seem to have a 
very limited influence by now, over the last twenty years IR has been struggling 
with a couple of additional stumbling blocks.  
The (f) organisational features of the Italian university system still limit today an 
autonomous progress of the field, because IR is included in the same 
organisational unit (“scientific-discipline sector”, in the jargon of the Ministry of 
Education, University and Research) as Political Science, the very discipline with 
which it had shared part of the founding problems in the early years, which is 
today predominant as it is ‘older’ in terms of establishment date, and 
quantitatively ‘stronger’ with reference to the number of research staff. Technical 
as this detail may seem, it is important because it influences both teaching and 
research funding (Brighi and Petito 2012: 838-839). Over a longer timeframe, 
such context does not facilitate the reinforcement of (g) an undersized experts’ 
community (also beyond the academia), and (h) does not foster proper 
university-level training for future politicians, members of Parliament and 
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diplomats dealing with international affairs, who then tend to ignore the 
expertise and consultancy academics and policy pundits may contribute to their 
daily work (Andreatta and Hill 2001). In turn, elements (g) and (h) further 
weaken the consolidation of IR as a field of research, thus making even worse this 
sort of ‘vicious circle’.  
To sum up, although the situation is starting to improve, with a growing number 
of research staff, PhD students and IR university taught courses, and with the 
increasing internationalisation of Italian academics (Andreatta and Zambernardi 
2010; Clementi 2011), it is in the underdeveloped academic and cultural scenario 
described above that research on Italian foreign policy has found an all but 
comfortable environment to develop. 
 
2.2.3 Consequences on the research on Italian foreign policy 
 
Considerations presented in previous sections have clearly affected research on 
Italian foreign policy in different ways. Assessing in 1990 the state of the art of 
the scholarship on this topic, Bonanate believed that “the situation in the field of 
foreign policy [was] only partially regrettable. On the one hand, it is certainly true 
that robust theoretical studies on foreign policy are still missing, but on the other, 
it should be stressed that the level of attention for such issue [was] exceptionally 
high” (1990: 47). While it is reasonable to agree with this scholar in general terms, 
it must be specified firstly, as the very same author then does, that 
“[u]ndoubtedly, empirical and descriptive studies outnumber[ed] theoretical and 
interpretative analysis in quantitative terms, but they also predated the latter, as 
if for long time this field had not been considered a possible object of theoretical 
reflection” (1990: 47). Secondly, it is important to note that such interest has 
really become to increase substantially only in the 1980s, towards the end of the 
Cold War, which is again one of the reason why studies published on Italian 
foreign policy were so limited during the bipolar era. Thirdly, it must be clarified 
that, as Santoro correctly observed in 1991, until that moment Italian foreign 
policy had drawn only the attention of a small number of scholars, mostly 
historians or journalists (and only on a limited set of issues), while it had not 
triggered at all the “constant and far-reaching interest of political scientists and 
sociologists, neither working on domestic politics and comparative politics, nor 
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on international relations” (1991: 20). Interestingly for the purpose of this thesis, 
Foreign Policy Analysis in particular is still today “a substantially neglected 
discipline”, despite some limited improvements (Brighi 2001: 219).  
When looking at the Bibliographical Catalogue including all academic and policy-
oriented studies published between 1980 and 1990 on Italian foreign policy issues 
going from the unification of the country (1861) to the 1990s, the absence of a 
section specifically dedicated to Political Science/IR works is extremely striking. 
Indeed, the catalogue is mainly focused on historical, sociological and intellectual 
history studies: only a group of works under the category labelled as ‘foreign 
policy structures’ seems to take, to some extent, a political science/IR approach 
(Vigezzi 1997). The same holds true also for the updated version of the Catalogue, 
published in 2004 and covering works appeared between 1990 and 1995 (Vigezzi 
2004). In a more recent collection of bibliographical references on Italy’s foreign 
policy, assembled by an IR scholar, there is a section devoted to ‘actors in Italian 
foreign policy - institutions and policy process’, yet it is extremely scarcely 
populated and many of the items listed are again works written by historians and 
law scholars (Croci 2013). 
In such an underdeveloped academic scenario, in a country where not even 
policy-oriented, house organ publications of Ministry of Foreign Affairs – if any 
– have ever really contributed to the public debate37, it is interesting to observe 
that attention for Italian foreign policy, at the beginning, has been encouraged 
precisely outside the academia, in think-tanks and private research centres such 
as the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI – Institute for 
International Political Studies), the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI – 
International Affairs Institute), and the Istituto per le Relazioni tra l’Italia e i 
paesi dell’Africa, America Latina, Medio ed Estremo Oriente (IPALMO – Institute 
for Italy’s relations with African, Latin American, Middle and Far Eastern 
countries). Obviously this state of affairs has favoured the appearance of 
                                                 
37An example of a Ministry’s house organ publication is “Longitude”, launched in 2011 and 
published in English, while “Affari Esteri” (“Foreign Affairs”) is a non peer-reviewed journal 
published from 1969 to 2011 (now only online) by an association of diplomats rather close to the 
Ministry’s positions. Neither of these publications (especially “Longitude”) can be considered as 
playing (or having played) any significant role in the debate on Italian foreign policy 
(www.longitude.it and www.affari-esteri.it). 
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empirical, descriptive and/or policy-oriented works on the country’s foreign 
policy, as mentioned before.  
Therefore, to summarize, the key problem of the material on Italian foreign 
policy, at least until the end of the Cold War, disclosed by Gori already in 1978, is 
that on “Italian foreign policy exists [existed] by that time a rich literature. 
However, the latter hardly ever enhance[d] the ‘scientific’ understanding in this 
field. Straightforward and clear-cut hypothetical correlations [have] not been 
suggested, that may allow for control and accumulation of knowledge in this area. 
Moreover, many of the generalizations proposed, are not supported by any kind 
of empirical evidence: in the best-case scenario, they only entail linear causal 
relations” (1978: 263).  
According to some scholars, Gori’s position could be applied also to the 
lamentable state of play of the studies produced after the end of the Cold War 
(Brighi 2001; Diodato 2014). However, as the section presenting in greater detail 
the literature review will show, over the last ten years a renewed interest in Italy’s 
international action has been reported on the part of Italian and foreign 
academics. With the exception of Santoro 1991, Political Science/IR-focused 
comprehensive, analytical efforts are yet to appear, aimed at developing a ‘model’ 
of Italian foreign policy, also catching up with the evolutions of the international 
environment occurred between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s, but I believe that in general terms the current situation can be considered 
as gradually progressing. 
 
2.3 Literature review 
 
In order to sketch out a brief overview of Political Science/IR studies on post-
1945 Italian foreign policy, I follow here the criteria set out by Brighi (2001 and 
2013) to describe models and theories that have shaped the most common 
accounts of the country’s foreign policy. According to this author, these analytical 
efforts can be classified into two categories, corresponding to two broad, 
established ‘narratives38’, placed at the ‘extremes’ of an imaginary continuum, 
                                                 
38 In the view of the author, a narrative is “a ‘reified’ model, i.e. a theoretical construction that 
taking advantage of its scientific authority, contributes to ‘preserve’ parts of the reality, preventing 
them from changing” (2001: 220). 
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that somehow mirrors the two elements of the nexus between domestic and 
international politics. 
However, other works defy easy positioning close to one or to the other ‘extreme’ 
of this continuum and are better placed on the theoretically challenging boundary 
between international and domestic politics. In addition, there are also other 
studies such as Ferraris 1998, which rather than a proper investigation, is a sort 
of more traditional ‘handbook’ for the study of Italian foreign policy post-1943, 
trying to organize existing material (mainly contributions from diplomatic 
history), following a chronological account of basic events occurred. 
 
2.3.1 From the outside looking in. External-centered explanations 
 
According to one ‘narrative’, Italy’s action on the international scene is 
necessarily driven by strict international imperatives; according to the other, on 
the contrary, Rome’s foreign policy is the outcome of autonomous domestic 
dynamics (Brighi 2001).  
Close to the first ‘extreme’, one can find studies trying to explaining the country’s 
foreign policy starting from some ‘constant features’ pertaining to the external 
environment, such as the geographical position, the fact of being part of the 
western alliance and of the European integration process. This external-focused 
perspective has laid the foundations for the ‘revival’ at the beginning of the 1990s 
of the Italian geopolitical debate led by the new journal “Limes – Italian Journal 
of Geopolitics”39, a very successful publication in terms of sales. ‘Contaminated’ 
by the Fascist heritage and neglected during the four Cold War decades, 
geopolitical thinking has resurged outside the university system shortly after the 
collapse of the bipolar system (Antonsich 1997; Atkinson 2000), and has rapidly 
seized the attention of both academics and the general public. Widely read 
accounts of Italian foreign policy adopting such an approach have tried first of all 
to ‘rehabilitate’ the debate on the definition of Italian “national interest”, a ‘taboo’ 
concept for many years (Galli della Loggia, Panebianco and Rusconi 1993), and 
then to call for reorienting Italian foreign policy towards more assertive stances, 
                                                 
39 Despite its name, Limes is not a peer-reviewed academic journal, but a specialized monthly 
publication (see www.limesonline.com). 
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vis-à-vis for example other EU big states, in an attempt that in some cases seems 
to share very little with grounded analytical reflection (Jean 2012). 
Indeed, it appears that in most cases “the rationale of such a revival has been less 
to import geopolitical knowledge into IR and more to confer legitimacy and 
respectability to the analyses put forward [ex post] by scholars and practitioners” 
(Brighi and Petito 2012: 819). Therefore, geopolitical thought, self-defined as “a-
theoretical” (Caracciolo and Konriman 1993), on the one hand has further 
frustrated the already problematic academic reflection on Italian foreign policy, 
and on the other has hampered the development of a serious public debate among 
politicians and the public opinion on this issue, serving as a sort of ‘legitimising’ 
discourse for those who practise it (on this see also Brighi and Petito 2014; 
Lucarelli and Menotti 2002 and 2006; Santoro 1996a; Bonanate 1997). 
In a similar geopolitical vein, but far from the theoretically weak and vague works 
mentioned so far, Santoro has offered one of the most comprehensive and 
theoretically-grounded accounts ever produced on Italian foreign policy. In its 
book The foreign policy of a middle power. Italy from the unification to the 
present (1991), published on the verge of the collapse of the bipolar system, he 
has argued that geographical factors such as the position of Italy between Europe 
and the Mediterranean are the main explanation for the country’s various 
diplomatic fluctuations, and has envisaged that post-1989 Italian foreign policy 
would be offered a larger room for manoeuvring cleared by the end of the Cold 
War especially in Western Europe, in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. It 
can be stated, with hindsight, that some of his intuitions have then proved right, 
although Rome has probably missed many of these opportunities for reasons that 
perhaps pertain more to the domestic politics domain and to the unfinished 
nature of the nation-building process of the 19th century (Chabod 1951; Varsori 
2013). Furthermore, Santoro has popularized in the academia, and to some 
extent also in the public debate, among policy makers and in the press focusing 
on foreign affairs, the concept of ‘middle power’, in a country trying to recalibrate 
its role in a fast-moving international scenario (Verbeek 2009; Valigi 2008; 
Fossati 1999 and 2008).  
Romano’s studies (with Bosworth 1991; 2004; 2007), although they do not 
amount to academic works in their own right, seem to give prominence to 
international factors, especially to Italy-US relations, considered as the most 
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importance variable influencing Italian foreign policy (on this see also Nuti 2003 
and Croci 2005, 2007 and 2008b). Finally, Varsori, a prominent Italian historian 
who is also familiar with Political Science/IR research, has recently authored the 
first comprehensive historical account of Italian foreign policy in the final phase 
of the Cold War (1998-1992), based on a great amount of primary sources that 
had just become available (i.e. mainly material contained in the private archive 
of the then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, one of the most influential politicians 
in post-1945 Italian history). In this work, the scholar stresses the influence of 
international factors such as the demise of the bipolar confrontation and the EU 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 on Rome’s foreign policy and even on its domestic 
political system40, to the point that he sharply describes post-1945 Italy as the 
“Cold War Republic” (definition suggested by the historian Pons 2014, already 
disclosed in Varsori 2013: 245 as part of an unpublished manuscript version; see 
also Varsori 1998, 2014 and 2015). 
 
2.3.2 “Foreign policy begins at home”41. Domestic-focused accounts 
 
At the other ‘extreme’ of the external/internal continuum mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, on the contrary, it is possible to find works trying to 
understand the international behaviour of Italy starting from the analysis of 
domestic factors like fragility of the party system, instability of government 
cabinets, or poor quality of a real, political and cultural domestic debate on Italian 
international affairs. The most compelling reflections following this research path 
have been offered for instance by Panebianco (1977), who has argued that the 
cause for the ‘low-profile’ Italian foreign policy are to be found in the domestic 
environment. In the peculiar political context of Cold War Italy, featuring the 
incompatibility between the internal goal of defending the political equilibrium 
(Christian Democrats vs. Communists), and the external objective of improving 
the country’s status on the international scene, domestic cultural and political 
dynamics have constantly underplayed and contained every type of tension 
possibly originating from foreign policy, therefore causing the ‘neutralisation’ 
and the ‘depoliticisation’ of the Italian international activity (Panebianco 1977: 
                                                 
40 A similar interpretation has been suggested also by the historian Gentiloni Silveri (2008). 
 
41 This the title of a book on U.S. foreign policy written in 1944 by James P. Warburg. 
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863; also 1982). For the purposes of this thesis, it is interesting to observe that 
Panebianco has also used the idea of foreign policy ‘delegation’, with reference to 
the delegation of foreign policy from citizens to the élites (government, pressure 
groups and parties). According to the scholar, such ‘delegation’ in the foreign 
policy domain was far-reaching and more extensive than that occurring in the 
realm of domestic politics, due to the low level of interest in international affairs 
showed by the citizens and the resulting limited relevance of foreign policy as an 
electoral issue (1977: 859 etc.). It is worth recalling here that the institutional 
system, political parties and political cultures are the domestic factors explaining 
Italian foreign policy in the author’s view, but public opinion in a broad sense is 
far less decisive.  
Moreover, in a book written twenty years later, Panebianco has examined in a 
comparative effort the foreign policies of the United States, United Kingdom, 
France and Italy, confirming similar (but more sophisticated in analytical terms) 
conclusions with respect to those outlined in the previous work, and claiming that 
the Italian institutional setting (i.e.: a consensual liberal democracy), the 
powerful role of the principal parties and a largely pacifist public opinion are the 
independent variables influencing the dependent variable, that is foreign policy 
decisions (Panebianco 1997). Such assumptions on the pre-eminence of domestic 
mechanisms in crafting Italian foreign policy seems to be confirmed also by other 
scholars like Verbeek, who claims that, paradoxically, the very increase in room 
for manoeuvring in the international environment opened up by the end of the 
bipolar confrontation, has not been well capitalized by Italy because even new 
golden opportunities (La Palombara 2001), for example in the Balkans in the 
1990s, have been framed through the lenses of domestic confrontations, 
consistently with a general tendency to ‘domesticization’ of foreign policy that 
according to the author is taking place in many Western democratic states 
(Verbeek 2009: 11). 
Also the very book by Santoro addressed in the previous section can be listed 
among the contributions giving importance to domestic dynamics, because it 
presents the first mapping of the actors intervening from within the country in 
the foreign policy decision-making, by employing the ‘Foreign Policy Community’ 
model that I start from in Chapter 3. Indeed, studies on the Italian foreign policy 
process published before and after Santoro’s work are extremely limited, being 
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either well researched books that unfortunately are pretty outdated (for instance 
Kogan 1963; Sassoon 1978; Attinà 1979; Gori 1982), or practitioners’ memories 
written by top diplomats (for example Serra 1999 and 2009; and Gaja 1995 to 
some extent). Other scholars have suggested that the FPA-oriented decision-
making process perspective may offer promising insights to understand Italian 
foreign policy, but unfortunately these authors have not (yet) elaborated 
extensively on their arguments (for example Zucconi 2006; Chelotti and 
Pizzimenti 2011), let alone have they turned to the assessment of empirical cases 
through these analytical lenses (see for instance Attinà 1972; 1983a and 1983b). 
For Santoro foreign policy is “understood as a public policy, i.e. a specific aspect 
of the pervading action of the domestic political system on all the activities falling 
within its scope” (1991: 219; 1990: 51). He observed at the beginning of the 1990s 
that the “institutional architecture of the country, due to its unclear distribution 
of tasks between the different bodies, has produced a significant fragmentation 
of powers in the foreign policy field, [sometimes] conferred to structures and 
persons associated to various government sectors”, that has often produced an 
erratic foreign policy as seen from abroad (1991: 227). In addition, differently 
from other countries, and similarly to what argued by Panebianco (1977 and 
1997), he has suggested that in Italy the party subsystem, together with 
institutions forms “a sort of systemic oligarchy […] that makes and decides at 
least 90% of national foreign policy, almost without any external influences and 
controls. Especially during the 1980s, this open-ended situation has predictably 
allowed for a sort of informal ‘monopolization’ of foreign policy areas/issues, 
previously not specifically attributed to any institution, by some political leaders 
(not always in government posts) (1991: 242). Today, such perspective still holds 
true, to some extent, although it is important to take into consideration that 
during the last two decades, the Italian political system has witnessed a gradual, 
both formal and informal strengthening of the post of Prime Minister42, which 
over the years has been enjoying greater autonomy at the expenses of other 
                                                 
42 For the sake of accuracy, the official name of the post should be translated in English as 
‘President of the Council of Ministers’ (‘Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri’, in Italian). This 
clarification is useful to better understand the relative weight of the cabinet as a whole in its 
interactions with the President. However, in this work the two expressions are used as synonyms. 
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ministers also in the foreign policy domain (more on this aspect is presented in 
Chapter 3).  
Finally, looking at different domestic factors, Galli della Loggia (1993; 1998), 
Rusconi (1993), Corsico (1998) and Graziano (2007a and 2008) have explored, 
in particular, the nexus between political culture, identity and foreign policy, 
stressing that it is the very fragility of Italian national identity that has always 
weakened not only the way Italy thinks about itself in political terms, but also its 
uncertain behaviour in the international arena.  
 
2.3.3 More complex interpretations. The international/domestic 
nexus 
 
It is worth mentioning that some recent contributions have tried to thread their 
way through the two most accredited external/internal ‘narratives’, in order to 
suggest more nuanced and complex interpretations, taking in due consideration 
the importance of the international/domestic nexus and linkage politics.  
Among these works, we find for instance the study carried out by Coralluzzo 
(2000), which presents a modified (and reduced) version of the framework for 
the analysis of foreign policy suggested by Brecher for the case of Israel (1969 and 
1972), focusing specifically on the scrutiny of ‘images’ and behaviours of decision-
makers. In his view, the environment in which decision makers have to operate 
“affects directly the outcome of decisions, but it exerts its influence only insofar 
as it is filtered by their ‘images’ of internal and external factors” (Brecher 1972 
quoted in Coralluzzo 2000). By applying this analytical framework on more than 
twenty Italian foreign policy cases (1946-2000), the scholar sketches out 
interesting features of the foreign policy behaviour of governments, ministries, 
parties, political leaders, and of the different élites perceptions developed during 
the various phases of almost four decades of foreign policy.   
Brighi’s work (2005 and 2013), from a different theoretical perspective, proposes 
a sophisticated assessment of how foreign policy meets politics at the domestic 
and international level. In the first compelling and comprehensive application of 
Foreign Policy Analysis insights not only to pre-, but also to post-1989 Italian 
foreign policy, the scholar employs the dialectical ‘strategic-relational model’, 
built within critical realism, in order to keep track of all the forms of interplay 
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that may occur between foreign policy (a 100% political activity in its own right), 
international relations and domestic politics. The findings of the book 
demonstrate that Italy’s foreign policy has revealed to be more elaborate and 
nuanced than many stereotypes have traditionally suggested in the debate, when 
claiming, often with shifty arguments, that the country’s foreign policy is 
seriously and inexorably ‘condemned’ to be seriously limited, if existing at all 
(Levi 1974; Pasquino 1977; Romano 1992 and 1995). 
In addition, it must be stressed that a small number of IR studies on post-Cold 
War Italy’s foreign policy have been published over the last few years, either 
exploring specific policies and/or actors, or following geographical criteria (e.g. 
Giacomello and Verbeek 2011; Carbone 2011; Marchi, Whitman and Edwards 
2015). Being in all cases collections of essays written by different authors, it is not 
easy to classify them neither in the group of ‘external-centered’ accounts, nor 
among the domestic-focused works. For instance, in Giacomello and Verbeek 
2011, scholars have built on the concept of ‘middle power’ employed by Santoro 
twenty years before, and although acknowledging that such notion is elusive and 
defies easy-theorizing, they have engaged with different theoretical approaches, 
ranging from neoclassic realist to constructivist views (Giacomello and Verbeek 
2011, reviewed in De Simone 2012). It is especially significant to underline here 
that some of the Chapters in this book feature among the few IR contributions 
interestingly introducing the puzzle of non-state actors in Italian foreign policy 
the post-Cold War era (Darnis 2011; Coticchia, Giacomello and Sartori 2011). The 
authors of these Chapters have argued that the changed international and 
domestic context has paved the way for more proactive non-state actors on the 
international stage, and for new patterns of interaction with the government (i.e.: 
partially state-owned companies in strategic industries such as oil and gas, 
electricity, defense, aerospace). In addition, although these scholars do not 
expand in depth on this from a theoretical point of view, like Brighi (2005 and 
2013) they seem to recognize the relevance of the international-domestic nexus, 
when arguing that middle power status is “a product of domestic processes 
leading to the definition of the role a state seeks to play in world politics weighed 
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against the expectations other states have regarding the role of the state in 
question” (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011: 16)43.  
 
2.3.4 Studies on internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy 
 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, most Political Science/IR studies in the 
domain of internationally active Catholic NGOs deal with the role of religion in 
world politics, or with the Vatican as a state actor and a transnational religious 
actor (Vallier 1972; Kent and Pollard 1994; Reese 1996; Casanova 1997; Hanson 
1987; Rudolph 1997; Ryall 2001; Alvarez 2002; Böllmann 2010; Graziano 2010; 
Madeley and Haynes 2011). An extremely limited number of works explore 
religiously inspired NGOs – be them Catholic or not – with a significant level of 
activity in the international arena, and the same holds true for their relations with 
the states they are embedded in and their foreign policy. 
This is all the more striking in the Italian case, as one would probably expect the 
opposite, being (or, at least, having been) Italy a country with some of the most 
significant social and political Catholic constituencies in Europe and in the world. 
Over the last few years, however, some limited attention has started to be devoted 
to these aspects. It is important to observe that among all the internationally 
active Catholic NGOs based in Italy Sant’Egidio is indeed the most – and almost 
the only one – analysed in the literature. As it has been mentioned in Chapter 1, 
some authors have devoted some attention to the Community of Sant’Egidio, 
arguing that, with its work on the Mozambican case and also in other areas of the 
world, it is the only remarkable NGO in the Italian landscape, that is quite 
underdeveloped in contrast to what happens in other European and Western 
countries (Carbone 2011: 10; see also Ferraris 1996: 478-480; Carbone, 
Coralluzzo et al. 2011: 202; Barbato, De Franco and Le Normand 2012). 
Sant’Egidio has been studied also by scholars working in the domain of diplomacy 
studies, as an example of a religious actor involved in ‘track-two’ diplomacy 
(Berridge 2005: 202; Roberts 2009: 20 and 517).  
                                                 
43 At the end of the book the authors affirm that the results of their study show that Italy has not 
always been considered a middle power by its fellows. Therefore, the gap between Italy’s 
aspirations and the status actually achieved is significant and will probably broaden in the future. 
Contributors conclude on a downhearted note that in the future “settling for the status of ‘great 
small power’ may be, after all, Italy’s most promising option” (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011: 225).  
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However, only a few scholars have gone a bit further, taking into account also the 
interactions with the Italian government, with special reference to the cases of 
Mozambique and/or the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, although these studies 
either look at the object of enquiry only from a diplomacy studies theoretical 
perspective, or are ‘only’ (sometimes) detailed memoirs written by some of the 
‘protagonists’ of these events (Hume 1994; Bartoli 1999: 245-273; Ajello 1999 and 
2010: 615-642; de Courten 2003; Hill 2003: 214-215; Petito and Thomas 2015; 
Ferrara and Petito 2016). Furthermore, a recent interesting contribution 
(Marchetti 2013) has analysed the relations between Sant’Egidio44 and the Italian 
public institutions in the case of the UN Moratorium on the death penalty (2007), 
and again on the occasion of the Mozambican peace process, presenting six 
‘conditions’ that must be verified to facilitate a successful civil society-
government synergy (concerning in brief government funding, bipartisan 
political support, role of other international institutional partners, involvement 
of other NGOs abroad, resonance of normative factors with institutional 
paradigms, focus on soft policy sectors). However, the author does not take into 
consideration cases in which NGOs-government relations are not good and 
conflicting situations materialize instead of win-win synergies (Marchetti 2013: 
105). 
In any case, the role of other internationally active Catholic NGOs based in Italy 
(FOCSIV, AVSI, Focolare Movement, mentioned in Chapter 1 and 4), should not 
be underestimated, especially in the domain of governmental development 
cooperation. Indeed, Italian foreign aid, during the Cold War, has often been at 
the mercy of different competing private interests of some political leaders and 
their constituencies, with the relevant Directorate general of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, officially in charge of the management of foreign aid, acting only 
as a ‘clearing house’. This pattern of interactions between the Italian state and 
NGOs – defined as one of ‘partial privatization’, in contrast to the model of ‘de 
facto nationalisation’ of other European countries, for example France – has been 
argued to be particularly evident in the case of Catholic NGOs. It has been 
suggested that some of them (e.g.: FOCSIV network) heavily influence Italian 
strategic choices in terms of countries or sub-regions to privilege, especially in 
                                                 
44 The authors examine also another small group of non Catholic Italian NGOs. 
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Africa, often promoting a set of priorities not directly relevant to Italy’s national 
interests (Dottori 1997). Despite the influence they exert, it is not possible, 
however, to suggest that Italian NGOs are able to pursue an autonomous agenda 
and autonomous development cooperation activities, as they remain still heavily 
reliant on government funds to devise and implement their projects. 
In conclusion, existing Political Science/IR literature on internationally active 
Catholic NGOs based in Italy is scarce and fragmented, offering only a few 
scattered remarks on Catholic NGOs different from the Community of 
Sant’Egidio and only an extremely limited analysis of conflicting government-
NGOs patterns. 
 
2.4 Conclusions: gaps in the literature on Italian foreign policy 
and contribution of the thesis 
 
To sum up, it seems fair to argue, also drawing on some scholars’ considerations, 
that over the last fifteen/twenty years, academic literature has witnessed a 
significant rise in Political Science/IR studies on Italian foreign policy. Hill, for 
instance, has written that “[...] there has been a notable upsurge of interest in 
Italian [and, particularly, German foreign policy]” (2003: 6).  
However, in the light of the brief literature review presented in this Chapter, it 
appears reasonable to claim that “we can be anything but unsatisfied with the 
state of play of the theoretical [and empirical] debate on foreign policy, that in 
Italy proves more limited than in other countries in comparative terms” (Brighi 
2001: 244). As a matter of fact, if of course the situation is currently improving, 
many problems still affect the state of the art of research on Italian foreign policy.  
On the one hand, the history of the late establishment of such disciplines in Italy 
and their current academic status have not helped create the best ‘structural’ 
conditions for well-grounded research to take root, nor has the general 
indifference to Italy’s international action on the part of scholars, policy analysts 
and (on some occasions) the very foreign policy professionals, being the topic an 
object of inquiry which proves to be more complex and challenging than how it is 
described by superficial clichés. On the other, and partially as a consequence of 
the elements just mentioned, the work of students and researchers intending to 
study Italian foreign policy is all the more difficult as the availability of primary 
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and secondary sources is sometimes extremely limited, especially on events 
occurred in the last two decades. Regarding primary sources, it must be taken 
into consideration that Italian diplomatic documents currently available in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives cover only the period going from 1861 to mid-
1950s (on this issue and on its impact on research see Nuti 2002 and Varsori 
2015). Interestingly, Nuti argued in 2002, when discussing not only the 
documentation related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the archival 
production of all the other Italian government departments, that “[t]he Italian 
archival system is mostly regulated by a law which is not as liberal or as 
researcher-friendly as are those of other Western states. The reasons for this will 
probably require a separate essay, but suffice it to say that no political force or 
group of scholars has hitherto deemed it particularly important to try to get the 
system modified” (2002: 93). This situation has not improved significantly since 
Nuti’s reflections of 2002: while finally Italian diplomatic documents have been 
digitalised and are now available online, it is not clear whether and when material 
drafted after the mid-1950s will be ready for reference. In a way, the problem of 
the scarce availability of primary sources can be considered both as a cause and a 
consequence of the general underdeveloped Italian interest in international 
affairs. A partial exception to this rule is represented by the fact that since the 
1990s, some former parties, political  foundations and cultural institutions45 have 
decided to open their archives and make material available for scholars, 
journalists and the general public. Although they only tell part of the story, these 
documents can compensate for official documents, to some extent, when 
reconstructing some specific foreign policy events and decisions, especially when 
key politicians (the archives are dedicated to) were on the very frontline of such 
events (Varsori 2015: 294). In a few cases, documents stored in the 
abovementioned archives cover also events occurred in the first half of the 1990s. 
Concerning secondary sources, as described in the previous sections, Political 
Science/IR studies on this topic are in overall terms scarce and scattered. A 
number of good analyses have been published, but comprehensive and in-depth 
works are limited and often focused on the Cold War era. This seems surprising 
                                                 
45 For instance, the Christian Democracy Party and the Communist Party, and foundations 
established in memory of leading political figures of the past such as Giulio Andreotti, Bettino 
Craxi, Alcide De Gasperi, Amintore Fanfani, Giovanni Gronchi, Aldo Moro (Varsori 2015: 294). 
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because of the changes occurred in Italian foreign policy during the last twenty 
years, leading to the slow emergence of an increasingly active foreign policy in 
some areas (Santoro 1991; Andreatta and Hill 2000 and 2001; Andreatta 2001b; 
Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009; Carbone 2011), and because of the relevance of the 
domestic political crisis broken out between 1992 and 1994 in most sectors of 
Italian political parties, business and society, then favouring the introduction of 
some institutional reforms and the formation of a new party system (see for 
instance IAI 1993; Hill 2003 and 2015; Brighi 2005; Carbone 2011). Therefore, 
by focusing on the post-1989 period, this thesis aims to contribute first of all to 
filling this general gap in works on Italian foreign policy after the demise of the 
bipolar confrontation. 
Looking more closely at the scarcely populated group of works existing on this 
object of inquiry, the second most evident gap the present work aims to 
contribute to partially fill is the lack of FPA studies on Italian foreign policy 
decision making, starting from the first application of the model of the Foreign 
Policy Community, in the only work of this nature conducted so far on the Italian 
case, twenty-five years ago (Santoro 1991), and employing FPA analytical tools 
like policy subsystem theory (see Chapter 1), to be combined with slightly revised 
versions of more general IR concepts such as delegation.  
Thirdly, the last gap this thesis aims to fill is the one concerning the role of NGOs 
based in Italy in general, which are active on the international scenario, and 
sometimes cross Italian foreign policy’s path, a topic which has drawn very poor 
little attention so far.  
Furthermore, some general considerations are needed here. The regrettable state 
of play of Political Science/IR literature on Italian foreign policy, especially with 
reference to post-1989, “[…] is all the more unfortunate, as in contemporary 
global politics – after the demise of the ‘regime of certainty’ constituted by the 
Cold War – it would be fruitful to have models, interpretations and hypotheses 
leading states in navigating the troubled waters between the Scylla of structural 
forces increasingly diversified and widespread, and the Charybdis of domestic 
politics that are more and more demanding” (Brighi 2001: 244). It is important 
to recall that in the medium/long run such state of affairs produces negative 
consequences also on the quality of daily management of Italian foreign policy, 
as described in previous sections, especially if compared to what occurs in other 
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Western European countries with a similar standing in the European and 
international arena. Indeed, one should hope that the further development of 
Italian foreign policy studies in Italy and on Italy could contribute somehow not 
only to the enhancement of the scientific understanding of the topic, but also to 
the advancement of a still poorly structured public debate on these issues. 
In conclusion, is it useful to go back to the question raised almost fifty years ago 
by the prominent Italian diplomat Pietro Quaroni on the existence of an Italian 
foreign policy (1967: 801). In the words of Ferraris, “Italian foreign policy is an 
obscure object: it exists because it could not be otherwise, but often, too often, it 
is not seen and above all, it is not heard” (1998)46. I believe the answer to 
Quaroni’s question is affirmative, although it is not straightforward, nor 
unproblematic. After all, also “non-actions, when the option of influencing the 
external environment is viable and a state [or an actor] decides not to do it, can 
be considered as foreign policy actions” (Gori 1973: 40). It is precisely the 
cultural, general indifference to this topic, especially and paradoxically in Italy, 
that is ‘risky’, in intellectual, policy and political terms, in the current uncertain 
global arena (Mammarella and Cacace 2008: 300-303). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Ferraris’ argument resonates with the idea of a ‘low profile’ foreign policy mentioned before. A 
similar perspective has been put forward by Gaja (1995: 23). 
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Chapter 3. The Italian Foreign Policy Community after 
the end of the Cold War 
 
 
“The first answer to the question  
‘who makes foreign policy in Italy?’  
should be ‘nobody’” 
 
(Ambassador Pietro Quaroni, 1967)47 
 
 
3.1 Chapter outline 
 
This Chapter offers a brief examination of the Italian Foreign Policy Community, 
building upon the model firstly developed by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993), and 
then partially modified and applied by Santoro (1990 and 1991) to the Italian 
case.  
The Chapter has two goals: first, it aims at locating institutional foreign policy 
actors and non-state actors within the bigger picture of the Italian foreign policy 
process; second, it intends to offer a first, very preliminary attempt to briefly 
build on the description of the Italian Foreign Policy Community presented by 
Santoro more than twenty years ago, of course in a much less ambitious way, and 
to update it in the light of changes occurred over the last twenty years. At the end 
of the Chapter, some preliminary conclusions are drawn on where in the Italian 
Foreign Policy Community internationally active Sant’Egidio and other Catholic 
NGOs operate, and on the actors they tend to interact the most with. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 This provocative remark was made during a conference by Ambassador Quaroni, one of the 
most prominent diplomats of his generation, in order to give an idea of the fragmentation of the 
decision-making process in Italian foreign policy (Bonanni 1967: 801). 
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3.2 The Foreign Policy Community 
 
3.2.1 Definitions 
 
The process of foreign policy making and implementation are considered in this 
Chapter starting from the assumption that foreign policy is a public policy, i.e. “as 
a particular aspect of the pervasive action exerted by the domestic political system 
on all the activities taking place within its scope” (Santoro 1990 and 1991: 219; 
Coralluzzo 2000). Because foreign policy is seen in this case as the outcome of 
the cooperative and/or conflicting interactions of domestic actors of different 
nature, such theoretical perspective on foreign policy can be located within the 
broader research streams inaugurated by scholars of the ‘organizational process’ 
and ‘governmental politics’ models, to borrow the definitions put forward by 
Allison in 1971, in its seminal work on the Cuban missile crisis (1971). 
The concept of ‘Foreign Policy Community’ (FPC) employed here was suggested 
by Santoro in The foreign policy of a middle power. Italy from the unification to 
present-day (1991), the first (and last) IR contribution published so far offering 
a preliminary description of all the actors intervening in the foreign policy arena 
in Italy48. According to his definition, built upon that elucidated by Hilsman 
concerning the US case (1971, 1987 and 1993), the Foreign Policy Community is 
the constellation of political, institutional, bureaucratic, economic actors, etc., 
public or private, that are involved to different extents in the foreign policy 
political process (Santoro 1991: 238).  
Although this goes beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth adding briefly here 
that Santoro (and Hilsman, to some extent), because in his research aims at 
offering an ambitious, comprehensive model of Italian foreign policy, includes 
the Foreign Policy Community and its process within the bigger picture of an 
open system in which he analyses also the interactions of the FPC actors with 
external and internal independent variables (e.g.: international political and 
socio-economic trends, geographical and historical ‘constant features’, ‘national 
                                                 
48 Other works worth mentioning are Kogan (1963) and Sassoon (1978), although they were 
published well before Santoro’s work, and use less complex theoretical tools. 
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attributes’), and the output of such relations in terms of decisions/non decisions 
and their different implementation patterns49. 
According to the aforementioned authors, within the Foreign Policy Community 
the various actors are located in three main concentric rings, according to their 
degree of proximity to the decision making core: 1) the ‘inner ring’; 2) the ‘second 
ring’; 3) the ‘outer ring’. It can be highlighted from the outset that the Italian 
foreign policy process features some interesting differences not only from the 
American case investigated by Hilsman50, but also from that of other big 
European countries (for example France, in first place), as the following sections 
in this Chapter will show. The mapping of the Italian Foreign Policy Community 
briefly sketched out in this Chapter has two objectives: first, it is useful to put 
non-state actors in context, as it is not always clear where exactly in the process 
their action unfolds; second, it is the first attempt51 to briefly build on the 
description of the Italian Foreign Policy Community presented by Santoro more 
than two decades ago, and to try to update taking into consideration changes 
occurred over the last twenty-five years (in the following subsection I will add 
more details on this second goal). Taking into account the scope of this Chapter 
and of the entire thesis, it goes without saying that this is only a preliminary 
overview which is not intended to be complete and exhaustive. 
 
 
                                                 
49 Santoro’s model is processual in nature and is firstly based on the ‘input/output’ scheme of the 
ground-breaking model of ‘political system’ developed by Easton (1965); it also borrows from 
McGowan and Shapiro (1973), Rosenau (1987), Hermann, Hermann and Hagan (1987). 
 
50 According to Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993) in the case of the US foreign policy process, the 
first ring (‘inner ring’) refers to those individuals and institutions that, according to the 
Constitution, are involved in the decision-making process, i.e.: a) the president; b) the White 
House staff; c) political appointees as ministers, undersecretaries of major departments, as well 
as all other spoil system staff members; then d) the Congress; e) the bureaucracies of National 
Security, the Department of State, Intelligence services and the Armed Forces. The second ring 
(‘second ring’) gathers the actors, individual or institutional, which are not part of the official 
governmental or parliamentary arenas, but whose very reason for being there lies in their ability 
to influence foreign policy. These are: a) interest groups of different types and nature, b) the 
media. The third ring (‘outer ring’) includes two very broad groups of actors: a) public opinion, 
analysed through surveys and polls, and b) the electorate, as it emerges from the results of 
elections. 
 
51 A partial exception is Coralluzzo (2000), although this book applies the Brecher concept of 
‘foreign policy system’ (1972), and focuses on the Cold War period. 
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3.2.2 Time frame 
 
Santoro’s book was researched and published between the end of the 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s. Unlike it has been suggested in different parts of the 
books, the scholar has neither elaborated more on the topic of that work, nor has 
put the concepts and models developed to the test, applying them to an empirical 
case of Italian foreign policy (this was probably also due to the premature death 
of the author). Therefore, the description of the actors of the Italian Foreign 
Policy Community put forward in his 1991 book could fully take into account the 
major changes occurred after the double international and domestic crises 
unfolded in Italy at the end of the Cold War, especially the internal one that would 
burst only the year after the publication of the book52.  
Changes occurred in Italian foreign policy during the last twenty years, as a 
consequence of the abovementioned crises, have been very significant indeed. On 
the international stage, the demise of the Cold War has produced the slow 
emergence of a gradually more assertive Italian foreign policy, facilitated by a 
larger room for autonomous manoeuvring offered by the demise of the East-West 
confrontation between 1989 and 1991 (see for instance Santoro 1991; Andreatta 
and Hill 2000 and 2001; Andreatta 2001a; Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009; 
Carbone 2011). On the domestic scene, the political crisis unravelled between 
1992 and 1994 in many sectors of Italian political parties (crucial actors in foreign 
policy as well as in the Italian political system in general), economic environment 
and society, triggered by major judicial investigations, resulted in the 
introduction of some, albeit limited in scope, institutional reforms and in the 
shaping of a new party system (and, according to some scholars, also in the 
establishment, more broadly, of a new political system, termed ‘Second Republic’, 
as explained earlier in this thesis).  
For the reasons explained above, and consistently with the overall time frame of 
the thesis, I have therefore decided to focus here on the present-day setting of the 
                                                 
52 No other scholars have followed this strand of research during the following two decades, at 
least not in such a comprehensive way; only a few of them have made similar research efforts 
(Carbone 2011; Chelotti and Pizzimenti 2011; Darnis 2011; Giacomello and Verbeek 2012; 
Marchetti 2013), but within a more limited scope, usually focusing only on one actor.  
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Italian Foreign Policy Community, stressing the differences from the previous 
Cold War make-up where needed.  
 
3.3 The ‘inner ring’. The institutional machinery 
 
The first concentric circle of the model, defined as the ‘inner ring’, is the place 
where one can find state institutions tasked by the Italian Constitution, 
constitutional and ordinary laws, with an explicit role in the field of foreign policy. 
The institutions analysed in greater detail in the following subsections are: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; President of the Council of Ministers and its Office; 
Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Economy and Finance and that of Economic 
Development; Foreign Affairs Parliamentary committees. 
It is important to underline here that the institutional setting of Italy, a 
parliamentary republic, especially if compared to that of other Western European 
countries such as France, Germany or the UK, features a significant degree of 
open-endedness in terms of attribution of tasks to the various institutions, 
resulting in a great level of fragmentation of powers in the realm of foreign policy 
(Attinà 1982, 1983a and 1983b; Santoro 1991; Fossati 1999; Mammarella and 
Cacace 2008: 289-293; Ferro and Leotta 2011). In addition, differently from the 
US and French cases, for instance, inside the Italian inner ring hierarchy in 
foreign policy between the different institutions is not always clear-cut. Such 
scenario has only partially been modified by the greater autonomy that the 
President of the Council (Prime Minister) and its Office have gained at the 
expense of other Ministers, as a result of both formal changes in the legal 
framework, and more informal evolution in practice, as it will be explained later. 
The institutional setting and the foreign policy process, as a consequence, remain 
fairly unstructured and in transition. 
 
 3.3.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the government department in charge 
of performing all the duties associated with the political, economic, social and 
cultural relations of the Italian state with foreign countries. More specifically, 
according to the art. 12 of the legislative decree no. 300/1999, the institutional 
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tasks assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the following: “1. [...] 
representation, coordination and protection of Italian interests in international 
forums; analysis, decision and implementation of the Italian action in the field of 
international politics; management of relations with other states and with 
international organizations; stipulation and revision of the treaties and 
international conventions and coordination of relevant activities of management; 
analysis and settlement of issues of international law and international litigation; 
representation of the Italian position on the implementation of the provisions 
relating to the Common foreign and security policy envisaged by the Treaty on 
European Union, and in the domain of political and economic external relations 
of the European Union; development cooperation, migration and protection of 
Italian citizens and workers abroad; management of the activities within the 
European integration process, related to the negotiation of the Treaties of the 
European Union, the European Community, Euratom”. The aforementioned 
legislative decree also assigns to the MFA the important task of ensuring the 
overall consistency of the international and European activities of the specific 
government institutions with the overall objectives of international politics, but 
without prejudice to the functions attributed to the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers53 (Baldi 2006; Silvestri 2000; Serra 2009).  
Beyond the political leadership, represented by the Minister and Deputy 
Ministers/Undersecretaries, at the headquarters level the MFA, since the last 
reorganization in 2010, is now structured in a General Secretariat and eight 
general directorates (identified according to thematic/functional criteria, in 
contrast to the previous geographically-based organizing principle), that in turn 
are divided into offices and units (Zucconi 2006). At the peripheral level, the MFA 
has a diplomatic-consular network of about 310 offices54, located in most 
countries of the world: embassies, permanent representations to international 
                                                 
53 Apart from the legal provisions, in the daily management of foreign policy it is not always easy 
to set clear boundaries between the functions and activities of the MFA on the one hand, and those 
of other institutions of the state (and some other departments in particular, like the Presidency of 
the Council) on the other. Further analysis of such interplay, however, goes beyond the scope of 
this work. 
    
54 The number shown is approximate on purpose, because of the proposed closing/merge of some 
peripheral offices, under consideration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of writing. 
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organizations, special diplomatic delegations, consular offices and Italian 
Cultural Institutes. 
In Italy, when new governments (or new ministers) take office, tend not to replace 
top administrative officials: such trend reinforces the role of bureaucracies in the 
daily management of ministries, often ensuring quite a high level of continuity in 
some policy areas, regardless of the changes – rather frequent – in the political 
leadership of the Ministry. This holds particularly true in the case of the MFA, as 
diplomats feature a significant ‘esprit de corps’, and a rather resilient 
“institutional memory” (see Hill 2003: 77, with specific reference to foreign 
policy) and organisational culture. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, first 
of all because of the limited material available for examination (Nuti 2002), the 
role of the MFA bureaucracy55 has been overlooked by scholars (Chelotti and 
Pizzimenti 2011). According to Croci, however, it can be argued that “[a]vailable 
evidence does instead suggest that MFA officials have always played a central role 
in the elaboration of Italian foreign policy and thus assured continuity through 
changes of government and political regimes” (2007b: 294), both during the Cold 
War and after the fall of the Berlin wall56. 
For the purpose of this thesis it is worth noting that activities in preventive 
diplomacy/crisis management are today dealt with by the cabinet of the Minister, 
the secretariats of the Vice Minister and the Undersecretaries, as far as policy 
guidelines are concerned, and by the Directorate of Political Affairs and Security, 
assisted by the relevant Embassies in the world and by Directorates on the basis 
of the countries involved, in the daily management of tasks. At the time of the 
                                                 
55 Draghi (1988) being the only notable exception, although it is a sociological study. Despite being 
a journalistic detailed report written in the 1970s, it is also worth mentioning here Ostellino 
(1972). 
 
56 On the influence of the MFA’s civil servants and on the role of political parties in foreign policy 
during the bipolar era, it is interesting to take into account the reflection offered by the historian 
de’ Robertis, who also served as an international affairs consultant to the Christian Democratic 
Minister of Foreign Affairs for many years.  “It has often been the case that the government – even 
when headed by a Christian Democrat and with a Christian Democratic Foreign Minister – has 
made decisions that, even if not totally in contrast with, did nevertheless significantly deviate 
from, the line elaborated by the party’s foreign bureau. One of the reasons is that within the party 
one looked at issues from an ideological point of view, often, albeit not always, taking into 
consideration the position of the Vatican. Within government by contrast, especially on the most 
delicate issues, decisions were made taking into consideration the Atlantic constraint, and 
through a policy process which included the civil servants [emphasis added], and hence did not 
always and precisely reflect the preferences of political leaders such as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry’s undersecretaries, even if these were the people formally responsible for 
those decisions (2003: 78, quoted in Croci 2008a: 293). 
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events described in this thesis, however, the Directorate of Political Affairs was 
basically the only unit in charge of the daily supervision of those issues, 
consistently with the then organisational structure of the Ministry. 
Development cooperation is instead managed by a dedicated General directorate 
for Development Cooperation, led by a senior diplomat, and by a number of field 
offices located in some recipient countries. Within the directorate there is an 
office specifically devoted to the Ministry’s relations with “civil society, non-
governmental and volunteering organizations”57 in the domain of development 
cooperation, in charge of assessing NGOs applications for managing development 
cooperation public funds for their projects in developing countries and of 
overseeing all matters relating to their work in the field. The track record of the 
‘Italian Cooperation’58 activities during the 1970s and the 1980s was rather poor 
in terms of aid effectiveness, and even more in terms of mismanagement of public 
funds by MFA political figures, party officials and top diplomats, with a 
significant number of judicial inquiries for cases of alleged corruption (Fossati 
1999; Carbone 2007). Such events, combined with budgetary cuts of last years, 
the political will of a few MEPs and of a bunch of ministers and 
undersecretaries59, the pressure from NGOs and other civil society organisations 
particularly vocal in this domain, and the need for meeting the increasingly 
demanding development cooperation targets set at the European Union level, 
have led to the much anticipated modification of the 1987 law regulating 
development cooperation. Among the innovations introduced by the reform law 
(125/2014), finally approved by the Parliament in August 2014, after many years 
of negotiations, there is the establishment of an ad hoc Agency, under the 
responsibility of the MFA, in line with the development cooperation governance 
models of other European countries (France and Germany, for instance)60. 
                                                 
57 Italian MFA official website: 
http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Ministero/Struttura/DGCoopSviluppo/default.htm?LANG=EN 
 
58 This is an alternative name for the MFA development cooperation activities. 
 
59 Info-cooperazione website: http://www.info-cooperazione.it/2014/03/esteri-pistelli-tiene-la-
delega-alla-cooperazione/ 
 
60 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/Documentazione/NormativaItaliana/legg
e%2011%20agosto%202014%20n.%20125%20-.pdf 
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3.3.2 Prime Minister Office 
 
The Prime Minister Office (officially the “Presidency of the Council of Ministers”, 
PCM)61 is the organizational body serving the President of the Council of 
Ministers62. In general terms, according to the legislative decree no. 303/1999, 
the President relies on the Presidency of the Council “for the exercise of the 
autonomous functions of political initiative, direction and coordination assigned 
to it by the Constitution and laws of the Republic” (article 2, paragraph 1). In 
addition, the PCM is required to provide, “[...] through liaison activities with 
other relevant government departments, the unity and consistency of the overall 
political and administrative orientations of the government, in accordance with 
article 95 of the Constitution” (article 2 paragraph 1).  
The legal provisions detailing the specific role of the President and of the PCM in 
the conduct of foreign policy are rather scanty. Its functions must therefore be 
inferred from the norms regulating their powers of general nature that are related 
to the implementation of general policy objectives, as determined by the Council 
of Ministers, to be balanced anyway with the attributions and responsibilities of 
individual ministers, first of all, in this case, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
In addition, it is necessary to combine the basic legal framework with analysis of 
the practice. Over the entire history of the Republic, at least until the end of the 
so-called ‘First Republic’ in 1992-1994, government practice in foreign policy has 
witnessed an oscillation between a more proactive role of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and a stronger action by the Prime Minister, depending on the degree of 
cohesion of the cabinet political coalition, for example, or on the specific interest 
                                                 
61 While it is not possible here to address the issue in more detail, it is worth noting that from the 
entry into force of the Republican Constitution (1948) to present-day, the President of the Council 
has progressively acquired greater autonomy from other Ministers in the informal, daily 
government practice. At the same time, a process of strengthening of the Presidency of the Council 
(i.e. the Office) has taken place, which culminated firstly in the approval of law 400/1988, 
detailing the legal provisions regulating the activities of the government and the organization of 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and then in the promulgation of legislative decree no. 
300 and 303 on the reorganization of ministries and again of the Presidency of the Council. 
 
62 For the sake of clarity, it should be explained that the expressions “President of the Council of 
the Ministers” and “Prime Minister” are used here as synonyms, although the latter is not the 
official legal term. In addition, it is useful to underline that the correct form, “President of the 
Council of the Ministers”, better elucidates the relative weight of the cabinet as a whole in its 
interactions with the President. Indeed, in the daily practice the President does not always fully 
wields the power of the ‘prime’ among all ministers. 
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in foreign affairs on the part of the individual politicians in office. Instead, with 
regard to the governments of the “Second Republic”, it is possible to observe a 
growing degree of proactivity of the PCM in the field of foreign policy, at least at 
the highest level of broader political goals, consistently with the concurrent, more 
general trend towards the ‘enhancement’, in all policy domains, of the functions 
of the President and of the PCM to the detriment of those of other ministries and 
of the Council of Ministers as a body (Ferraris 1996; Mammarella and Cacace 
2008). 
In conclusion, it is not possible to argue that the driving force of foreign policy in 
Italy can be always identified in the Prime Minister or in the Foreign Minister, 
but rather that “a principle of varying ‘polycentric’ decision-making” (Ferro and 
Leotta 2011) is applicable to the field of the conduct of foreign policy.  
Concerning specifically the organisation of the Office of the Presidency of the 
Council, according to the law 400/1988, the General Secretariat of the Presidency 
is tasked with assisting the President “through analysis and documentation 
services, [...] in managing international relations and, in general, in conducting 
all foreign policy actions” (article 19 paragraph 1, letter i). Similar duties are 
assigned also as to external advisers and consultants appointed by the President, 
as well as to a senior diplomat seconded by the MFA (“Diplomatic Adviser”, in 
Italian “Consigliere Diplomatico”), assisted by a staff composed of career 
diplomats. Within its office, every diplomat is usually in charge of covering 
dossiers related to specific geographical areas. In the Office of the Presidency 
there is also an office of the Military Adviser, led by a senior official from the 
Ministry of Defence, who is responsible for providing support to the President 
and its Office in its coordination activities with all the institutions dealing with 
matters concerning defence and security, and with all matters relating to the 
military commitments deriving from Italy’s membership of relevant international 
organizations (UN, NATO, EU, etc.). In this respect, over the past twenty years, 
the PCM has been particularly active in politically endorsing and supporting the 
Italian contribution to NATO and EU peace support operations abroad (Coticchia 
2006; Giacomello and Verbeek 2011). Finally, also intelligence services, that play 
an important role in the pre-decision making phase of the foreign policy process, 
are now located under the PCM after the last reform law of the intelligence 
system, passed in 2007. The Department of Information for Security, reporting 
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directly to the President and to a dedicated PCM Undersecretary, is responsible 
for overseeing the activities of the two intelligence agencies. In particular, the 
agency dealing with external security, together with the military intelligence 
department of the Ministry of Defence, is in charge of collecting intelligence out 
of the national territory and is therefore one of the supporting tools the Prime 
Minister and the PCM can rely on to make foreign policy decisions. 
 
3.3.3 Ministry of Defence 
 
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the ministry in charge of performing the state 
duties in the domain of defence and military security. In particular, the MoD is 
responsible for “the political and military participation of Italy in peace support 
operations, the Italian contribution to international organizations dealing with 
security and defense policies, the general and operational planning of the armed 
forces and of planning in the industrial defence sector” (article 20, paragraph 1, 
legislative decree. No. 300/1999).  
Although according to the relevant legal provisions it does not wield specific 
powers in foreign policy, in the light of practice it is possible to observe that from 
the 1980s onwards, the role of the MoD in matters of international concern has 
greatly expanded. This transformation has taken place on the basis of a peculiar 
trait of the Italian foreign policy of the last thirty years, i.e. the progressive 
increase of military commitments made by Italy in the framework of the 
multinational UN/NATO/EU peace support operations, especially after the end 
of the Cold War, in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the ‘broader Middle East’ 
(Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan). The significant Italian contribution 
to these missions and possible gains in terms of political leverage and prestige are 
considered by some commentators as one of the most successful foreign policy 
activities carried out by Italy after the end of the Cold War (Giacomello and 
Verbeek 2012). 
The political leadership of the MoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four Armed 
Forces involved in various crisis areas have in fact gained more weight in the 
decision-making and implementation process concerning the establishment and 
management of these military missions, due to the operational and technical 
nature of the activities. It is therefore possible to argue that the Ministry of 
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Defence contributes to the development of the Italian foreign and security policy 
through the formulation of politico-military guidelines applicable to the Italian 
participation to these operations. 
In greater detail, the Ministry of Defence oversees the politico-diplomatic 
implications of the operations through the office of the Diplomatic Adviser (in 
Italian ‘Consigliere Militare’) and the office of Military Policy. The importance of 
international military operations for the the political leadership of the MoD has 
clearly emerged in recent years, inter alia, from the regular visits of defence 
Ministers and top officials to Italian troops deployed in theatres of operation in 
different areas of the world.  
At the level of Chiefs of Defence Staff, the Department III - Military Policy and 
Planning supports the Ministry in the development of defense and national 
security policies, as well as in the assessment of security priorities related to the 
geographical position of the Italian peninsula. The Joint Staff Operational 
Command however, in particular through the Operations Division, is responsible 
for the tasks of command, control and coordination of peace support operations, 
and works closely with all Italian military actors present in the field, including 
military attachés, if any. In carrying out these tasks, the Command is in close 
contact with the MFA, in accordance with the agreements signed on coordination 
of their respective roles in operational contexts abroad.  
With respect to countries where Italian military units are deployed, however, the 
network of military attachés and their offices, embedded in the Italian embassies 
abroad, plays an important role as it is responsible for covering issues of military 
interests affecting the host state. This network also reports to the Division for 
Information and Security, the department of military intelligence of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (already mentioned in the section on the PCM). 
 
3.3.4 Ministry of Economic Development 
 
The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is the institution tasked with 
assisting the main sectors of Italian economy, with regard to the enhancement 
and development of competitiveness of the national productive system, and for 
what concerns the harmonization and monitoring of the internal market. 
According to the law no. 117/2008, the MED subsumed the former ministries of 
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Industry, International Trade, Communications, Energy and Economics 
Cohesion Policies.  
In accordance with the Prime Minister’s decree no. 158/2013, detailing the 
reorganization of the ministry, the MED is now structured in 15 Directorates-
General headed by General Directors, and coordinated at the top level by a 
Secretary General.  
Given that the MED is undoubtedly one of the ministries with the most complex 
and diverse portfolios, and that the boundary between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ in 
certain policies is increasingly blurred, there are different Directorates General 
which are involved to some extent in the foreign policy decision making and 
implementation process. To name only the most important ones, there are the 
Directorate-General for international trade policy, the Directorate-General for 
internationalization of business firms and the promotion of trade, and the 
Directorate General for security of energy supply and energy infrastructures. All 
these directorates-general have offices covering different regions of the world; the 
second of them, in particular, is also responsible for giving political guidance and 
for overseeing the network of the “Institutes for Foreign Trade”, located in many 
countries abroad, in cooperation with the MFA and the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance63. Founded in 1926, abolished in mid-2011 and re-established at the end 
of 2013 in the form of an agency, its objective is to promote economic and trade 
relations of Italian companies abroad, with particular attention to the needs for 
internationalization of small and medium-sized enterprises, and to strengthen 
the image of Italian products in the world. The Institute is structured in 
headquarters offices and 60 branches around the world, working in cooperation 
with the diplomatic-consular network of the MFA, and is an important tool of 
foreign and economic policy. 
                                                 
63 In the light of the limited scope of this Chapter, I have decided not to cover all the actors of the 
Italian Foreign Policy Community. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), although not 
included here, is nonetheless an important player not only in supporting the MED in assisting 
Italian firms abroad, but also because it is a fundamental shareholder in some Italian large firms 
with a prominent international projection, as discussed later in this thesis. In addition, MEF plays 
an important part in the decision-making process in all matters concerning the Italian 
participation in international economic organisations and forums (EU/G8/G20/IMF/World 
Bank), and according to the 2014 law on development cooperation, it has a fundamental say in 
the management of financial aspects of the allocation of Italian foreign aid. 
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Finally, the Directorate-General dealing with energy is especially important in the 
Italian foreign policy process, as one of the main tenets of Italian foreign policy 
has always been to secure its energy needs by maintaining good relations with 
important oil and gas producing countries (Libya, Algeria, Russia).  
Although they are not formally related to the MED, it is useful to mention at this 
point two organizations that in different ways play a part in the economic foreign 
policy process in Italy. Founded in 1977, transformed in 2004 in a public 
company, SACE is an insurance and finance group totally controlled by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, offering export credit, credit insurance, 
investment protection abroad, financial guarantees and deposits to Italian 
companies interested in exporting to foreign countries, being them SMEs or large 
companies. SACE also provides monitoring and analysis of the political-economic 
risk factors in countries which companies intend to do business with.  
SIMEST (“Italian Society for Companies Abroad”), established in 1991 by the 
former Ministry of International Trade (now MED), and transformed into a 
public company in 2012, is tasked with assisting in the process of 
internationalization of Italian firms, by acquiring up to 49% of their capital. With 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance being the majority shareholder of SIMEST, 
the company offers also consulting services to various firms, and provides 
funding for feasibility studies and technical assistance programs, as well as 
initiatives for exporting companies. 
 
3.3.5 Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committees 
 
In the Italian system of ‘perfect bicameralism’, both chambers of the Parliament, 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, wield the same powers, therefore there 
are two identical standing Foreign Affairs Committees in the two parliamentary 
bodies. Within the scope of their competences, the standing Committees perform 
legislative functions, offer political guidance to and parliamentary overseeing on 
the executive; the Foreign Affairs Committees, in particular, are responsible for 
the matters concerning “foreign affairs, European Union (treaties revisions, 
relations with non EU states and political relations with EU members); 
migration”64. Public hearings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, senior 
                                                 
64 Chamber of Deputies website: http://www.camera.it/leg17/737 
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diplomats, academics and experts, are regularly organised before the 
Committees, and in cases of particular urgency ad hoc sessions are set up on 
specific issues. 
Interesting accounts of the role of Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committees in 
the Italian foreign policy making have been offered by many scholars, but 
especially from a legal point of view (Attinà 1972; Cassese A. 1982; Manzella 1982; 
Rogati 1982; Garavoglia 1984; Massai 1984; Casu 1995). However, they date back 
to the 1970s and the 1980s, therefore they clearly do not cover the post-Cold War 
period. Only one scholarly research has been conducted over the past two 
decades, and again from a legal perspective: according to the author, the analysis 
of such committees demonstrates that the Italian parliament exerts a role of 
“occasional, irregular centrality” in foreign policy. In contrast to the cases of the 
US, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, “the parliament offers a wide 
array of regular meetings and venues for debating and overseeing foreign policy 
issues”, but the fragmentation of the occasions for exercising its functions of 
political guidance and parliamentary control of the executive proves sometimes 
inefficient and time-consuming (Longo 2011).  
Further political science/IR research is of course needed on this topic, 
nonetheless it is possible to try to suggest some preliminary remarks. It is clear 
that due to the nature of foreign policy, most functions and powers are attributed 
to the government. This holds true particularly in the case of Italy, where the 
Constitution and other types of laws assign only a limited role to the Parliament 
(and therefore to the corresponding Committees), in terms of law-making. 
However, on the basis of the analysis of the work performed by the Committees 
and by specific MPs both on a daily basis, and on the occasion of specific foreign 
policy events/decisions concerning Italy, it can be argued that during the last few 
years these parliamentary bodies have been experiencing a slow shift towards 
greater involvement. Indeed, they have been fairly active on a number of 
occasions, considering the limited scope of their attributions, in terms of 
supporting/challenging the executive in the public debate on specific issues, 
parliamentary questions required, passing of motions and resolutions containing 
political guidance for the government, etc. (Ranieri 2006; Zanon 2006; Ronzitti 
and Di Camillo 2008). Concerning the aforementioned limited role that they can 
play in the domain of foreign policy law-making, it is important to underline, as 
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a partial ‘exception’, that in the case of the reform of the ‘Italian Cooperation’, 
approved in 2014 and previously mentioned in this Chapter, the political pressure 
coming from a group of MPs belonging to Foreign Affairs Committees in both the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate has been crucial for achieving such goal. In 
addition, although specific analyses on this have not been produced so far, it is 
possible to suggest that the work of these committees (and the ‘informal’ 
influence they seem to have gradually started to exert) should be studied also in 
combination with the examination of the role of parties in the foreign policy 
process. On the one hand, they are indeed a privileged site for parties’ political 
action, together with the executive, and on the other they are for MPs an 
important step towards top political appointments in the MFA or in international 
organizations with political forums for MPs (on political parties see the relevant 
subsection). 
 
3.4 Between the ‘inner ring’ and the ‘second ring’ 
 
3.4.1 Political parties 
 
During the Cold War, political parties have played a crucial role in the whole 
Italian political system. The expression ‘Republic of parties’, coined by an Italian 
historian and quite popular both in the scholarly literature and the public debate, 
well epitomizes the centrality of party actors in Italian politics (Scoppola 199765). 
According to Santoro (1991: 242), still at the end of the Cold War the party 
subsystem, unlike in the US case, played a fundamental role of ‘filter’ between the 
‘inner ring’ on the one hand, composed of the institutional bodies of the executive 
and of the legislative, tasked by the Constitution with specific attributions in the 
domain of foreign policy, and the ‘second ring’, where non state actors can be 
found (on Italian political parties and foreign policy during the Cold War see also 
Pilati 1978; Putnam 1978; Panebianco 1977 and 1982). In sum, in Italy there was 
“a sort of double systemic oligarchy (institutions and parties) that create[d] and 
                                                 
65 In greater detail, the scholar argues that the Italian party subsystem has hampered the 
development of a mature democracy in Italy, although he acknowledges that in the aftermath of 
the II World War no other options were viable for Italy to rebuild its institutional and political 
system. 
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decide[d] at least 90% of national foreign policy with almost no external 
influences from the outside” (Santoro 1991: 242).  
No comprehensive accounts of the role of parties in Italian foreign policy have 
been published after the collapse of the party system between 1992-1993, but it 
can be argued that some changes have occurred in this domain. Although the 
subject would need in-depth analyses, some preliminary considerations can 
nonetheless be suggested. The demise of historical parties such as the Christian 
Democracy Party and the Communist Party, that with some leading political 
leaders (especially Christian Democrat ones) had managed the foreign policy of 
the country for almost fifty years, for the first part of the 1990s has left a vacuum 
not filled by the emergence of political figures with a particular expertise on 
foreign affairs66. This tendency, in addition, has also further increased the 
influence of civil servants vis-à-vis the politicians charged with managing foreign 
policy, as described in the section on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A few years 
later, some politicians hailing from the remnants of the two main parties have 
slowly emerged with a particular interest in international politics. On the centre-
left side of the political spectrum they were Beniamino Andreatta, Romano Prodi, 
Massimo D’Alema, Piero Fassino, Umberto Ranieri, Enrico Letta and Marta 
Dassù (Croci 2008a; Brighi 2007), and more recently Federica Mogherini, Lapo 
Pistelli, Vincenzo Amendola and Lia Quartapelle. On the center-right side, on the 
contrary, the establishment of a leading party with a pronounced tendency 
towards the ‘personalisation’ of politics and of the organisation of the party itself, 
has led to the centralisation of functions and skills in foreign policy in the leader 
Silvio Berlusconi and in an extremely narrow circle of very close, low profile 
foreign policy advisers with no significant appointments within the party 
structure (Brighi 2006; Coralluzzo 2006; Croci 2002).  
As this is one of the most overlooked areas of the Italian foreign policy process, it 
is extremely difficult to argue whether political parties still play the crucial role 
illustrated by Santoro or not (1991). When thinking of the main events occurred 
in Italian foreign policy over the last two decades, the first impression is that on 
the center-left side of the political arena they still do, although in a different way 
                                                 
66 Interestingly, some scholars also stressed the emergence of a sort of ‘bipartisan consensus’ on 
many foreign policy issues (Giacomello, Coticchia and Chelotti 2006; Carbone 2011). 
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and with different tools. One of the arguments supporting this idea could be, for 
instance, the fact that many of the political appointees at the top of the MFA 
(ministries and undersecretaries) had previously worked as shadow ministers or 
party board members with tasks related to foreign policy. Finally, the role of 
parties can be examined also through the lenses of their behaviour within 
coalition cabinets. While in most cases coalition partners have shared a 
significant number of views on foreign policy matters, on two occasions, the 
stability of a government was on the contrary challenged in Parliament by 
coalition junior partners, resulting in cabinet crises (in 1997 and 2007, and in 
both cases on the center-left side of the political arena). It is important to 
underline that on the contrary, during the Cold War, the extremely frequent 
cabinet crises witnessed by the Italian political and institutional system had never 
been triggered by a confrontation over foreign policy issues (Carbone 2011). 
Coticchia and Davidson (2015) have recently started to explore the dynamics of 
the management of foreign policy by Italian coalition cabinets, with a special 
emphasis on the role of ‘radical’ parties, but further research is anyway much 
needed on political parties in the Italian foreign policy arena (Brighi 2013). 
 
3.5 The ‘second ring’. Non state actors 
 
Some scholars have argued that the significant changes occurred for Italy at the 
end of the Cold War and at the onset of the 1990s, both on the international and 
on the domestic scene, were expected to reverse, to some extent, the tendency for 
Italian foreign policy to be hostage of domestic politicking and, at the same time, 
to open up fresh space for other societal actors in the realm of foreign policy (IAI 
1993; Hill 2003 and 2015; Brighi 2013; Carbone 2011). This holds true especially 
for some of these actors. The ‘second ring’ of the model presented here includes 
large business firms with a remarkable international projection, media, 
academia, think-tanks and NGOs.  
 
3.5.1 Large business corporations 
 
ENI, the “National Hydrocarbons Corporation”, founded in 1953 as a public firm 
and transformed in 1992 into a limited company, is a global company active in 
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the production, transportation, transformation and marketing of oil and natural 
gas. Owned for about 30% of shares by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, it 
is one of the largest companies in the world in the energy sector and is now 
present in 90 countries. For the management of institutional and international 
relations of the company, ENI has an International Relations Director. 
Interestingly, in recent years a career diplomat has been appointed to this 
posting, by virtue of a law authorizing the secondment of diplomats from the MFA 
to major Italian strategic companies for a short period of time. Both the 
Directorate of International Relations and the offices dealing with political and 
financial risk analysis cover daily political and security developments affecting 
areas of the world where the group is present, in cooperation with relevant MFA 
departments. However, beyond such specific offices, the proactive and prominent 
role that the company has always played in the making of foreign policy in Italy, 
from the 1950s to today, has to be undoubtedly attributed to the top management 
of the company, in general terms. Notwithstanding ups and downs, the 
relationship between ENI’s leadership and the Foreign Ministry and other top 
policy-makers have historically been very sound. As a result, among all Italian 
economic actors, the company is the one that, in the long run, has definitely 
exerted the biggest influence on many Italian foreign policy issues (Darnis 2011; 
Coticchia, Giacomello and Sartori 2011). In this context, the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East and most recently Russia and some areas of Sub-Saharan Africa have 
traditionally been key regional scenarios for the group. 
ENEL, the “National Corporation for Electricity”, established in 1962 and 
transformed in a limited company thirty years later, is a multinational utility 
company working in the production and distribution of electricity and gas. 
Approximately 25% of the company’s shares are today owned by the Italian 
governement, through the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Unlike ENI, ENEL 
does not have a Director or an office specifically dealing with international affairs, 
but dedicated board members are now appointed to deal respectively with 
Europe, South America, and North and Sub-saharan Africa, consistently with the 
fast-moving expansion of the company in these areas since the 1990s. At the same 
time, over the last two decades the influence of the company, particularly of its 
top management, on Italian foreign policy matters has clearly increased. 
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Founded in 1999 as part of ENEL, following the liberalization of the electricity 
sector, Terna is the leading independent operator of the electricity transmission 
networks in Europe in terms of kilometres of lines managed. It is responsible for 
the National Transmission Network, based on the Grid Development Plan 
approved each year by the Ministry of Economic Development. A rather young 
company in this sector, Terna has an Office of International Affairs, located 
within the Department of Public Affairs, which deals with the daily relations of 
the company with Italian institutions and foreign partners. The group has 
nowadays a strong interest in enhancing its international projection in Europe, 
the Balkans and the Mediterranean. 
Edison, established in 1884, is the oldest European company operating in the 
field of energy. Today in Italy it is the second largest producer of electricity, and 
the second operator in the hydrocarbons sector, meeting about 17% of the 
country’s gas needs. The company is also engaged in the exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons in various areas of the world, particularly in the 
Middle East and Africa. External Relations and Communication, Management 
and Economic Studies Departments work in support of the institutional and 
international strategies of management of Edison. 
The Astaldi group, founded in the 1920s, is one of the most important suppliers 
of engineering solutions in Italy and in the world in the fields of transport 
infrastructure, water and renewable energy, and civil and industrial construction. 
Mainly engaged in the construction of railways, water mains, ports and public 
buildings in Italy and in some African countries until the outbreak of World War 
II, after the war the company managed to expand its presence in other parts of 
the world, while in Italy it focused primarily on post-war reconstruction. 
Nowadays, Astaldi operates in many areas of the world, from Central Europe to 
the Middle East, from North Africa to the Americas. 
Born in 1948 as “Institute for Industrial Reconstruction” (IRI) and privatized in 
the early 1990s, Leonardo Finmeccanica is currently the leading Italian industrial 
group in the high technology sector and among the top global companies in the 
areas of defence, aerospace and security. With about 30% of its shares owned by 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the group is active in the fields of military 
aircraft, defence electronics and security and aviation, as well as those of defence 
systems and satellite services. In addition to the Italian one, the three most 
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important markets for Finmeccanica are the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Poland, but the company is also active in (and exports to) many other areas 
of the world (e.g.: Middle East countries). From an organizational point of view, 
the top management is assisted by a Directorate for External Relations, 
Communication and Institutional Affairs and a Research Department, tasked 
with developing strategies to expand its presence in foreign markets. In the same 
way as ENI, also the senior management of Finmeccanica itself carefully monitors 
political and economic issues related to the countries of interest for the company 
(Darnis 2011). 
 
3.5.2 Media 
 
Generally speaking, all Italian media with national circulation (or broadcasting 
on a national scale) devote some attention to Italian foreign policy and to 
international politics in general. However, the quality of information conveyed to 
the public, at least on mainstream media, is often poor and the message is rather 
oversimplified. One of the reasons for such circumstances is that historically, 
Italian public opinion, for a number of reasons partially touched upon in Chapter 
2 and in the section on public opinion in this Chapter, has never been particularly 
interested in foreign affairs, and such feature of the Italian audience has certainly 
had its impact on the activity of the media in this field (Vigezzi 1991; Isernia 
1992). According to Santoro (1991), in addition, during the Cold War the media’s 
attitude tended to show a rather uncritical acceptance of the political leanings of 
specific parties in foreign policy, more or less openly (some of them were directly 
financed by parties, and media in general have always benefited and still benefit 
today from huge public funding). 
Over the last twenty years, the number of articles and TV reports on international 
politics published and offered by the widely popular mainstream newspapers like 
‘Corriere della Sera’ and ‘La Repubblica’, or by the TV public service broadcasting 
RAI and the main private broadcasting corporations Mediaset and Sky, especially 
when it comes to pieces contributed by correspondents and reporters from the 
field, has decreased, as well as their quality, with an all-time low over the past few 
years, mostly due to the budgetary crisis almost all traditional media have gone 
through. Over the last few years, TV national evening news have dedicated 
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approximately 6% of the programme to international politics, compared to 22% 
to domestic politics and 12% to crime reporting (Barretta 2013: 2, for the 
Observatory on Media of the University of Pavia). The situation is partially 
different as far as new media are concerned, as some good quality websites 
dealing with international politics, sometimes related to universities or think-
tanks, are slowly emerging. At the same time, the limited – but growing – 
exposure of the Italian public to foreign media is somehow having a moderate 
impact on how citizens approach this kind of specialised information.  
Unfortunately, academic research has not focused on the role of the media in the 
Italian foreign policy arena so far, neither in the domain of political science/IR, 
nor in the field of communication studies, with the exception of Turato (2013), 
dealing with the role of the media in the process of ‘personalisation’ of foreign 
policy in Italy, with a specific focus on the Berlusconi governments. On the basis 
of the assessment of the main foreign policy issues Italy has been confronted with 
after the Cold War, it is possible to argue that on some occasions media have 
played a part in the foreign policy arena, for instance as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the 
actions of the government, e.g. in the case of the Italian diplomatic and then 
military initiatives after the outbreak of the 2006 Lebanon War, or in the case of 
the liberation of Italian hostages in war-zones, etc. In other cases, specifically 
related to the Italian participation to NATO military operations, media activities 
have been constrained, to some extent, by a strict information policy issued by 
the Minister of Defence (Biloslavo 2007; Ignazi, Giacomello and Coticchia 2012; 
Coticchia and De Simone 2014). Of course, examples mentioned here do not 
provide sufficient empirical evidence to draw conclusions, but are presented in 
order to offer some preliminary suggestions for further analysis. 
 
3.5.3 Academia 
 
During the Cold War, the Italian academia67 has never had a significant impact 
on the foreign policy process, with the exception of an extremely narrow group of 
                                                 
67 For the sake of accuracy, although most academic institutions in Italy are publicly funded and 
depend on the Ministry for Education and Research, they are described together with other non 
state actors because for the purpose of this analysis, they behave as if they do not have formal ties 
with the state. 
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historians and jurists, that had developed close ties with MFA top officials during 
part of their career (for instance the historian Mario Toscano). In contrast to the 
cases of the US or other European countries, in Italy the appointment of 
academics to government postings has never been common practice in the field 
of foreign and defence policy. If one follows the line of reasoning suggested by 
Pasquino in 1977, according to which “the more dynamic a state foreign policy is, 
the higher the demand for scholars and international practitioners (and the offer 
thereof) would be” (1977: 27), it should be inferred that being the object of inquiry 
so poor, the low number of academics and experts dealing with foreign policy was 
a natural consequence, as well as the extremely limited impact they had on the 
Italian foreign policy process. However, as explained in Chapter 2, the 
establishment of political science and IR as academic disciplines, respectively in 
the 1940-1950s and in the 1960-1970s, has been hampered in Italy by different 
institutional, intellectual and political reasons. Such scenario has produced two 
main consequences concerning the (non-) impact of academia on the Italian 
foreign policy proces. On the one hand, it has led to the lack of a well-established 
foreign policy Italian epistemic community, and to the marginalization of 
political science/IR academic pundits in this field, whose expertise has simply 
been ignored by foreign policy élites (Andreatta and Hill 2001). On the other, it 
has resulted in the graduation of would-be politicians, diplomats, etc. with a 
particularly poor university-level training in political science and IR (Lucarelli 
and Menotti 2002a)68.  
Over the last twenty years, such state of affairs seems to have changed, at least 
partially. The number of scholars and students working and graduating 
specifically in political science and IR has constantly increased: as a result, some 
academics have gradually started to become formal or informal advisers of top 
political appointees within the government (a trend much stronger in the realm 
of economics, in Italy), participate in public hearings before the Foreign Affairs 
parliamentary committees, or regularly contribute op-ed and opinions on foreign 
policy issues to major newspapers and TV channels. In addition, a moderately 
higher number of politicians dealing with foreign affairs now hold a university 
                                                 
68 To provide an example, still today the Italian national exam for entering the diplomatic career 
does not cover political science/IR topics, but only international history, international and EU 
law, international economics and two foreign languages. 
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degree in these subject, and although the effects of such changes will probably be 
clear only in the mid- or long-term, they will likely be more inclined to approach 
matters with a different attitude from the past (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002a; 
Andreatta and Zambernardi 2010; Clementi 2011). 
  
3.5.4 Think-tanks  
 
As an exhaustive analysis of all think-tanks and political foundations would have 
gone beyond the limits of this Chapter, think-tanks analysed here have been 
selected on the basis of their role in the foreign policy process and on their 
activities in the policy/geographical areas relevant for the development of this 
thesis (Lucarelli and Menotti 2002b and 2004). 
The Istituto Affari Internazionali (Institute for International Affairs – IAI), 
founded in 1965 as a non-profit cultural association, on the initiative of the pro-
European intellectual Altiero Spinelli, is today the leading Italian think-tank in 
the field of international politics. The goal of IAI is to raise awareness and 
promote the knowledge of international affairs, security and international 
economics in Italy through studies, research, publications, conferences, public 
outreach activities, often in cooperation with other foreign think tanks, 
government institutions and business companies. Very limited financing is 
supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while most of the funding comes from 
EU sponsored and private research projects. Over almost fifty years of activity, 
thanks to the network of members, the Institute has become a regular 
interlocutor and partner of the institutions responsible for the conduct of foreign 
policy, major Italian companies with international projection and other actors 
from academia and of civil society, for example during the negotiations for the 
Italian accession to the Non Proliferation Treaty during the second half of the 
1960s, or on occasion of the Euromissiles crisis at the end of the 1970s. Close ties 
with top politicians working in the foreign policy area are still in place today. In 
some cases, IAI researchers have worked as formal or informal consultant for 
policy-makers and large firms (Darnis and De Simone 2014). The Institute is 
headed by a President and a Director, and is structured in different research 
areas: European Union; Transatlantic relations; Mediterranean and Middle East; 
Turkey; Security and Defence; International Economics; Italian foreign policy.  
 93 
The Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (Institute for International 
Political Studies – ISPI) was established in Milan in 1934 by a group of scholars 
from the universities of Milan and Pavia, and has traditionally been funded by a 
small grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like IAI, and from corporate 
donors (Longhini 2015: 582). It is less research-oriented than IAI but it has 
always been very active in the field of education, offering for instance short and 
executive courses, and a year-long programme for training students who aim to 
take part in the national exam to join the diplomatic corps. ISPI is organised in 
different observatories and programmes: Asia, Cyber security; Europe and global 
governance; Geoeconomics; Middle East and North Africa; Radicalisation and 
International terrorism; Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia; Energy security; 
Latin America; Migration; Transatlantic relations. Mediterranean and Middle 
East. Since the beginning of the 2010s, ISPI’s staff presence in the public debate 
on international issues and their interactions with state foreign policy institutions 
and policy makers have been growing significantly. 
The Centre for Studies on International Politics (in Italian ‘Centro Studi di 
Politica Internazionale’, CeSPI), is an independent, not-for-profit organization 
founded in Rome in 1985 as a research center on international politics affiliated 
with the Italian Communist Party. After a few years of readjustment, due to the 
collapse of the Communist Party at the end of the Cold War, the Centre has 
resumed its activities, securing its funding by participating in research projects 
supported by the EU and other international organizations, providing consulting 
services to business firms and other actors, and benefiting from a small 
contribution offered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the degree of 
proximity of CeSPI to the ‘control rooms’ of foreign policy and to the political 
parties has obviously decreased over time, the Centre is nonetheless part of a 
number of international networks of think tanks and foundations, and organizes 
a number of conferences and seminars open to the public each year. The Centre 
is headed by a President and a Director, and conducts research according to some 
prevailing guidelines: international cooperation, financing for development, 
security and peace; decentralized cooperation, cross-border cooperation and 
regional development; human mobility, transnationalism and co-development; 
enlargement, neighbourhood policy and global projection of the European 
Union; role of international and foreign economic policy in Italy. From a 
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geographical perspective, the areas covered by the Centre are Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans; Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Mediterranean. 
The Institute for Relations between Italy and the African, Latin American, Middle 
and Far Eastern Countries (IPALMO), is a think-tank established in 1971 in Rome 
by a group of politicians and intellectuals close to some members of the Christian 
Democracy Party, and to socialist and communist leaders. A non-profit 
organization, the purpose of IPALMO is to contribute to raising awareness of 
international politics, and to stimulate debate on Italian foreign policy and on 
Italian Development Cooperation policy. The Institute conducts research and 
policy studies and international economics, economic and cultural cooperation, 
regional integration processes and relations between countries with different 
levels of economic development. During the first part of its life, the IPALMO was 
primarily devoted to issues relating to decolonization, the struggle for democracy 
in Latin America, and North-South relations in the world. In the 1980s, the 
Institute has focused on the politics of development cooperation in Italy, 
contributing to the drafting of the first framework law for the reform of the Italian 
Cooperation in 1987, in collaboration with the MFA. The demise of the bipolar 
confrontation and the crisis of the Italian Development Cooperation led the 
Institute to modify the focus of its activities, looking also at the private sector as 
a priority issue and analysing the role of Italy in the Mediterranean and in the 
Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. In recent years, the Institute has also expanded its 
focus to Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. IPALMO is headed by a President 
and a Director, and today its funding comes from a small MFA grant and from 
the research projects carried out by the Institute.  
 
3.5.5 NGOs 
 
The number of NGOs operating in Italy is rather high, as well as the proportion 
of them being active on the international scene. However, the vast majority of 
them are rather small in size and are active in the domains of development 
cooperation and human rights advocacy domains, while very few organisations 
work also in the fields of preventive diplomacy and crisis management. To name 
but a few with no specific Catholic orientation, there are two vocal NGOs affiliated 
to the Transnational Radical Party, “No Peace Without Justice” and “Hands off 
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Cain”, that have been very proactive in coordinating the efforts towards the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (the Statute was indeed signed 
in Rome in 1998), and in supporting in the UN General Assembly, together with 
the Italian government, the Moratorium on Death Penalty in 2007 and a 
resolution containing a ban on female genital mutilation in 2012 (Cugliandro 
2009; Marchetti 2013). 
As explained in Chapter 1, the Community of Sant’Egidio is situated in a broader, 
diverse group of NGOs based in Italy (or whose central headquarters are on the 
Italian territory), which consider themselves ‘Catholic-inspired NGOs’. Such 
organisations, which in principle operate largely independently from the 
government, feature several differences in terms of legal status, mission, 
structure, activities, funding, etc. but are all active both in Italy and abroad, often 
being part also of broader non Catholic NGOs networks. Some of these NGOs are 
Catholic lay ecclesial movements and associations and are defined ‘private’ or 
‘public’ according to the Code of Canon Law. Others have no formal ties with the 
Holy See but obviously share a strong ideational common ground with it, and rely 
on Parish churches networks on the Italian territory. Nevertheless, they are all 
subject to Italian law and their rooting in the Italian society is pretty evident. 
Apart from Sant’Egidio, that will be described in the next section, the most 
important NGOs in this group are the FOCSIV network of Catholic-inspired 
NGOs, founded in 1972 and made today of approximately 60 organisations; AVSI, 
an NGO established in 1972 in the framework of Communion and Liberation, a 
broader, prominent lay ecclesial movement which is very influential in different 
sectors of Italian domestic politics; Focolare Movement, a movement founded in 
Italy at the end of the 1940s that is currently present in 182 countries all over the 
world, with local councils and delegates. These NGOs are all extensively involved 
in the fields of development aid, humanitarian assistance and human rights 
protection, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. These 
organisations enjoy full access to funds and projects managed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, under the Italian law on development cooperation (law 49/1987, 
modified in 2014). None of them, however, has developed a specific expertise in 
the domains of preventive diplomacy and crisis management, unlike Sant’Egidio 
(see the following Chapter). 
 
 96 
3.6 The ‘outer ring’ 
 
3.6.1 Public opinion 
 
Studies on Italian public opinion during the Cold War demonstrate that the level 
of interest in foreign policy on the part of citizens has always been rather low, and 
that their attitudes and preferences have been significantly stable over time 
(Battistelli and Isernia 1991). Many scholars and commentators have argued that 
Italy’s extremely limited room for action in foreign policy during the bipolar era, 
and the sort of ‘delegation’ of Italian foreign and defence policy to NATO, have 
pushed Italian public opinion (and politicians and academia too, to some extent) 
to an overall lack of concern about foreign and military affairs, and made any 
debate over national interests nearly impossible to develop (Pasquino 1977; 
Vigezzi 1991; Isernia 1992 and 2001; Battistelli 2012). “The two main political 
cultures and parties, the Christian Democrats and the Communists, which also 
had to come to grips with the historical inheritance of fascism, found common 
ground on two basic points: first, the image of Italy as a ‘pacifist’ actor on the 
international stage, backing only UN or multilateral initiatives; second, the 
necessity of avoiding harsh political confrontation on military issues” (Coticchia 
and De Simone 2014; see also Panebianco 1997; D’Amore 2001; Coticchia 2010). 
It is clear that if debates on contentious foreign and defence issues were 
disregarded by the main parties, it was all the more difficult for public opinion to 
receive the appropriate incentives to get informed on these policies and the role 
of Italy. 
Generally speaking, a rather inward looking attitude is confirmed also after 1989. 
An extensive poll conducted on Italian public opinion and foreign policy in 2013, 
showed that 65% of people interviewed believed that Italy should focus mainly on 
its domestic problems, while only 27% argued that international affairs should be 
the priority (CIRCaP/LAPS-IAI 2013: 7). However, such scenario has started to 
change during the last two decades, at least as far as specific foreign policy issues 
are concerned, for a number of reasons. First of all, like in other Western 
countries (and beyond) the advent of new media technologies such as satellite TV 
and the internet brought Italian public opinion closer to events occurring in 
remote corners of the world. Secondly, and more importantly, the renewed 
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activism of Italy on the international stage started to moderately draw the 
attention of a higher share of public opinion. Italian involvement in 
UN/NATO/EU peace support operations abroad is a litmus test in this sense, as 
public opinion interest in foreign and defence policies has begun to increase on 
these occasions (Isernia 2001). The use of the military instrument within the 
framework of international organizations has been considered a legitimate and 
crucial tool of foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008), a significant data 
taking into account the fact that participation in such operations has been one of 
the most successful Italian foreign policy activities over the last two decades. 
As briefly illustrated, Italian public opinion is slowly emerging in the foreign 
policy process as an actor gradually building a rather sound set of ideas and 
beliefs on different issues. Public opinion surveys are now much more carefully 
considered by politicians also in this field (again, especially as far as public 
support for military operations is concerned; see Battistelli 2012; Coticchia and 
De Simone 2014). However, compared to other policy areas, foreign and defence 
policies are yet to become a decisive issue in the public debate and during 
electoral campaigns (Silvestri 2013). 
 
3.7 Conclusions. Back and forth from the ‘second ring’ to the 
‘inner ring’. Possible interactions between the state and NGOs  
 
As described in this Chapter, the Italian Foreign Policy Community is composed 
of many different actors, and their roles and tasks are not always clearly set out, 
not even at the institutional level69. While conducting a complete assessment of 
all patterns of interaction possibly developing among all the actors of the FPC 
would be impossible due to the scope of this Chapter – more than a whole thesis 
would be necessary – it can be reasonably argued that the Italian institutional 
setting in foreign policy is rather fragmented, and that it features a) centres of 
power and influence scattered along different ‘rings’, according to the different 
issues and sub-policies at stake on a case-by-case basis; and b) an institutional 
‘inner ring’ with a relatively high number of ‘access points’ for external actors, to 
                                                 
69 For a brief historical – not political science/IR oriented – overview of the foreign policy process 
in Italy since the unification in 1861 see Mammarella and Cacace 2008: 289-293). 
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use the metaphor suggested by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993) and Santoro 
(1991), according to the different issues and sub-policies at stake on a case-by-
case basis. It is assuming this picture as a general map of the fragmented foreign 
policy landscape in Italy that the concept of ‘policy subsystem’70, presented in 
Chapter 1, will be employed in the following parts of this thesis in order to identify 
emerging policy subsystems in two foreign policy subfields, and that interactions 
between the state institutions and Sant’Egidio in the cases selected will be 
tracked. 
Within this framework, Sant’Egidio and other internationally active Catholic 
NGOs can channel their proposals and advance their goals interacting with other 
actors at different points of the ‘rings’. First of all, because of their long-standing 
presence in the subfields of preventive diplomacy and peace-making activities, 
human rights advocacy and development cooperation, they certainly have the 
ability to get closer to a crucial sub-actor at the basis of the ‘inner ring’, i.e. the 
bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing on a daily basis with such 
sub-policies (especially development cooperation), in order to influence their 
activities, secure funding, and negotiate issues of their interest according to the 
government agenda (if any).  
Second, each of the main Catholic NGOs, especially Sant’Egidio, on given 
occasions, in specific periods of time, and to a different extent, has managed to 
establish and maintain particularly close ties with top politicians at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and at the Prime Minister Office (ministries, undersecretaries, 
etc.), because of common political or religious leanings, or simply because of a 
background of good personal relations accumulated when political appointees 
were in a previous stage of their career (e.g., when they were MPs working in the 
foreign policy arena). This is particularly important when these NGOs aim to play 
a role on more important high politics issues, as it is the case when preventive 
diplomacy and peace-making activities are at stake. 
                                                 
70 The concept of ‘policy subsystem’, unlike those of ‘policy networks’ and ‘iron triangles’ “refers 
explicitly to policy autonomy enjoyed by a small numbers of actors in a specific policy field” 
(Verbeek and van Ufford 2001: 131). According to the authors, it encompasses all combinations 
of actors and at across different levels of government; policy subsystems can come in three forms: 
dominant, competitive, and disintegrated (for more on these concepts see Chapter 1).  
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Third, these NGOs often have established relations with political parties (located 
between the ‘inner’ and the ‘second’ ring), which are crucial in the Italian 
institutional system, although they are not formally ‘part of the state’. 
Interestingly, they are often on good terms not only with parties and MPs 
belonging to the former Christian Democracy Party, but also with center-left 
groups hailing from the remnants of the Communist Party. In an exceptional 
case, the founder and head of the Community of Sant’Egidio, Andrea Riccardi, 
became himself part of the government with the support of a Catholic party 
recently founded. He was appointed as Minister for International Cooperation 
(i.e.: development cooperation) in the Mario Monti’s technocratic government, in 
office from late 2011 to early 2013.  
Finally, although in the ‘second’ and in the ‘outer ring’ no state institutions can 
be found, it is clear that in order to advance their international agenda, it is very 
important for these NGOs to demonstrate their credibility to the state 
interlocutors also through the level of support received by societal actors such as 
the media, relevant academics and public opinion. As mentioned before in this 
Chapter, part of the added value of these NGOs is the fact of being deeply rooted 
in the Italian social fabric. 
 
------oooo----- 
 
Italian foreign policy between 1989 and 2001. Background  
 
Basic features  
 
Further reflections are needed here on the basic features of Rome’s foreign policy 
after the demise of the bipolar confrontation, that has been also termed “dual 
crisis” in Chapter 1, in order to illustrate to the reader the backdrop against which 
a) the Italian Foreign Policy Community actors described later in Chapter 3 have 
acted, and b) the events presented in Chapters 4-6 have unfolded.  
The operational environment of Italian foreign policy has experienced radical 
changes between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (see for 
instance Santoro 1991; Andreatta and Hill 2000 and 2001; Andreatta 2001b; 
Walston 2007; Verbeek 2009 and 2011; Carbone 2012 Varsori 2013; Pons et al. 
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2014). On the international side, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the 
Cold War in 1989 have ushered in a new historical phase, marked by a significant 
easing of the bipolar system strict constraints, which has urged all the actors on 
the global scenario to rethink their own international position and redefine their 
strategic interests in the world. This increase in both international opportunities 
and responsibilities for all states, also defined in terms of “diffusion of power”, 
has been particularly “crucial for middle powers like Italy, forced during the Cold 
War to play a subordinate role within their respective asymmetrical alliances” 
(Santoro 1991: 9).  
On the domestic side, ‘Mani Pulite’71, a major judicial investigation into cases of 
widespread political corruption started in 1992, the introduction of a quasi-
majoritarian electoral system in 1993 and the entry into force of the EU 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993 have resulted in a huge and complex process of political 
and institutional transformation, and in the formation of a new bipolar political 
and party system (two coalitions emerged, alternating in power), that some 
scholars have defined as the transition from the ‘First’ to the ‘Second Republic’72. 
These domestic transformations were expected to contain, to some extent, the 
inclination of Italian foreign policy to fall victim to domestic political skirmishes, 
while clearing somehow the way for the action of other societal actors in the 
domain of foreign policy, such as NGOs or business groups (Hill 2003 and 2015; 
Brighi 2005; Carbone 2011; Pons et al. 2014) – on these transformations and 
their impact on institutional and political setting of Italian foreign policy refer 
also to Chapter 3, on the Italian Foreign Policy Community. 
After the short-lived center-right government headed by Silvio Berlusconi 
between April 1994 and January 1995, and the following technocrat cabinet led 
by Lamberto Dini until the general election in 1996, the center-left governments 
in power between 1996 and 2001 inaugurated a process of reconsideration of 
Italian foreign policy and of ‘rediscovery of the concept of “national interest” 
                                                 
71 In English ‘Clean Hands’. 
 
72 As explained in previous Chapters, these definitions are today rather established both in the 
public debate and in academia, and are accepted also by scholars of Italian foreign policy (see for 
instance Coralluzzo 2000; Walston 2007), although a small number of political scientists and 
historians do not agree on it. It refers to the new political system emerged in the first half of the 
1990s, in order to distinguish it from that in place from the end of the Second World War (on this 
debate see for instance Sartori 1992; Pasquino and McCarthy 1993; Mershon and Pasquino 1995; 
Katz and Ignazi 1996).  
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(Molinari 2000; Romano 2002; Carbone 2011; Giacomello and Verbeek 2012). 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had suddenly presented Italy with international 
responsibilities that the country, for more than half a century, had to some extent 
“delegated” (Romano 2002; Fossati 1999: 26-35 and 2008; Carbone 2011: 10) to 
the United States and the Western camp in general, and to the partners of the 
European integration process, especially in its close geographic neighbourhood. 
At the same time, the demise of the Cold War brought about new ‘neighbours’ for 
Italy. Over the previous fifty years, the country had been perceived as a ‘border 
land’ at the heart of Europe, in a world dominated by the West-East divide. 
Instead of the Communist bloc, at the beginning of the 1990s Italy realised – or 
was supposed to realise – that other ‘unchartered’, unstable territories lied on its 
doorstep. These were the Balkan tinderbox, with its ever-simmering ethnic and 
political fault lines, and the Mediterranean, with its southern and eastern shores 
experiencing at that time the challenges posed by political Islam and radical 
Islamic terrorism.  
Until that moment the concept of ‘national interest’ had represented almost a 
taboo73. From the international perspective, contrasts between the Western camp 
and the Soviet bloc after the end of World War II had strongly influenced any 
substantive reflection on Italy’s main goals on the international scene, essentially 
leading to the identification of Rome’s priorities with the main tenets of the 
Western alliance, namely NATO and the European integration process (Santoro 
1991; Romano 2002; Carbone 2011). From the domestic politics point of view, in 
addition to evoke the imperial ambitions of the Fascism era, the political and/or 
public debate on the definition – and possible fine-tuning over time – of national 
interest had long been paralysed by harsh ideological confrontation, especially 
between the ruling Christian-democrat party and the Communist Party (such 
conflict was in turn shaped also by the abovementioned international elements) 
(Galli della Loggia, Panebianco and Rusconi 1993; Molinari 2000). Not only did 
the lack of a well thought out debate on Italian foreign policy goals hamper and 
delay during the Cold War the establishment of international studies in general, 
                                                 
73 As explained in Chapter 2, the notion of “national interest” has re-emerged in the public debate 
at the beginning of the 1990s, especially in the wider context of the ‘rediscovery’ of geopolitical 
thought in Italy, together with demands by some intellectuals and politicians for recalibrating 
Italian foreign policy in a more assertive way (Galli della Loggia, Panebianco and Rusconi 1993; 
Brighi 2013). For a detailed assessment of this issue refer to Chapter 2. 
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and IR in particular, in the country, as explained in Chapter 2 (Lucarelli and 
Menotti 2002: 129, among others); another outcome of such political and cultural 
standstill was that the few attempts to launch a careful assessment of Italian 
foreign policy and national interest were carried out only by right wing parties 
and intellectuals.  
In the changing landscape of international politics in the 1990s, Italy has come to 
realize that it was urgent to try to rethink a fresh and more coherent foreign policy 
agenda to adapt to an evolving scenario, steadily reaffirming at the same time the 
Western/NATO and European Economic Community (later EU) membership. 
Therefore, on the one hand it was essential for Italy to demonstrate its loyalty to 
its allies and not to articulate interests in conflict with those of its partners; on 
the other, Rome had to try to pursue an “effective [foreign policy, added by the 
author] reorientation in many other key areas of the world and [...] an increased 
international credibility as a [reliable, added] strategic and economic partner" 
(Colombo and Zannoni 2001: 45).  
However, the ‘modus operandi’ of the different center-right and center-left 
governments in power between 1992 and (at least) 2001, in order to identify 
national interest and foreign policy tools to advance it, has not stood out for being 
particularly strategic and forward-looking, but rather for relying on a case by case 
evaluation of specific events and on a piecemeal – if not inconsistent and erratic 
– policy. At the same time, like most of the small and medium powers over the 
world, Italy was faced with a more complex international arena and with a 
gradual specialisation process of the conduct of international affairs which 
presented all actors with both opportunities and challenges. In addition, in the 
same period of time the country has set out on a risky but somehow necessary 
path towards a ‘bipartisan’ foreign policy (Carbone 2011). Finally, it is interesting 
to note here that the new Italian activism in foreign policy was “also brought 
about by MAE [i.e. MFA in Italian, added] officials and not [only, added] by 
politicians” (Croci 2008a; see also Croci 2003), in line with the dynamism civil 
servants working on foreign policy had showed, on some occasions, also during 
the bipolar era. 
An assessment of how Italy has conducted its foreign policy over the years going 
from 1989 to 2001 in terms of results, effectiveness, consistency, etc. goes 
absolutely beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as further explained in 
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following Chapters, it can be argued that Rome showed a certain degree of 
activism in domains such as preventive diplomacy, peace-making, human rights 
advocacy, and particularly in traditional geographical areas of interest, namely 
the Balkans and the Mediterranean/Middle East (Carbone 2011; Giacomello and 
Verbeek 2012; Molinari 2000; Romano 2002). This is one of the main reasons 
why the cases selected for this thesis are all related to these foreign policy 
subfields and/or geographical regions. 
 
Preventive diplomacy/crisis management in post-Cold War Italian 
foreign policy  
 
The changes produced by the simultaneous international and domestic crises 
occurred between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, also 
defined in the public debate as a “dual crisis” (IAI 1993) (see Chapter 2 for further 
remarks on this), have opened up new opportunities for diplomatic action of 
states such as Italy, especially in its close neighbourhood, i.e. Balkans and the 
Mediterranean/Middle East. Preventive diplomacy and more ‘classic’ diplomacy 
tasks pursued in crisis management are among the domains in which this Italian 
foreign policy renewed activism has unfolded, in some cases in combination with 
peace-making efforts and significant contributions to international peace-
keeping and peace-enforcing operations (see Chapter 5 on this).  
Among the main features of Italian foreign policy and diplomacy of the second 
half of the 1990s, there was an attitude to grant countries seen at that time as 
‘pariah’ actors by the international community lines of ‘political credit’, 
consistently with previous foreign policy choices dating back to the Cold War era, 
such as the unilateral diplomatic initiatives aimed at reaching out to the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Libya and Syria (Guazzone 2000: 433; 
Ferraris 1998; Romano 2002; Mammarella and Cacace 2008). However, a fresh 
diplomatic blueprint has apparently emerged in the 1990s, moving away from 
previous initiatives, often occasional and inconclusive. In many cases, during the 
Cold War these moves were indeed aimed at carving out a small niche of 
autonomy and independence for Italy in the context of the Western alliance, in 
order to a) win the consent of domestic, Catholic and leftist constituencies, b) try 
to increase Rome’s bargaining power in negotiations with western allies or, in 
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some cases, c) gain limited economic benefits in terms of energy supply or trade. 
On the contrary, starting with the center-left cabinet which took office after the 
1996 general election, led by Romano Prodi, the decision to open channels for 
dialogue with countries considered as ‘troublesome’, seemed to be consistent with 
a more comprehensive and quite well thought out vision of specific national 
interests, to be promoted more independently from – although not overtly in 
conflict with – those of traditional partners (Molinari 2000 and 2001; Romano 
2002). 
This was the case, for instance, of diplomatic initiatives launched in those years 
concerning Iran, Libya, Iraq and Algeria (the latter is the case addressed later in 
this Chapter). On the Iran dossier, between 1997 and 2001 Rome has played a 
prominent role in the first attempts of rapprochement between Europe and Iran. 
In 1997, after the ‘Mykonos affair’74, the European Union decided to freeze 
relations with Iran, interrupting the ‘Critical Dialogue’75 launched in 1992 
(Struwe 1998)76. Taking advantage of the fact that other EU countries were not in 
a position to take the lead in a diplomatic attempt to improve relations with Iran 
– Germany, for example, was directly involved in the ‘Mykonos’ legal dispute, 
while the United Kingdom was concerned with the case of Salman Rushdie, the 
Anglo-Indian writer sentenced to death by a fatwa issued in 1989 by the then 
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, on blasphemy grounds – Italian 
leaders realised they had a chance of trying to play the diplomacy card to ease 
tensions and normalise relations with Tehran. The idea of Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi and of Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini was precisely to place Italy 
at the forefront of a diplomatic ‘offensive’ aimed at building bridges between the 
                                                 
74 According to the verdict of the German Supreme Court, high level Iranian officials working for 
the Ministry of Interior were found guilty of giving the order for the assassination in 1992 of four 
members of the Iranian-Kurdish opposition in a Berlin restaurant called ‘Mykonos’. 
 
75 The ‘Critical Dialogue’, initiated by the European Council in 1992, was based on the idea that 
although the time was not yet ripe for establishing formal relations through the standard EU 
external relations tools, such as trade and cooperation or political agreements, some form of 
dialogue had to be maintained with Iran, considering its importance in the Middle East. However, 
EU Member States stressed that the dialogue had to be ‘critical’ because at the same time it had 
to urge Iran to improve its record in terms of human rights and international terrorism (Hill and 
Smith 2000: 320).  
 
76 In greater detail, the Council of the European Union agreed on a series of measures entailing 
the suspension of bilateral relations in a number of domains; in particular, they decided to 
suspend official bilateral Ministerial visits to or from Iran (Hill and Smith 2000: 321). 
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West and the Islamic Republic of Iran, at at time when relations between Europe 
(and even more so Washington) and Tehran were hitting a historical low. 
With a good sense of timing, Rome seized this opportunity, further favoured by a 
combination of additional factors. First, the ‘reformist’ turn in Iranian politics 
after the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, which some Italian observers 
defined at that time, somehow incautiously, a “Thermidorian” evolution of the 
regime (Zanardi Landi 1998: 210)77. Second, the lack of a significant colonial past 
and of any historical heritage of political influence in the region, unlike states 
such as the United Kingdom, for instance; third, Italy’s attitude of presenting 
itself as a non-aggressive power; fourth, the uninterrupted presence of Italian 
diplomats posted to Tehran even in the worst phases of the Iran-Iraq war of the 
1980s, during which many Western countries had been forced or had decided to 
recall their ambassadors and, in some cases, even close their diplomatic 
representations (Molinari 2000).  
Through the joint action of the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and top 
diplomats, Italy has conducted a diplomatic action which, at least for a few years, 
before the George W. Bush’s election in 2000 and the emergence of the nuclear 
dossier, has contributed to fairly improve the relations between Western 
countries and Iran. The tools used were rather ‘classic’ instruments of diplomacy: 
establishing or resuming behind the scenes contacts, strengthening economic 
ties78 and, above all, organising the first official visits to Iran since the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 of a EU/Western state head of government (Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi travelling to Tehran, in 1998), and of an Iranian president to 
Europe (President Mohammad Khatami visiting Italy, in 1999). An important 
role in this process was played also by the partially state-owned oil and gas 
company ENI, a firm with a long-standing presence in Iran. The United States 
were of course kept informed during this flurry of diplomatic activity, in order not 
to damage relations with Washington, and some of the indirect contacts between 
                                                 
77 Over-optimistic comments such as the one quoted here are emblematic of the expectations 
raised by the election of Mohammad Khatami during those years, and of the high value Italian 
foreign policy makers, businessmen and observers placed on the political and economic potential 
of strengthened bilateral ties with Tehran. 
 
78 Between 1997 and 2005, Italy was alternately Iran’s first or the second trade EU partner. In 
2003, for the first time, Italy has even run a trade surplus with an increase in exports of around 
8% (Italian-Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2005). 
 
 106 
the formal ‘enemies', the US and Iran, were exchanged at that time through this 
Italian channel behind the scenes (Molinari 2000 and 2001). All these initiatives 
were of course very welcomed also by the Iranian side – especially by Mohammad 
Khatami’s cabinet and the business sector – that was trying to find a way out of 
two decades of international isolation. 
As many analysts have argued, the icebreaking diplomatic rapprochement with 
Iran brokered by Italy, although limited in time and scope, and then overshadow 
by the emergence of the nuclear dossier in 2002-3, was probably the most 
significant foreign policy success chalked up in the 1990s by Italy in the Middle 
East. By facilitating a gradual diplomatic reconciliation between the 
European/Western world and Tehran, Italy has obtained three main results: a) it 
gained the status of EU privileged partner of Iran in political terms; b) it benefited 
from new economic opportunities; c) it has strengthened its presence in the 
Persian Gulf, that until that moment had stayed out of the traditional areas of 
Italian interest (Guazzone 2000: 437). 
In the case of Libya, between 1996 and 1999 Rome has played a role in the process 
of Western/European détente with the Ghaddafi regime, leveraging (and further 
strengthening, at the same time) its long-standing political and economic ties 
with Libya. The core issue hindering the improvement of relations at that time 
was the resolution of the Lockerbie affair (1998)79. Tripoli was urged especially 
by the United States and the United Kingdom, but also by other European 
countries and the United Nations, to extradite the two Libyan suspects to the 
Scottish court in charge of investigating the case. In addition to wielding political 
pressure through frequent contacts and official visits of Ministers and top 
diplomats to Libya, Italy took responsibility of the delicate matter of the transfer 
of the Libyans from Tripoli to the Netherlands, where the court was relocated at 
Libya’s request, using a government official aircraft (Molinari 2000). 
Not always, however, has Italian diplomatic activism yielded positive results. As 
far as Russia is concerned, for example, the “bridge approach” (Collina 2008) that 
Italy has tried to adopt in more than one occasion since the end of the 1990s, in 
order to improve relations between European Union countries (and sometimes 
also the United States) on one side, and Moscow on the other, has often been a 
                                                 
79 Lockerbie is the Scottish town where in 1988 the wreckage of Pan Am flight 103 crashed after a 
bomb attack aboard the flight, which killed 270 people. Following a joint UK-US investigation, 
arrest warrants were issued for two Libyan officials. 
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failure. According to some scholars, such “obsession with mediation”, is a 
common feature of Italian foreign policy, “which implies a persistent offer to 
mediate even when that role is not requested by the involved parties, generally 
with the [sole, added by the author] aim to gain visibility in the international 
arena” (Coralluzzo 2006). This attitude has complemented (if not replaced) the 
Cold War era “old ‘obsession with visibility’, which implied an excessive 
preoccupation with presence rather than with policy outcomes” (Carbone and 
Coralluzzo 2011: 189). The latter was also defined as “the chair policy"” (Quaroni 
1956) by the prominent Italian diplomat Pietro Quaroni, to stress the idea that 
the very fact of sitting at international tables and forums was more important, for 
Italian political leaders and officials, than the substantive reasons for (and the 
concrete aims of) being part of the game. These reflections on Italian foreign 
policy ‘obsessions’, undoubtedly, hold true also for activities conducted in the 
realm of peace-making (see Chapter 5 on this). 
 
Peace-making in post-Cold War Italian foreign policy 
 
In Chapter 2 I have briefly mentioned that the international and domestic crises 
striking the country between the end of the Cold War and the first years of the 
1990s have generated fresh opportunities for preventive diplomacy activities 
carried out by states like Italy. The same holds true also for peace-making efforts. 
It is useful here not to consider them as a tool per se, but rather to place them in 
the broader context of a set of foreign policy instruments, all used to enhance the 
country’s international position.  
In some cases, peace-making activities have indeed gone hand in hand with – and 
have preceded, too – significant contributions to international peace-keeping and 
peace-enforcing operations, and it is worthwhile having a look at the latter tool 
here. Since the end of the Cold War, Italian armed forces have indeed participated 
in a great number of UN/NATO/EU/multinational missions around the world. 
Such dynamism in the post-1989 War era is a striking feature if compared to the 
Cold War era reluctance to get involved in military efforts abroad (Attinà 2008; 
Ignazi et al. 2012), and has transformed the country from a security consumer 
into a security producer (Ratti 2011; Coticchia and De Simone 2014). “The 
identification of peace support operations as a bipartisan and legitimate foreign 
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policy tool was matched with an increasing public awareness of the relevance of 
the military instrument, especially when employed for peace-keeping 
interventions and in multilateral contexts” (Coticchia and De Simone 2014: 5; see 
also on this Battistelli and Isernia 1991; Battistelli 2004; Battistelli et al. 2012). 
In addition, contributing a significant number of troops to these operation has 
become in the eyes of Italian policymakers a crucial instrument to advance 
Rome’s positions in the global arena in general, and specifically within 
international organisations, and in the context of bilateral relations with its allies, 
especially the US and other major EU partners (Davidson 2011), and countries 
where military units were/are deployed. The high value placed on 
multilateralism, in all its dimensions – military, political, economic – is indeed a 
distinctive feature of Italian foreign policy both pre- and post- Cold War; Ratti 
has even argued that being a multilateral actor is “the inescapable destiny of a 
middle power” like Italy (2011: 123). 
Besides the experience with the Mozambican conflict, which is the case covered 
later in this thesis, the Lebanese war of 2006, for instance, is a case in point of a 
peace-making effort that has then been complemented by a remarkable – 
considering the size and the armed forces of the country – contribution to a 
peace-keeping mission. On that occasion, Italy has managed to carve out a small 
niche for its international action contributing to the political and diplomatic 
peace-making initiatives that have then resulted in the launch of the so called UN 
peace-keeping operation ‘UNIFIL II’ (Del Sarto and Tocci 2008; Carbone 2008). 
Following the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah 
in July that year, on the initiative of the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Italian diplomats coordinated the organisation of a multilateral 
conference in the Foreign Ministry headquarters in Rome, at the end of the 
month, to try to reach a cease-fire. This political and diplomatic effort was 
facilitated by good personal relations between the Italian Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister and leaders of different Lebanese political factions, and by a 
direct channel established with the US Secretary of State and her staff. Although 
the outcome of the diplomatic summit in itself was modest, the conference was a 
rather good diplomatic move per se for a country like Italy, that has managed to 
take the lead of the process, also taking advantage of the French and German 
hesitations (Aliboni 2006; Brighi 2007), on a relevant foreign policy issue for 
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Rome – due to its geographical position, Italy has historically been interested in 
preserving security and stability in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East 
(Santoro 1996b; De Leonardis 2003; Bardi et al. 2008; Graziano 2007b; 
Coralluzzo 2008). The conference was also a first step towards the passing of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1701 in August 2006, establishing the enhanced 
presence of blue helmets forces in the country, that are still deployed there today 
(Ronzitti and Di Camillo 2008). In addition, it is important to stress that since 
2006 Italy has always ranked first in the list of countries contributing troops to 
the mission (UNIFIL official website80). 
However, not every Italian attempt at launching (or participating in) peace-
making activities has been successful. An example of a failed bid is, for instance, 
the modest attempt made by the then Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 
2008, after the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian conflict, to present himself as a 
broker between Moscow and Tbilisi, and between Moscow and European Union 
countries, leveraging its personal friendship ties with the Russian leader Vladimir 
Putin. “While Russia publicly praised his successful mediation, Georgia not only 
accused Italy of taking sides, but also rejected its proposal for an international 
conference on stability in the South Caucasus to be held in Rome” (Carbone and 
Coralluzzo 2011: 185). The “obsession with mediation” (Carbone and Coralluzzo 
2011: 189) illustrated in Chapter 4, with reference to preventive diplomacy and 
more ‘classic’ crisis management diplomacy, is therefore relevant also as far as 
peace-making is concerned. Ratti (2011: 138), with reference to Italy, pointed to 
the concept of “catering diplomacy”, defined as “the hosting and promotion of 
high-level diplomatic events at the expense of a deeper and more systematic 
analysis about whether and how ‘catering’ events feed into wider international 
policies”. In the specific domain of peace-making, sometimes the risk of “catering 
diplomacy” appeared indeed to be high for Rome (Coralluzzo 2006; Carbone 
2013), and this will probably be the case also in the near future. 
 
                                                 
80 unifil.unmissions.org (last retrieved: 2016).  
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Chapter 4. The Community of Sant’Egidio 
 
 
4.1 Chapter outline 
 
This Chapter presents a brief illustration of the Community of Sant’Egidio, 
shedding light on its establishment, structure, functioning, and activities on the 
international scene, mostly following a chronological criterion. First, it looks at 
the establishment of CSE at the end of the 1960s, its founders and the politico-
cultural milieu they were embedded in at that time. Second, it briefly presents the 
activities carried out in the time frame going from its inception to the demise of 
the Cold War in the religious, social and voluntary work fields (e.g. spreading the 
Catholic religious message and providing help for people in need). Thirdly, the 
chapter takes stock of what the Community has done in the international arena 
after 1989, especially in the subfields of preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution 
and peace-making, trying to understand how it has operated – particularly in 
cases when also Italian state institutions were involved – in what areas of the 
world it has been mostly active, and with what sort of outcomes. Fourth, some 
remarks are offered on the internal structure of the CSE and on its main leaders 
from the 1990s to present day. In closing, some remarks are presented on policy 
subsystems emerging in the subfields of in preventive diplomacy/crisis 
management. Although they refer, in part, to some of the material on Italian 
foreign policy presented in previous Chapters, they have been included here as 
they are based also on considerations on Sant’Egidio activities on the 
international stage presented in this Chapter. 
 
4.2 1968-1973. The early days. The birth of an ‘innovative’ 
Catholic non state actor in Italy 
 
The Community of Sant’Egidio is a Catholic-oriented civil society movement 
founded in Rome in 1968, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council of 1962-
1965, by a bunch of high school students led by the then 18 years old Andrea 
Riccardi. The original core of the association was formed by a rather unstructured 
group of middle and upper class kids – ten of whom attending one of the most 
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distinguished schools in the city, the “Liceo Virgilio” (“Vergilius Lyceum” in 
English) – who started to meet spontaneously to read and discuss the Gospel, and 
pray81. They gathered together for the first time on 7 February 1968, in the oratory 
of “Chiesa Nuova” (“New Church”), in the center of Rome. From 1968 to 1973, the 
group was known simply as “the community” and did not have yet proper 
headquarters (Marazziti and Ivereigh 2006: 30-31).  
One of the main topics of discussion during their first meetings was the role the 
Church should play within the society, with special reference to the contribution 
of the Catholic faithful to alleviate the sufferings of unfortunate people. The issue 
was highly debated among Catholics at that time, after Pope John XXIII had 
clearly articulated in 1962 his vision for the Catholic community as a “Church for 
everyone, and particularly for the poor” (A.A.S.82 1962: 682)83. The goal of putting 
in practice the Gospel teachings by helping people in need soon became evident 
in the group’s early activities, going hand in hand with their interest in the in-
depth study of religious texts. They physically moved, indeed, the center of gravity 
of their activities to Trastevere, an historical neighbourhood that during the 
1960s was still a popular district, and to other low-income urban areas in the 
outskirts of the city, for instance Primavalle, Garbatella and Tufello, that at that 
time were crowded with working class immigrants coming mostly from the south 
of Italy. Their projects, during the first years, were quite unstructured, and 
basically consisted in helping poor people, providing health care assistance, and 
teaching free classes to needy children. They often met in the basements of 
buildings rented in these popular areas to read the Bible and pray (Marazziti and 
Ivereigh 2006: 30; Montonati 1999: 16-17).  
                                                 
81 It is interesting to note that the very fact of getting together in churches to pray and study the 
Bible, without the guidance of a Catholic priest, was still considered at that time rather peculiar, 
because it was viewed as a Protestant feature. For this reason, it caused some problems to the 
group in the first years, especially when they did not have yet a place of their own for their 
meetings (Riccardi, interviewed by Catherine Odell 2004, quot. in Marazziti and Ivereigh 2006: 
41). 
 
82 A.A.S. is the acronym used to refer to “Acta Apostolicae Sedis”, i.e. the Vatican official bulletin 
including for record purposes all the laws, regulations, decrees, speeches, etc. concerning the 
activity of the Holy See. 
 
83 The message of Pope John XXIII and the activities of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) 
were important contextual factors leading to the birth of the Community, as it will be highlighted 
later in this Chapter. 
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Some remarks on the founder of the CSE, Andrea Riccardi, and on the political, 
social and cultural context of the second half of the 1960s are useful here to try to 
understand where the idea of Sant’Egidio came from. Riccardi was born in 1950 
into a wealthy family, to parents who were Catholic but not particularly practising 
(Riccardi 1997: 11-12). His father worked as a banker and had never been an 
advocate of the Christian Democracy Party, but liberal and secular, and close to 
the group of the Italian intellectuals contributing to the political and cultural and 
economic weekly magazine “Il Mondo” (in English “The World”), inspired by left-
wing liberal, radical and laicist political ideas, that was published in Italy in the 
1950s and 1960s (Montonati 1999: 9-10; Orsina 2015: 245). Riccardi was raised 
according to the main traditional Catholic principles, but he actually started to 
develop a genuine interest in theology and Catholic doctrine out of the family 
context, and only when he was in high school, and then at the University of Rome, 
where he graduated first in Law and then in History. 
Although Riccardi had not framed, during his childhood and high school years, 
any explicitly political orientation, nor was the intellectual background of the 
other founding members of the group particularly politically nuanced, the social 
and political effects of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) are of course a 
contextual factor that has exerted a significant degree of influence on the 
establishment of the group (Riccardi: 30-31). This ecumenical Council, the formal 
conference of bishops, ecclesiastical figures and theological experts from all over 
the world, gathering together to discuss and settle disputes on issues of doctrine 
and practice, was announced by Pope John XXIII in January 1959, and was the 
first comprehensive attempt ever made by the Catholic Church to modernize 
itself, by addressing a wide array of topics, encompassing nearly all the issues 
concerning its relations with the contemporary society. The conference was 
basically aimed at fostering spiritual renewal for the Church, and starting a 
dialogue with other Christian denominations (Orthodox, Protestant, etc.), to 
explore options for some form of reconciliation. Such an opening to the external 
world was per se a powerful driver for stimulating a fresh debate on new, more 
modern ways of practising the Catholic faith, in Italy and in the rest of the world 
(Reese 1996; Graziano 2010). Yet the Second Vatican Council was all the more 
important, as far as Catholic-inspired civil society movements are concerned, 
because two of the documents approved by the assembly, the Dogmatic 
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Constitution “Lumen Gentium” (in English “Light of the Peoples”) and the decree 
“Apostolica Actuositatem” (“Apostolic Activity”), were focused precisely on the 
role of the laity in the Catholic community, i.e. all the believers except those who 
are members of Holy orders or religious institutes (Hayes 2006; Melloni 2015). 
In particular, for the first time the documents explicitly attached great 
importance to the activities of lay faithful in the everyday life of the Catholic 
Church. The decree “Apostolica Actuositatem” was specifically aimed at further 
promoting the participation of lay people, and better organising their activities in 
Catholic-inspired daily life, outlining their basic principles (evangelization and 
sanctification, renewal of the temporal order, charitable works and social aid) and 
giving pastoral guidelines on the issue (A.A.S. 1966: 837-864).  This turn towards 
a more pronounced opening to the broader society triggered the establishment of 
a great number of ‘associations of the faithful’, i.e. groups of Catholic believers 
(lay or clerics, or both together), who started to gather together autonomously 
from the Church hierarchy – and even more so, outside of it, being completely 
embedded in civil society in their countries. Their objective is to “strive with a 
common effort to foster a more perfect life, or to promote public worship or 
Christian teaching. They may also devote themselves to other works of the 
apostolate, such as initiatives for evangelisation, works of piety or charity, and 
those which animate the temporal order with the Christian spirit” (Code of Canon 
Law 2016: art. 298.1). Although, according to the definition of ‘association of the 
faithful’, also clerics can participate in such associations, most of the members of 
these new groups were lay people: this is the reason why this shift turned out to 
be so significant for the role of the Church in the society (Hayes 2006; Graziano 
2010). In 1967, a dedicated Pontifical Council84 for the Laity was established 
within the Roman Catholic Curia, the complex of central administrative bodies of 
the Vatican. The department was (and still is today) in charge of assisting the 
Pope in dealing with the many lay movements founded after 1967, and in 
                                                 
84 A Pontifical Council is a central administrative unit of the Roman Catholic Curia, that could be 
roughly equated to a Ministry in other states. The name ‘Dicastery’ is also used, and other terms 
for central departmental units are ‘Secretariat of State’, ‘Congregation’, ‘Tribunal’ and ‘Offices’. 
These bodies are generally headed by a cardinal ‘prefect’ or a presiding archbishop, assisted by a 
group of other cardinals and bishops, a secretary, advisors, senior administrators, and officials 
(A.A.S. 1988: 859-860). In August 2016, the Pontifical Council for the Laity was merged with the 
Pontifical Council for the Family and transformed in a Dicastery for the Laity, Family and Life 
(Vatican website 2016). 
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particular to examine associations, movements and groups in order to grant them 
the Holy See’s official recognition as ‘international’85 associations of the faithful, 
with Sant’Egidio falling into this category later in its history86.  
Some of these movements, “even those whose origins antedate the council, 
identify themselves as “the fruit of the Vatican II” and claim legitimacy on the 
basis of the council – if not in the ‘letter’ of its documents certainly in its ‘spirit’” 
(Heft and O’Malley 2012: xvi). The new organizations that emerged or 
strengthened their role in Italy in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council – 
apart from the CSE, for instance the Focolare Movement, Communion and 
Liberation, the Pope John XXIII Community, Pax Christi, the Association of 
Italian Catholic Guides and Scouts, or the Christian Workers Movement, to name 
just the most renowned – were very different in nature, objectives and trajectory, 
but all of them gained inspiration or momentum from that event, and are still 
operating today87. For the purpose of this thesis, it is interesting to note that, like 
Sant’Egidio, although on a smaller scale, some of these organizations later 
developed also an interest in the international scene, at least in terms of 
development cooperation with least developed countries in Africa and Asia 
(Hayes 2006; Heft and O’Malley 2012).  
In addition to the post Second Vatican Council religious ‘climate’, the wave of 
protests of 1967-69 brought to the fore, in Italy as in the rest of Europe and in the 
United States, social and political demands that, in turn, prompted in the short 
and in the medium term other kinds of civil society mobilization in the country, 
                                                 
85 Official recognition to similar associations, having only a national or local scope, is granted 
instead by the country’s Episcopal Conference and local bishops. 
 
86 The essential requirement for recognition as ‘international association of the faithful’ “is that 
an association be international in character, with a consolidated presence of members in 
particular churches in different countries. Other elements taken into consideration are the 
number of members in the association, its nature and the purpose of the association’s activities. 
As can be seen, these criteria are general and flexible, in order to take into account the specificity 
of each association”. A fair degree of personal connections between the members of the group and 
Holy See’s officials is of course also important: “periodic contact between the association’s leaders 
and the Dicastery is also an indispensable part of the recognition process, as it provides the 
Dicastery with a better knowledge of the association” (Vatican official website 2016). 
 
87 Elaborating more on the effects of the social, political and cultural atmosphere of the late 1960s 
on the Catholics in Italy, it is worth mentioning that a scholar has even written that “the real 
winners of the struggle within Italian Catholicism after 1968 were movements like Communion 
and Liberation on the one side, and the Community of Sant’Egidio on the other, which embodied 
and represented the Rome-linked and at the same time post institutional face of Roman 
Catholicism – while expressing two different sets of style and theological cultures” (Faggioli 2016: 
80). 
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i.e. social care groups, trade unions-led movements, extra-parliamentary political 
groups, even terrorist organizations88  (Lepre 1993: 238-245, to name just one of 
many scholars who have worked on this topic). Also the high school attended by 
the founding members of Sant’Egidio was actively involved in 1968 student 
movements. Although Riccardi and his fellows “shared something of the spirit of 
‘1968’” (Marazziti and Ivereigh 2006: 33), instead of taking the road of political 
left (mostly Marxist), in order to address pressing social concerns, they started 
looking for a Catholic way, so to speak, to deal with the same issues. Such idea 
was shared also by a non Italian commentator, the Vatican correspondent of the 
National Catholic Reporter from 1998 to 2014, John Allen. The CSE was “founded 
in 1968 by a group of young Catholic leftists who did not want to drift off into 
secular radicalism but remain anchored in the Gospel” (Allen 2004: 163, quot. in 
Hayes 2006: 41). In sum, if any particular political leanings are to be found when 
analysing the orientation of the first members of the CSE, it is possible to argue 
that they were close, to some extent and only in terms of intellectual tenets, to the 
ideas of the then leftist political trend within the Christian Democracy Party (the 
consolidation of this group within the party in itself could be viewed, at least 
partially, as an outcome of the Second Vatican Council). However, they did not 
seem to have any specific ties with political parties, their youth wings, individual 
political leaders, nor with other para-political entities, like cultural foundations 
or research centres, etc. After the end of the Cold War, the CSE of course 
developed good relations with some political leaders from different parties, also 
due to its work on the international stage, on issues some political leaders were 
also dealing with, but it was only in recent years (2011-2013) that some of its 
members got involved in politics, as it will be illustrated later in this Chapter. It 
is worth mentioning here that a different perspective on this aspect has been 
suggested by Melloni, a renowned Italian Church historian specializing in the the 
Second Vatican Council, who has argued that the Community “that entered 
parliament and the government in 2011-2013, had a very political future” since 
the very beginning, unlike other groups, e.g. the Focolare Movement, or the 
Neocatechumenal Way, that were lacking a political agenda, and were instead 
fine with receiving just some form of ecclesiastical acknowledgment (Melloni 
                                                 
88 For the sake of brevity, here various forms of civil society involvement are briefly mentioned all 
together as a mere example. The author is aware of the significant differences among all of them. 
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2015: 418). This is not the preferred interpretation used here in this thesis 
because it seems, at least to some extent, to be influenced by ‘hindsight bias’, i.e. 
by later developments that started to affect the activities of the CSE only towards 
the end of the Cold War. 
 
4.3 1973-1989. The Cold War era: quite a ‘classic’ Catholic-
oriented NGO 
 
It is against the social and cultural backdrop sketched out in the previous section 
that the Community took its first steps between 1968 and 1973. In 1972, the first 
important change occurred for the group, with the arrival of the first cleric 
member, Vincenzo Paglia. A young priest serving in a parish church in the 
popular district of Casal Palocco, he was very open to the debate on the new forms 
of interaction between the Church and the society stirred by the Second Vatican 
Council, of which the Community was somehow a ‘product’, as illustrated in the 
previous section. For this reason, he was highly interested in the innovative vision 
of the Community, and soon became one of its most prominent members, as it 
will be explained also later in this Chapter. His presence turned out to be crucial 
not only for the group to become more sophisticated in terms of religious 
knowledge, but also as far as he acted as a sort of ‘bridge’ towards the Church 
establishment (Riccardi 1997: 30; Montonati 1999: 38-40).  
In 1973, the Community started to better shape itself and its activities. After 
makeshift meeting places scattered over various Roman suburban districts, and 
after a temporary relocation to a university chapel, in September 1973 they set up 
their first – and last, to this day – proper headquarters in Trastevere. In the 
historical neighbourhood they moved to an abandoned wing of a Carmelite nuns’ 
convent, owned by the state and located in Sant’Egidio square, first ‘occupying’ 
the property to some extent unlawfully, then formally renting it (Montonati 1999: 
17-20). The square had been named after the small church annexed to the 
convent, dedicated to Sant’Egidio. From that moment on, the convent and the 
church, reopened shortly after, on the initiative of Paglia, became closely 
associated to the group, and vice versa: it was then that the group officially 
became known as the “Community of Sant’Egidio” (Montonati 1999: 17). The 
reopening of the church to the public also marked a significant shift for the CSE, 
as it signalled its gradual transition from a relatively small-scale, close-knit group 
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of people, to an entity that was started to reach out to a broader audience, first of 
all by sharing the moment of mass liturgy. Furthermore, during that period the 
CSE begun to consider the option of expanding also outside the city of Rome, 
where it was already operating a dozen centres – also called informally 
‘communities’– in different suburban areas, and in 1974 a branch was established 
in Naples, working on people in need in distressed districts of the city. More 
centres followed suit in the next years, all over the country (Riccardi 1997: 44). 
From 1973-4 to the mid-1980s, the Community strengthened its role in 
performing ‘classic’ activities for a Catholic inspired lay movement. As explained 
in the previous section, their first objective was essentially traditional in nature, 
for a religiously inspired association: a) meeting to discuss the Gospel, spreading 
its message and putting in practice its teachings. Their first sources of inspiration 
were the first Christian community of the Acts of the Apostles (I century)89 and 
Saint Francis of Assisi (XIII century), the Italian preacher who founded the Order 
of Friars (CSE official website: 2016). Both these ‘models’, indeed, immediately 
point to the core activities carried out by the Community from its early stages and 
up to present day: a) dissemination of the Catholic message, as argued before, 
and b) assistance to people in need. As it will be illustrated later in this Chapter, 
their c) involvement in preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution, peace-making 
and development cooperation abroad came later, only in the 1980s. In 1974 the 
CSE started to gain popularity and visibility in Rome by participating for the first 
time in a big public event, a religious/lay conference on the main social and 
economic problems of the city organised by the local diocese that caused 
considerable stir in the Roman public debate. On that occasion, the Community 
introduced itself as an actor actively committed to addressing the problem of the 
widening social gap between different parts of the city, and at the same time it 
started to establish the first contacts with the Catholic hierarchy (Montonati 
1999: 42). Among the most relevant initiatives launched during those years and 
still in progress today, in Rome and in other Italian regions, are the following: 
prayer groups to study the Gospel (“Scuole del Vangelo”, “Gospel Schools”), a big 
charity canteen operating every day in the center of Rome, Italian language 
                                                 
89 I.e. the first group of Christians, considered as the most authentic (and faithful to the original 
message of Jesus Christ) community of Christian believers. Their deeds, including the foundation 
of the Catholic Church and the spread of the religion through the other provinces of the Roman 
Empire, are portrayed in the book called “Acts of the Apostles”, that is part of the New Testament. 
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courses for immigrants, centres delivering staple foods for low-income families, 
after-school tuition for children, centres for assisting disabled people, terminally 
ill patients, and for mental health care, assistance to older people, clinics (CSE 
official website).  
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Community’s encounter with Pope John Paul 
II marked another important shift for the association. In December 1978, during 
a visit to a Roman popular neighbourhood, the newly elected pontiff stopped by 
a kindergarten run by the CSE, almost by chance, getting to know firsthand one 
of the projects of the group. The Pope acts formally also as the bishop of Rome, 
and Karol Wojtyla, more clearly than his predecessors, was determined to attach 
great importance to his role of head of the local Roman Church community too. 
For this reason, he placed great value on establishing direct links with local 
entities like the CSE.  From that moment on, contacts between the leader of the 
Catholic Church and Sant’Egidio intensified with other meetings and an official 
visit paid by the Pope to the headquarters of the CSE in 1981 (Montonati 1999: 
24-26) (more came also during the 1990s). In the words of its founder, a sort of 
‘friendship’ was born, more than a fully-fledged ‘acknowledgment’ (Riccardi 
1997: 79). The group was then granted the official recognition from the Pontifical 
Council for the Laity of the Holy See as an ‘international association of the 
faithful’ in 1986. 
A few remarks could be useful here on relations of the Community with the 
Vatican. As explained in other parts of this thesis, adding also the Vatican to the 
examination of the interplay between the Italian state institutions and the CSE in 
the realm of foreign policy would have proved unfeasible for different reasons. 
However, it is worth mentioning that from the analysis of the history and 
activities of the group, very little has emerged pointing to some form of 
‘subordination’ of the association to the Vatican hierarchy. Undoubtedly, both 
actors could have possibly seen each other as being mutually beneficial on a 
number of issues, concerning both the Italian domestic debate and international 
politics, and the Community itself has certainly taken advantage of its good ties 
with the Holy See, especially with some of its leaders, for instance Pope John II90. 
However, these facts hardly amount for the small group to being ‘directed’ from 
                                                 
90 An American commentator has argued, as if it was an outright contradiction, that 
“[s]ociologically and politically, the centre of gravity in Sant’Egidio is on the left, yet it has terrific 
[emphasis added] contacts with the Vatican” (Allen 2004: 163, quot. in Hayes 2006: 41). 
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the much more powerful Roman Curia. This is all the more probable when 
acknowledging that in some cases, as illustrated later in the Chapter on the 
Algerian case, frictions occurred between the two actors, or at least with part of 
the Church’s hierarchy, both in Rome and at the local level, in Algeria. Therefore, 
it can be reasonably argued that the Community has always operated 
autonomously from the Vatican leadership, both in its early contacts with it, and 
later, when it became a well-known entity on the international scene.  
Relations with the Holy See have probably been more important for the history 
of the CSE in another respect. In effect, a) close ties with the Vatican leaders, and 
in particular with John Paul II, a Pope with a pronounced interest in international 
affairs – that in the first years of the Community had been pretty non existent – 
are maybe one of the factors that, at least to some extent, contributed to the 
‘internationalisation’ of the activities of Sant’Egidio. Another crucial element, in 
this regard, possibly even more relevant than the previous one, is the b) 
progressive expansion abroad that the Community experienced in the 1980s. 
After the first center was opened in Würzburg, Germany, in 1982, on the initiative 
of two young German priests who had previously cooperated with the CSE during 
a study period in Rome, other branches were established in the following years in 
different cities in Germany, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and in Prague, Kiev and 
Moscow. Interestingly, in some of these countries also Christians Orthodox or 
Evangelical members joined the centres. From the mid-1980s, centres were set 
up also in other continents: Central America, for instance in El Salvador, Mexico, 
Argentina, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Cuba, and Africa, for example in Cameroon, 
Ivory Coast, Guinea-Conakry, Mozambique, and Indonesia. Such a massive 
expansion abroad was not centrally directed by the headquarters in Rome, but – 
as in the case of the establishment of the first branch abroad, in Germany – was 
the spontaneous outcome of the international exposure that the Community 
gradually started to gain. Many foreigners started to get in touch with the group 
in Rome in that period, and it should be remembered that the city has always 
been a sort of a ‘required stop’ for theology students, Catholic clerics, etc. from all 
over the world (Montonati 1999: 130-1). Finally, a third factor influencing the 
decision of Sant’Egidio to ‘go international’, is of course the c) gradual opening 
up of the international arena that had already set in motion towards the end of 
the Cold War, at the end of the 1980s. As discussed in other parts of this thesis, 
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such context offered new opportunities both to middle and small powers, and to 
non state actors, in a number of foreign policy subfields, for example 
development cooperation and, later on, also for preventive diplomacy/conflict 
management and peace-making. As far as foreign aid projects are concerned, in 
the 1980s the CSE begun to work with the funds distributed to NGOs by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that in that decade begun to boost its 
development cooperation policy, especially in African and Central and South 
American countries (Fossati 1999). Since 1987 it is part of the list of Italian NGOs 
entitled to receive and manage funds of the Italian foreign aid, allocated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA official website: 2016). 
Another experience that strengthened the international credentials of the 
Community was the organisation from 1987 of annual meeting of religious 
representatives to address issues of international peace, and pursue interreligious 
dialogue. The initiative followed up on the “World Day of Prayer for Peace”, 
organised by Pope John Paul II in Assisi in 1986, an event that for the first time 
had brought together the leaders of the main religions of the world. Since then, 
these events have been organised every year in different cities in Europe, the 
United States and the Middle East, and interreligious dialogue has become 
another hallmark of the Community (Scott Appleby 2000: 157; Graziano 2010). 
 
4.4 1989-2001. The post-bipolar world: Sant’Egidio enters the 
international arena 
 
Building upon the first initiatives with an international dimension carried out in 
the 1980s, sketched out in the previous section, with the end of the Cold War the 
CSE entered the international stage, albeit preserving its ‘Italian-ness’, that has 
clearly emerged from the history of the group discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
The leaders of Sant’Egidio did not see this as a major shift from, but as a natural 
‘spin-off’ of their ‘classic’ activities (Montonati 1999: 26), because it was precisely 
through its long-standing commitment to helping poor people that, the CSE came 
“to better understand that war is the mother of poverty”. The Community’s work 
in different poor and war-torn countries contributed to enhance its strong “belief 
in the ‘weak power’ of prayer and in the transforming power of non-violence and 
persuasion” (CSE official website: 2016). The group started to perform a great 
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number of activities, ranging from supply of foreign aid to poor countries 
(especially in the sector of health care) to human rights protection (i.e. 
campaigning for the abolition of the death penalty), from preventive 
diplomacy/conflict management to peace-making. Most of these initiatives are 
still carried out today. Here in this Chapter, due to the purpose of this thesis, 
special attention is devoted to the activities implemented by the CSE particularly 
in the domains of preventive diplomacy/conflict management. With varying 
degrees of success, as it will be illustrated in the next sections, Sant’Egidio has 
worked in many different conflict scenarios, from Mozambique to Algeria, from 
Albania to Burundi, from Kosovo to the Democratic Republic of Congo, earning 
the nickname of “UN of Trastevere” (Man 1995). 
 
4.4.1 The Community of Sant'Egidio and preventive diplomacy/crisis 
management  
 
As explained earlier in this thesis, the role of non state actors in preventive 
diplomacy/crisis management has been the focus of a number of academic works 
over the past few years, in the broader context of the study of transformations of 
diplomacy (to name just a few: Langhorne 2005 and 2007; Cooper et and 
Hocking 2000; Khagram 2006; Murray 2008). Hocking has defined the growing 
international involvement of NSA in these activities as a process of 
“diplomatization” of these entities (Hocking 2011). Concerning in particular 
NGOs, Krahmann 2005, Stoddard 2006 Jentleson 2000, Hackett 2000 and Lund 
1996 have focused on the features of NGOs involvement in different forms of 
preventive diplomacy, including their participation in early warning activities. 
For works dealing with the contribution of NGOs to peace-making see instead the 
following section. Catholic NGOs (in general, and those based in Italy in 
particular) involved in preventive diplomacy have received less attention by 
academics – on the contrary, they have been explored a bit more with reference 
to the domain of development cooperation activities – with the exception of the 
Community of Sant’Egidio.  
As far as Sant’Egidio’s preventive diplomacy activities in particular are 
concerned, literature is less risch but it is still possible to find some interesting 
accounts of its role in the Albanian scenario in 1991-1997 (de Guttry and Pagani 
1999; Molinari 2000; Morozzo della Rocca 2010a), in Kosovo in 1993-1997 (Lund 
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2000; Morozzo della Rocca 1998 and 2010b; Giro 2011), and in Algeria in 1994-
1998 (Rupesinghe 1998; Hill 2003 and 2015; de Courten 2003; Impagliazzo 
2010), which is the case addressed later in this thesis. 
In the case of Albania, after an energetic mediation activity, in June 1997 the 
Community was able to broker an agreement between contending political 
factions called “Pact for the Future of Albania”, that allowed regular elections to 
take place after a few days (Morozzo della Rocca 2010a). A state where a pro-
communist political regime, in power since the end of the Second World War, had 
de facto banned most forms of relations and contacts between the local 
population and the outside world, Albania was also a country with a poor track 
record of protecting Christian minorities, something which certainly had not 
encouraged the set up of a Catholic-oriented civil society presence its territory. 
The arrival of Sant’Egidio in Albania dated back to the collapse of the communist 
regime in 1991, and its activities during the political transition of 1991-1993, 
aimed at delivering aid to a poverty-stricken population in sectors such as 
healthcare, social assistance, education, etc., regardless of religion and political 
stances, helped the Community leaders and volunteers establish good 
connections with different sectors of Albanian society and politics. This action 
proved effective and fruitful also in strengthening diplomatic ties between Rome 
and Tirana, and even more in facilitating the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the Vatican and Albania in 1991 (Morozzo della Rocca 2010a: 
155-157).  
When in the first half of 1997 the Albanian financial and political crisis broke out, 
also with violent street demonstrations, Sant’Egidio suggested the idea of a pre-
electoral ‘guarantee’ pact between the two main opposing parties, i.e. the Socialist 
Party and the Democratic Party, and a number of smaller groups, defining the 
conditions according to which all parties would recognize the validity of the 
outcome of the ballots, and seeking to prevent political and social unrest from 
erupting again after the elections, by including a precise commitment to the 
inclusiveness of the process of government formation. Over two weeks, in June 
1997, representatives of the Community engaged in a sort of ‘shuttle diplomacy’91 
among the various parties, in order to work on and finalize a draft proposal 
                                                 
91 The term “shuttle diplomacy” was coined in 1974 by journalists covering the short trips to the 
Middle East of the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was trying to secure a deal after 
the Yom Kippur war of October 1973 (US Department of State – Office of the Historian 2013). 
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prepared by Sant’Egidio itself. They succeeded in these efforts because they were 
able to take advantage of their image of a third-party, neutral actor maintaining 
good ties with representatives of different political factions, and relying on a 
sound expertise in Albanian history and society gained working on the field 
(Morozzo della Rocca 2010a). In addition, it is important to note that the 
Community also played a useful role in keeping the Italian government, that was 
deeply interested and involved in the management of the Albanian crisis, 
informed on the whole process. As a testimony of fruitful cooperation on the 
Albanian question, a cabinet member, the Minister of Defense Beniamino 
Andreatta, on 23 June 1997 attended the signing ceremony of the Pact, held at 
the Sant’Egidio headquarters in Rome, on behalf of the Italian government, 
although it must be stressed that Italian state institutions had played only a minor 
role in brokering the political deal. 
The preventive diplomacy effort conducted by the Community in the case of 
Kosovo between 1993 and 1999 resulted in the “Educational Agreement”, signed 
on 1 September 1996 by the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim 
Rugova, the Albanian leader in Kosovo, in their respective cities, without meeting 
each other in person. The agreement stated that a significant number of Albanian 
children who were not granted access to public schools would return to school 
after five years spent in a sort of ‘parallel’ education system. It also affirmed the 
“normalization” of the school system there, including classes taught in Albanian, 
and the set up of a “3+3” implementation commission composed of three 
representatives from the Serbian government and three from the Albanian 
community. Sant’Egidio’s mediation efforts built on the indirect knowledge of the 
area (at least as far as the Albanian side of the matter was concerned), ‘spilling 
over’ from the Community’s simultaneous activities in Albania during the first 
half of the 1990s, mentioned earlier in this section, and on some humanitarian 
aid delivery projects (mostly in the health sector), set up by the NGO for both 
Serbs and Albanians. After a series of unsuccessful trips of Sant’Egidio 
representatives to Belgrade, Pristina and Tirana to meet Serbian and Albanian 
leaders between 1993 and 1995, mutual distrust among the two opposing parties 
gradually started to give way to cautious signs of availability to start off some form 
of dialogue. In the summer of 1996, Serbs and Albanians agreed on Sant’Egidio’s 
mediation role because it was seen as a neutral and impartial third party and in a 
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set of meetings held in Rome, in the Community offices, they decided to start their 
step-by step negotiations from education issues, leaving purely political matters 
for a later stage of the process. Such activities were organised with no direct 
involvement of Italian authorities, although political support was occasionally 
showed by cabinet members like Prime Minister Giuliano Amato and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Beniamino Andreatta. 
Unlike the initiative in Albania, the activity in Kosovo was only a partial success, 
because for a number of reasons – including controversies on “the legitimacy of 
international mediation provided by Sant’Egidio on what the Serbs perceived to 
be a domestic issue” (Morozzo della Rocca 1998: 14) – the “Implementation 
Protocol” was signed only in March 1998, shortly before the political situation 
significantly changed and violence broke out during the summer of that year. 
However, what at first sight may appear as a dialogue forum and a technical deal 
in a low politics domain such as education, should be assessed against the broader 
backdrop of the tense relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo between 
1993 and 1999. Indeed, it turned out to be the only negotiating table where Serbs 
and Albanians started some form of direct dialogue (Morozzo della Rocca 2010b: 
182), and managed to sign the “first official agreement of any kind reached 
between the Serbian government and the Albanian community in [that] century” 
(Morozzo della Rocca 1998: 13).  
 
4.4.2 The Community of Sant’Egidio and peace-making 
 
A rather significant body of literature has been produced on the role of NGOs in 
peace-making activities during the past two decades. Some scholars have 
examined the role of Norwegian NGOs working on the issues of Oslo Accords 
(Israeli-Palestinian conflict) (1993), Guatemala (1996), Haiti, Sudan, Cyprus, 
Kosovo (1999), and Colombia (2000) (Kelleher and Taulbee 2005, quoted in 
Bullion 2001), while Gerstbauer (2005) has looked more at NGOs involved in 
peace-building92. Norwegian NGOs addressed by this stream of literature are of 
                                                 
92 According to the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (commonly known 
as the “Brahimi Report”, the definition of ‘peace-building’ is the following: “activities undertaken 
on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building 
on those foundations, something that is more than just the absence of war” (2000). 
 
 125 
particular interest to this thesis not only as they have a religious connotation 
(Lutheran), but especially because, in the cases mentioned above, they have 
actively cooperated with the Norwegian government, setting up a mutually 
beneficial relation. In this interaction, on the one hand NGOs have taken 
advantage of the image of ‘honest broker’ Norway has built over decades of 
engagement in strengthening international peace and in fostering development 
in the Third World, earning a sound reputation for moral standing, and ensuring 
parties to the conflict secrecy and ‘quiet’, behind the scenes diplomacy. On the 
other, government institutions have benefited considerably from the well-
grounded and first-hand knowledge of war-torn countries they had to operate in, 
accumulated thanks to their long-standing physical presence there (Kelleher and 
Taulbee 2005). 
As in the case of preventive diplomacy (see previous section), activities carried 
out in the peace-making domain by Catholic NGOs in general, and by those based 
in Italy in particular, have not been examined extensively by academics, with the 
exception, again, of the Community of Sant’Egidio. Besides scholarly works on 
(or mentioning) the mediation work provided by the Community in the 
Mozambican conflict, that will be investigated later in this thesis (Hume 1994; 
Bartoli 1999 and 2011; Ajello 1999 and 2010; de Courten 2003; Hill 2003 and 
2015; Roberts 2009; Anouilh 2011; Bartoli 2011; Carbone 2011; Giro 2011; 
Marchetti 2013; Borruso 2014; Perry 2014), the efforts of this NGO in other 
scenarios have been studied by some scholars. For instance, Hara (1999), 
Romano (2010), Anouilh (2011) and Nhlapo and Alden (2015) have looked at the 
parallel diplomacy conducted by the Sant’Egidio in Rome during the Burundian 
conflict in 1997-1998. Others have studied its mediation action in Kosovo in 1993-
1997 (Morozzo della Rocca 1998), in Albania in 1991-1997 (de Guttry and Pagani 
1999), and Guatemala in 1993-1996 (Bonini 2008; Morozzo della Rocca 2010c).  
On the occasion of the Guatemalan civil war, for example, the Community has 
been very active in relaunching the existing peace process with a series of 
meetings organised between 1995 and 1996, and in helping the United Nations 
conclude it successfully, with the signing of a Peace Agreement at the end of 1996 
(Giro 1998; Cugliandro 2006; Bonini 2008; Morozzo della Rocca 2010c). Unlike 
other peace-making efforts, such as the one concerning Mozambique, in this case 
the Community did not have to set up a peace process starting from scratch, but 
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reactivated a process that had been frozen approximately one year before, aimed 
at bringing to an end a war started thirty-four years earlier (Giro 1998: 98). The 
war had broken out in 1962 between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala (URNG, in English ‘Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity’) guerrilla movement, one of the oldest insurgent groups in 
Central America, and had claimed approximately 200,000 lives, being the 
bloodiest war in Latin America in the twentieth century and the second longest-
running of the continent after the Colombian conflict (Morozzo della Rocca 
2010c: 91). 
The peace process had been launched long before the decade of the 1990s, but it 
had been largely ineffective. At the beginning of 1994, the United Nations had 
taken official responsibility for reinvigorating the peace process by acting as an 
official mediator, but had run into the stumbling block represented by the lack of 
mutual trust and of direct contacts between the Guatemalan government and 
URNG group; the leaders of the different parties to the conflict, indeed, had never 
met each other in person (Giro 1998: 98). The main task the Community of 
Sant’Egidio decided to focus on to overcome this stand off was providing some 
form of informal but direct contact between the warring factions, leveraging the 
good ties established with both parties. The good reputation earned through years 
spent in the country carrying out development cooperation activities in different 
areas was, according to Sant’Egidio leaders, a sound asset to present the 
Community as an honest and neutral third party for mediation (Morozzo della 
Rocca 2010c: 93-94).  
Discretion was essential at that stage, in order to verify whether the conditions 
for restarting the negotiating process, so after a series of preliminary secret 
contacts, meetings were held in San Salvador, in December 1995, between the 
then presidential candidate Alvaro Arzu, who had previously showed its interest 
in the peace process, and the leaders of the URNG group. Others encounters 
followed in the same city, in Mexico City, and after Arzu’s victory in the 
presidential election in January 1996, also in Rome, at the Sant’Egidio 
headquarters, in February that year. It was only on the occasion of the last 
meeting in Rome that the parties decided to go public and to break the news of 
the resumption of the peace process with a joint press statement (Morozzo della 
Rocca 2010c: 104).  
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Although the representatives of the Guatemalan government and of URNG group 
announced that the peace process was not over yet, they stressed that the secret 
meetings had been decisive in persuading the warring factions to go back to the 
negotiating table (Giro 1998: 99). With the impasse being resolved also thanks to 
the work of Sant’Egidio, the ball of negotiations then returned to the United 
Nations’ court. The official mediator resumed the process starting from the 
results of the meetings facilitated by the Community, and after further months of 
intense work performed in parallel, on related issues, in Oslo, Stockholm, Madrid 
and Mexico City, a Peace Agreement was signed in December 1996 in Mexico City 
(Morozzo della Rocca 2010c: 106). For the purpose of this thesis, it is worth 
noting that on this occasion the Italian government was not involved at all in any 
stage of the process. 
The mediation work performed by the Community during the Burundian conflict 
is another topic that has been studied by scholars and practitioners (Hara 1999; 
Anouilh 2011; Romano 2010; Nhlapo 2015). Unlike the Guatemalan scenario, 
where the Community has a) intervened in the framework of a peace process 
already in place, although stalled, steered by an intergovernmental official 
mediator, i.e. the United Nations, which b) was kept always updated on its moves 
over the whole duration of the negotiating effort, on the Burundian affair 
Sant’Egidio has engaged in “parallel diplomacy”. This notion, similar to that of 
“track-two diplomacy”, is defined as “non state diplomacy that occurs 
simultaneously with, but it is not coordinated with, state diplomacy” (Hara 1999: 
158)93.   
In June 1993, the Hutu candidate Melchior Ndadaye won the first multiparty, 
democratic elections ever held since the country’s independence from Belgium 
(1962). After his assassination by Tutsi military officers in October that year, an 
Hutu-Tutsi national unity government led by the Hutu politician 
Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was formed in September 1994, with the United 
Nations blessing94, but failed to stabilize the situation. A Hutu group opposing 
                                                 
93 “Parallel diplomacy” is a term also used by some scholars (Kuznetsov 2015: 26) as a synonym 
for “paradiplomacy”, a concept first introduced in social sciences in the 1960s by Butler (1961) 
and then popularised in the academic literature by Soldatos (1990 and 1993) and Duchacek (1988; 
1990). 
 
94 The power-sharing agreement shoring up the formation of the coalition cabinet was defined as 
“Convention of Government” (Hara 1999: 143). 
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the coalition cabinet set up an armed group called CNDD-FDD (National Council 
for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy), and a 
brutal civil war erupted shortly after, claiming between 200,000 and 300,000 
victims and forcing hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee to bordering 
countries (Hara 1999: 143).  
Some attempts at solving the crisis were made over the following two years with 
two international conferences, organised respectively in Cairo in 1995 and in 
Tunis in 1996, but none of this efforts succeeded in bringing the hostilities to an 
end. In the meanwhile, Burundians and the international community were 
haunted by memories of the recent Rwandan genocide of 1994, as the ethnic and 
social make up of the country was similar to that of the neighbouring country 
(although less polarised) (Romano 2010: 113). After Major Pierre Buyoya, the 
Tutsi Burundi's president from 1987 to 1993 came back into power with a coup 
staged by the military in July 1996, a host of mediation initiatives were launched 
by different actors: an internal dialogue platform between the Buyoya 
government and the FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi, a Hutu party), 
the Arusha group, formed by different states of central and east Africa and 
coordinated by the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere95, and the 
Sant’Egidio process. In addition, the Organisation of African Unity dispatched 
military observers in the country, while the United States, Canada, South Africa, 
Kenya and the European Union appointed special envoys during 1996 to try to 
contribute to put a stop to the conflict.  
In such a crowded scenario, with actors of different nature – states, international 
organisations, domestic political actors, NGOs – all committed to find a solution 
to the crisis, the Community worked, in particular, on what has been defined as 
the ‘second track’ component96 of the peace talks, that was facilitation of secret, 
direct meetings between the Pierre Buyoya government and CNDD-FDD 
representatives in Rome, at Sant’Egidio headquarters, in 1995-1997, in parallel 
with the other regional and international ‘public’ mediation efforts. The 
Community was approached to coordinate this work by the national unity 
                                                 
95 Former United States President Jimmy Carter with his Carter Center, a non-profit NGO 
involved in conflict resolution and human rights advocacy, also participated in this process. 
 
96 The other two track components being 1) formal talks organised in Arusha under the auspices 
of Julius Nyerere, and 2) internal talks within the ‘Convention of Government’ framework led by 
President Pierre Buyoya (Nhlapo and Alden 2015: 4). 
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government itself, that had come to know the Italian NGO for its mediation in the 
Mozambican conflict a few years earlier (Romano 2010: 111). Preliminary 
contacts to arrange these encounters took place in 1995-1996; during this phase, 
Sant’Egidio’s ties with the Burundian Catholic Church’s network on the field 
proved very useful, with archbishops, priests, missionaries, etc. frequently 
visiting the headquarters in Rome to help the Community staff get a more 
accurate picture of the situation on the ground (Romano 2010: 119). The position 
of Sant’Egidio and its ‘second track’ component were rather delicate, urging the 
Community to navigate the whole process with special discretion, as “[t]he special 
envoys from the EU, US and South Africa argued that rumours of these secret 
discussions fed into the conspiracy theories that were festering amongst 
Burundians involved in other negotiation initiatives” (Nhlapo and Alden 2015: 
4).  
The mediation offered by Sant’Egidio continued also after the 1996 coup by Pierre 
Buyoya, at the request of both negotiating parties, with an even more secretive 
format: no representatives of any international organisation or state were allowed 
to attend the meetings in Rome, except of course for the Community staff 
(Romano 2010: 132). Representatives from the government and CNDD-FDD 
went back and forth between Burundi and Italy several times, until a first 
milestone was reached in March 1997, with the brokering of a “Framework 
Agreement” preparing the ground for future negotiations; the deal included 
details on the agenda items to be discussed, stated that Sant’Egidio continue to 
act as a mediator, and reaffirmed that the agreement be still kept secret (Romano 
2010: 134).  
However, the agreement was disclosed to the Burundian press by CNDD-FDD 
shortly after, in May that year, in a hazardous political move producing political 
tensions in the country that prevented the meetings from going on in Rome. The 
situation in Burundi, worsened by the secret negotiations publicly disclosed, and 
other political gridlocks resulted in the suspension of peace talks until June 1998. 
They resumed in Arusha in a multiparty format, and after highs and lows, with 
Nelson Mandela replacing Julius Nyerere, who had passed away in 1999, and 
many hurdles to overcome, the peace negotiations finally produced the Arusha 
Accords, signed in 2000 (Romano 2010: 136-143). In the final stages of the talks, 
the Community attended all the meetings but did not play a leading mediation 
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role, as in the earlier phases of the process. The Italian foreign policy apparatus 
was not part of the mediation efforts, although it was aware of the involvement of 
Sant’Egidio in the exercise. 
 
4.5 Sant’Egidio: structure and who’s who 
 
First of all, it must be said that it is not easy to understand the structure and the 
inner working of the Community from their official material, as they have always 
been pretty inclined to be discreet and low-key about it. No organizational chart 
is published on its website, nor are the names of its leaders stated in a systematic 
way on their main online outlet. However, some basic information can be 
collected from scattered posts on events and activities uploaded on its website, 
rich memoires written by their leaders, their association statute (publicly 
available from other sources), and news reports and interviews.  
According to the Italian civil law, the Community is incorporated as a private 
‘association of voluntary work and solidarity’ and enjoys legal personality. On the 
basis of its statute, Sant’Egidio is led by a President, assisted by a Council (made 
up of 5 to 7 members), a Secretary General and an Assembly including all the 
members. Although the post is not mentioned in the statute, an Ecclesiastical 
Assistant is also part of the top leadership, and is a member of the clergy who is 
usually a bishop or an archbishop. The President, the Council and the Secretary 
General are elected every five years by the Assembly of the representatives of all 
the Community groups (in countries where there are several local branches, a 
national President may be appointed) (CSE statute 2016; Vatican directory of the 
‘International associations of the faithful’, managed by the Dicastery, formerly 
Pontifical Council, for the Laity, Family and Life 2016; CSE official website 2016).   
Apart from statutory bodies, a number of less structured committees, both at the 
central and local level, are in charge of managing different issues, such as health 
care, canteen services, assistance to old people, international affairs, etc. 
Committees are run by coordinators, selected by the members with consensus-
based methods and approved by the governing bodies of the Community. 
Generally speaking, and apart from the leading bodies, the CSE portrays itself as 
an entity with a rather flexible and adjustable structure (Riccardi 1999: 54-55), 
although dissenting opinions have been suggested on this issue, arguing that the 
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group is, on the contrary, conflict-ridden and run by an overtly hierarchical 
structure (Magister 1998). 
In order to become a member, an applicant must demonstrate to share the 
purposes of the association, and contribute actively to its projects; his/her 
admission must be approved by the Council. The overwhelming majority of 
Sant’Egidio members participate on a voluntary basis and do not work for the 
Community full time; on the contrary, “[a]lmost all members live active lives in 
the nonreligious world with their own families and professions, and are self-
supporting and unpaid by the association” (Bartoli 1997: 256). The CSE today has 
approximately 50,000 members in more than 70 countries in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, North America and South America (CSE official website 2016; Pontifical 
Council for the Laity website 2015), plus an unspecified number of volunteers 
cooperating with the Community on a case-by-case basis, or only for limited 
periods of time, without being ‘official’ members (CSE official website: 2016). As 
mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the presence of Sant’Egidio abroad comes in 
different forms: it is either organised in well established, ‘formal’ groups, or it is 
active on a less permanent basis, relying on other NGOs and/or the networks of 
local Catholic Churches to manage development cooperation projects or 
humanitarian assistance activities (Riccardi 1997; Morozzo della Rocca 2010). 
The CSE has developed also a rather dynamic online communication strategy, 
with a website published in 17 languages, mirroring the Community’s 
geographical reach and interests (11 European idioms, and 6 non European 
languages, namely Albanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Swahili, Chinese, and 
Indonesian; oddly enough, Arabic is not included), and a widespread presence on 
all the main social media – they have even launched a smartphone app live-
streaming the group prayer organised every day in the Church of Santa Maria in 
Trastevere. In addition, most of its leaders have personal websites and social 
media accounts. 
As far as financial matters are concerned, according to the statute members are 
required to pay an annual membership fee, and the association can receive funds 
from private or public external actors. The greatest share of funding comes indeed 
from donations from citizens from Italy and abroad; public national and 
internationals entities such as the Italian government and the European Union, 
especially to finance public events and development cooperation projects abroad; 
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public local bodies, like the Municipality of Rome and the Lazio Region, 
particularly to sustain permanent activities in Rome, such as the canteen and 
housing services for the poor and the disabled; local parish churches, dioceses, 
and religious congregations, from Italy and other countries in the world; private 
foundations and sponsoring companies (CSE statute 2016; Montonati 168-169).  
In terms of who’s who in Sant’Egidio, it is interesting to note the high degree of 
continuity in its leadership over the almost 50 years of life of the association. The 
main protagonists of the early years of the CSE are more or less all still working 
for the group, in a formal or informal leadership capacity, and this is all the more 
true for leaders directly involved in preventive diplomacy/conflict management 
and peace-making tasks. Since 2003, the Community is led by the President 
Marco Impagliazzo, a university professor teaching Contemporary History at the 
University for Foreign Students in Perugia. However, also the founder Andrea 
Riccardi, who then became a university professor of Contemporary History, 
specializing in Church History at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, is still a 
very influential figure in the management of Sant’Egidio, although he does not 
hold anymore any official position in the organisational structure. Apart from his 
work in the CSE, after serving as Minister for International Cooperation and 
Integration (without portfolio) in the technocratic government led by Mario 
Monti from November 2011 to March 201397, he is now also the President of the 
“Società Dante Alighieri” (in English “Dante Alighieri Society”, an institution 
founded at the end of the XIX century to promote Italian language and culture 
abroad, that is also in charge of issuing one of the internationally recognised 
language certificates of Italian as a foreign language). Other prominent members 
of the group are: the archbishop Vincenzo Paglia, mentioned previously in this 
Chapter, the former Ecclesiastical Assistant of the Community, who had served 
in the past as parish priest in the Church of Santa Maria in Trastevere, the most 
important church in the Rome’s neighbourhood, where Sant’Egidio’s 
headquarters are based, and is currently also the President of the Pontifical 
Academy for Life, a Vatican body dealing with bioethics and moral theology. 
From 2012 to 2016, he was the President of Pontifical Council for the Family, in 
                                                 
97 It is worth stressing that for the first time in Italian history that an apposite Ministry – although 
without an administrative structure and a dedicated budget – was established on that occasion 
specifically for development cooperation, traditionally managed exclusively by the Directorate 
General for Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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charge of rather crucial issues in the contemporary public debate in Italy. Mario 
Giro, the head of CSE’s international relations from 1998 to 2013, served first as 
an advisor to Riccardi (during the former’s tenure as Minister for International 
Cooperation and Integration), then was appointed as Undersecretary for Foreign 
Affairs in the center-left cabinet led by Enrico Letta, and was reconfirmed also by 
the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi in 2014, with the upgrade to Vice minister and 
the portfolio of development cooperation98 – and in the cabinet formed by Paolo 
Gentiloni at the end of 2016. Matteo Maria Zuppi, who was directly involved in 
peace-making negotiations on Mozambique, as it will be illustrated later in the 
thesis, served as Ecclesiastic Assistant of the CSE from 2000 to 2012 and is now 
also the archbishop of Bologna. Mario Marazziti, a journalist and spokesperson 
for the Community who was elected as an MP in 2013, is currently sitting in the 
parliamentary committees on Foreign Affairs, Human rights protection and 
Social affairs and is one of most active members dealing with these issues. 
Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, an historian teaching at the University of Roma 
Tre, focusing on history of the Balkans, worked in particular on Sant’Egidio’s 
efforts in Albania and Kosovo (information published on the CSE official website 
and on personal websites). It is important to underline here that all the key 
members mentioned above have played leading roles in every important 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management activity the Community has conducted 
in its history, some of which are analysed in this thesis. In addition, it is 
interesting to note that many of them come from – and work in, on a permanent 
basis – the Italian academia.  
 
------oooo----- 
 
A slowly emerging policy subsystem in preventive 
diplomacy/crisis management? 
 
Policy subsystem theory, as explained in Chapter 1, is one of the analytical tools, 
proposed by Verbeek and van Ufford (2001), that I have decided to use to conduct 
the empirical inquiry of the subject matter of the thesis. The concept of policy 
subsystem, applied by the authors to given cases of the Netherlands’ foreign 
                                                 
98 The reform law of Italian development cooperation (125/2014) (see also Chapter 3) established 
the post of a Vice minister of Foreign Affairs specifically in charge of development cooperation. 
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policy, revolves around the very “policy autonomy enjoyed by a small numbers of 
actors in a specific policy field”. Policy subsystems can span all combinations of 
actors at all different levels of government, and illustrate evolutions of 
inclusion/exclusion/modification patterns over time (Verbeek and van Ufford 
2001: 131). Policy subsystems can be of three different types: a) dominant, with 
stable relations among the small group of actors and generally a significant 
degree of control of issues and programs by the government; b) competitive, with 
(coalitions of) actors who permanently compete with each other and the field is 
open to new actors; c) disintegrated: with many actors, loose relationships 
between them and huge interference from outside.  
As illustrated by the activism of both Italy and the Community after the end of 
the Cold War, described in previous sections, it can be argued that a policy 
subsystem is slowly emerging in the domain of preventive diplomacy/crisis 
management, although it is still in a preliminary stage and it comprises, for the 
time being, only two – the Italian government and Sant’Egidio–, or three-four at 
most – NGOs, including one or two other vocal organisations, such as “No Peace 
Without Justice” or “Hands off Cain” (despite the latter two are more committed 
to promoting human rights protection as a way to defuse tensions in the long 
term, inter alia, than to facilitating preventive diplomacy/crisis management 
initiatives. 
As far as the type of policy subsystem is concerned, of course it is not possible to 
draw general conclusions because a broader set of events should be assessed for 
that purpose. However, as the next Chapter will show, the Algerian events 
suggests that probably the subsystem gradually taking shape is competitive. In 
addition, despite being always open and easy to access for new actors, in theory, 
new actors seem not to have entered the field of this policy subsystem, at least 
until now.  
 
A slowly emerging policy subsystem in peace-making? 
 
Taking into consideration the rather intense activity of the Italian government 
and Sant’Egidio after the end of the Cold War, elucidated in previous sections, it 
can be suggested that a policy subsystem is gradually taking shape in the field of 
peace-making. Like preventive diplomacy/crisis management, addressed in 
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Chapter 4, it is still in an early phase of formation; differently from the other case, 
for the time being, only two actors – the Italian government and the Community 
of Sant’Egidio – appear to be operating in this policy subsystem. As a matter of 
fact, it seems that other Italian NGOs, like for instance “No Peace Without 
Justice” or “Hands off Cain”, mentioned in the previous section, have not played 
yet a significant role in the domain of peace-making. A variegated landscape of 
civil society NGOs dealing with these issues, such as the Norwegian one, is far 
from taking root in Italy. 
In terms of types of policy subsystem, as explained earlier in this thesis, clearly it 
is not possible to reach general conclusions because of the limited number of 
cases analysed in this work. Yet, as the Mozambican case illustrated in the 
following section will suggest, it may be the case that the policy subsystem 
gradually emerging is dominant, with stable relations among the actors and 
generally a significant degree of control – or, at least, of ‘non-opposition’ – of 
issues and programmes by the government. In addition, the fact that new actors 
have not entered yet the subsystem until now, although it is open and relatively 
easy to access, could be explained by the very type of subsystem taking shape. 
According to Verbeek and van Ufford (2001), new actors are expected to join 
more frequently competitive policy subsystems than dominant ones.  
Finally, it cannot be excluded that there will be in the future a trend for the 
emerging policy subsystem in peace-making to overlap with that gradually taking 
shape in preventive diplomacy/crisis management, at least to a certain degree. It 
is not easy indeed, in some cases, to draw a line between the two set of activities, 
and the relatively small number of actors operating in both scenarios is another 
factor pushing towards that direction.  
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Chapter 5. Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio in 
the Algerian crisis (1994-1998)  
 
 
5.1 Chapter outline  
 
According to a functional division along the lines of the two different issue-areas 
(‘sub-policies’) of foreign policy analysed in this thesis, this Chapter presents the 
empirical research conducted on a case concerning the first of them, i.e. 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management. In particular, I have looked here at the 
relations between the Italian state and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the case 
of the Algerian crisis of 1994-1998. 
First, the Chapter offers a brief account of Italian foreign policy towards Algeria 
from the end of the Second World War to the eruption of the crisis in the 1990s, 
and on the activities carried out on and/or in the country by the CSE since its 
inception. Second, it sheds light on how interactions have developed between the 
state institutions and the Community during the three main phases of the crisis: 
1) preliminary initiatives by the CSE (1994); 2) Sant’Egidio’s “Rome Platform” 
and the government’s wait-and-see reaction (1994-1995); 3) suspension of any 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management effort by the Italian authorities (1996-
1998). Third, it wraps up the empirical material presented and argues that 
relations maintained by the two actors were mostly competitive. 
 
5.2 Background 
 
5.2.1 Algeria in Italian foreign policy 
 
The Mediterranean, and its southern shore in particular, has always been one of 
the most important geographical areas for the Italian international agenda 
(Santoro 1996b; De Leonardis 2003; Bardi et al. 2008; Graziano 2007b; 
Coralluzzo 2008). According to a widely known metaphor in the academic 
literature on this topic, the Mediterranean is one of the three traditional “circles” 
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of post-1945 Italian foreign policy99, together with the transatlantic alliance and 
the European integration project (De Leonardis 2003). The Mediterranean was 
(and still is today) crucial for Italy for both political stability/security matters and 
economic reasons. The international projection of Italian business firms towards 
the Mediterranean, be they big companies or small and medium enterprises, has 
been a constant feature throughout the history of the Republic. For a country with 
limited energy resources, that needed to rebuild its industrial base from scratch, 
restart the whole economy and find new markets for its companies, it was a 
straightforward option to turn to its Mediterranean neighbours in the aftermath 
of the Second World War. Between the mid-1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, 
this international economic agenda was pursued mainly by ENI, the national oil 
and gas company, founded in 1952 as a state-owned firm, and then transformed 
in 1992 into a limited company (with the state still holding a significant 30% share 
today). As illustrated in Chapter 3, together with other business corporations, and 
both before and after the fall of the Berlin wall, ENI has always wielded a 
significant influence on foreign policy decisions made by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the President of the Council of Ministers, and on major economic 
policies with an international dimension, managed by other economic 
government departments (Romano 2002; Carbone 2011; Darnis 2011; Coticchia, 
Giacomello and Sartori 2011). The vision of Enrico Mattei, the founder and then 
head of ENI, inspired – and was inspired by, in turn – a “neoatlanticist”100 policy 
                                                 
99 Other authors have argued, in recent years, that a fourth ‘circle’ should be added, comprising 
the Danube-Balkans area, or its inclusion in the Mediterranean one, because of the growing 
importance of the area for Italy since the 1990s (Coralluzzo 2000: 36; Carbone 2008). In addition 
to the idea of the three ‘circles’, scholars working on this have suggested the metaphor of a triangle 
with vertices pointed towards the north, south and west), or that of an hourglass, facing Central 
Europe on one side, and North Africa on the other (Panebianco 1977; Garruccio 1982).  
 
100 The scholarly debate on ‘neoatlanticism’ in Italian foreign policy is quite rich and interesting. 
The expression (in Italian ‘neoatlantismo’, first introduced in 1957 by the then Italian Foreign 
Minister Giuseppe Pella, “was meant to describe a new kind of relationship between Italy and the 
other members of the transatlantic alliance as a way to enhance the Italian position within the 
military organisation. Neo-Atlanticists believed that Italy could play a major role in the 
organisation by becoming the NATO ambassador to the [Mediterranean and the] Middle East, 
due to an alleged Italian vocation in dealing with Mediterranean affairs. In return, Italy would 
have had the opportunity to improve its power position in the alliance while pursuing its national 
interest in the region” (Pirani 2010: 221), although it could imply, on some occasions, deviating 
from the path of US preferences in the area. Graziano (2007b) has added the adjective 
“Mediterranean” to the word “atlanticism”, in order to stress the specific geographical element of 
this policy. De Leonardis, on the contrary, has offered a more nuanced interpretation of the 
alleged quest for a more independent foreign policy, that according to other scholars was at the 
heart of Rome’s “neoatlanticism”. He has argued that it was an attempt made by Italy during the 
second half of the 1950s to present itself as a “privileged partner of the United States in the 
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crafted by the Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani and by the President of the 
Republic Giovanni Gronchi, with a clear pro-Arab stance. During those years, 
representatives of the Italian government and Mediterranean countries 
frequently exchanged official visits, and Rome immediately established friendly 
contacts with the governments of the various countries of North Africa that had 
just gained independence, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, offering political 
cooperation, and promoting major oil deals that ENI was then able to sign with 
Tunisia, Libya and Egypt ENI, often in exchange for technical and economic aid 
and training (Bini 2014). This strategy remained basically unchanged also during 
the cabinets led by the Christian Democratic Prime Minister Aldo Moro and 
during his tenure as Foreign Minister, between the mid-1960s and the early 
1970s.  
Within the Mediterranean scenario, Algeria has always been one of the most 
relevant country for Italian foreign policy, even before the country gained 
independence from France in 1962; there was also a significant Italian 
community living in the Mediterranean country, that had started to settle down 
there at the end of the XIX century, mostly to establish business activities. It was, 
however, shortly after the declaration of independence, achieved after an 8-year 
bloody conflict, that bilateral relations between Rome and Algiers started to 
consolidate in a more robust way, because of flourishing economic ties, with Italy 
immediately publicly offering to cooperate with Algiers in 1962 (De Leonardis 
2003). Algeria rapidly became one of the most important suppliers of natural gas 
for Italy; relations with this country, of course, were no exception to the rule of 
the “unscrupulous economic diplomacy” conducted by Enrico Mattei (Romano 
2002: 106). Thanks to his friendly ties with the Algerian post-colonial authorities, 
strengthened by the support Mattei had provided to the National Liberation 
Front (FLN, from the name in French, ‘Front de Libération Nationale’) that had 
                                                 
Mediterranean” (2014: 286), leveraging this position to better achieve its own objectives in the 
area, rather than trying to carve out greater leeway to act autonomously from the US ally. In 
addition, in terms of government-foreign policy bureaucracy relations, it is interesting to 
underline here that top MFA officials were, in this case, those who fiercely “opposed and 
eventually sank the policy of “neo-[a]tlanticism”, as they actually disapproved “the attempt to 
carve out for Italy a regional role in the Mediterranean even at the price of ignoring multilateral 
Atlantic policies and responsibilities" (Croci 2008a: 301; Grassi Orsini 2003). With a new center-
left coalition coming to power in 1963, the “neoatlanticist” vision was replaced by a similar pro-
Arab foreign policy, but with a less evident emphasis on the possibility of reshaping bilateral 
relations with Washington to slightly tilt the balance in Rome’s favour. 
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fought against the French colonial rule (Graziano 2007a: 295), Mattei's ENI 
managed to negotiate a three-part deal with Algiers and Paris, that he would have 
finalised with the new Algerian president in late 1962, a week after he lost his life 
in a plane crash accident101. Economic relations with Algeria grew significantly 
although the agreement was not signed,  and during the tenure of Prime Minister 
Giulio Andreotti, in 1983, the first part of the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline (also 
known as the ‘Mattei pipeline’), was finally built to transport natural gas from 
Algeria to Northern Italy, via Tunisia, to provide up to 30 per cent of Italian 
consumption still in 2014 (Graziano 2007a; Verda 2014)102.  
Close ties with the North African countries were built since the late 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1970s also in the field of development cooperation and in the 
industry sector (in addition to the oil and gas field). The latter was, in part, “also 
the consequence of Italian industry’s scramble for markets in the aftermath of the 
first oil shock. The bigger corporations, from both the private and the public 
sector, were obviously better placed to participate in the export drive, and such 
household names as Fiat, Pirelli, Italsider, Ansaldo, plus various ENI subsidiaries 
such as Saipem, Agip or Snam Progetti, as well as civil engineering groups like 
Impresit, Italconsult and Lodigiani [were] quick to establish themselves in the 
Arab states where, particularly in North Africa, they proved to be a match for 
French and German competition” (Donini 1988: 178). A host of highly specialised 
small and medium enterprises too, started to turn to the Maghreb to expand their 
international presence, acting at the beginning as sub-contractors of big 
companies already active in these countries, and then setting up autonomous 
relations. This trend further increased the importance of these countries for 
Italian foreign policy, considering that the overwhelming majority of Italian 
                                                 
101 In 1961, Mattei had refused to become part of the oil cartel in exploiting Algeria’s oilfields, as 
he believed that “ENI should have no part in developing Algeria’s natural resources while the 
country was still under French colonial rule, correctly believing that the Italian state corporation 
would be given preferential treatment after independence” (Donini 1988: 177). Mattei’s 
assumption proved right a year later, after the declaration of independence, when his good ties 
with Algerian new leaders convinced the French government that Italy could join France in 
assisting the country in managing oil resources. “The three-cornered agreement was to involve 
Italian technical assistance to be paid for by direct ENI ownership of a quota of Algerian crude, as 
well as by gas deliveries through the pipeline which was finally commissioned over two decades 
later” (Donini 1988: 177). 
 
102 During the early 1980s, however, Italian needs in terms of energy resources stayed largely the 
same, with a remarkable exposure to countries such as Algeria and Libya, not offset by sufficient 
export flows of Italian products to these markets; in that period Italy ranked first among OECD 
members for export credit insurance granted, as far as Mediterranean countries were concerned. 
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companies, in general, is made up of small or medium firms. As far as Algeria in 
particular is concerned, a case in point was that of a pool of approximately twenty 
companies, “each specializing in a particular stage of the textile cycle, which 
joined forces with [the major company, added] Generale Impianti to develop the 
backbone of Algeria's textile industry” (Donini 1988: 178). Against a backdrop of 
sound political and economic links between Rome and Algiers, the events 
described later took place in the 1990s. 
Although this goes beyond the time frame of the case analysed here, it is worth 
underlining that also today, clearly, relations in the energy sector with Algeria 
still feature as one of the main pillars of Italian energy and foreign policy, 
especially after the turmoil erupted in 2011 in Libya, the fall of Ghaddafi’s regime 
and the conflict still ongoing – Libya, together with Russia, are the other main 
partners Italy imports energy products from.  
 
5.2.2 The Community of Sant’Egidio and Algeria 
 
Since its inception in 1968, Sant’Egidio had always considered Algeria as a 
suitable country for pursuing interreligious dialogue, one of its flagship activities, 
between Muslim, Christians and Jewish (see Chapter 4). The first contacts 
between the CSE and Algeria were established in the 1980s through Léon Etienne 
Duval, who had been serving as the archbishop of the Algerian Catholic Church 
since 1954. During the liberation war, he had never sided with the French, as he 
was convinced that it was crucial to preserve good relations with the Muslim 
majority, therefore attracting much hostility from part of the Christian 
community in Algeria. On the contrary, Duval was very vocal, since the very 
outbreak of the conflict, in condemning the tortures perpetrated by the French 
military against FLN members. Thanks to this attitude, after the 1962 
independence the Catholic Church had been able to continue its activities in the 
country, “developing a peculiar experience as a [Catholic, added] Church in an 
Islamic land” (Impagliazzo 2010: 61). Over the first two decades of work, the CSE 
had forged friendly ties also with the community of the monastic Order of 
Trappists, based in the Atlas Abbey of Tibhirine, in the north of the country, and 
with the archbishop of Algiers, Léon-Étienne Duval, who served in this position 
from 1954 to 1988, and Henri Antoine Marie Teissier, who succeeded him the 
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same year. Since 1984, CSE members visited Algeria every year to organize 
interreligious conferences and youth meetings and members of Algerian Muslim, 
Christian and Jewish communities attended the annual interreligious meetings 
organized from 1986 onwards by the Community in Italy or in other European 
countries (Scott Appleby 2000: 291).  
 
5.3 Relations between Italy and the Community of Sant'Egidio during 
the Algerian crisis 
 
The Italian government and Sant’Egidio acted in the context of the Algerian 
turmoil together with other state and non state actors. Other main actors involved 
were the following: 
- Algerian government, led in 1991-1998 by various FLN’s political leaders 
- United States 
- France 
- European Union 
A clarification is needed here. I have mentioned in the section focusing on 
definitions that, as suggested by the academic literature on this topic, preventive 
diplomacy and crisis management deal mostly with conflicts on the brink of 
explosion and/or low-intensity turmoil, and not with fully fledged conflicts, be 
they civil wars or international wars. Algerian events of the 1990s, at least until 
1995, are included in the category of unrest preventive diplomacy and crisis 
management deal with, because they are not considered as amounting to a full 
blown civil war. Arguing on the exact and detailed nature of this crisis goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis; the decision to put it in this grouping was based 
on how the conflict was perceived at that time by the actors analysed here 
(especially Italy) and other international and regional players. Never did the 
Italian government, nor France, the United States, the European Union or states 
of the region term the unrest as a ‘civil war’, for political reasons that are not the 
object of inquiry of this thesis (Molinari 2000; de Courten 2003: 86). The 
Algerian government and its definition of the turmoil has obviously been not 
accounted for in this assessment, as it was one of the opposing parties. Neither 
did Sant’Egidio, that used the term ‘crisis’ in the title of the document resulted 
from its crisis management initiative (see further details later in this section). The 
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nature of the conflict, together with other factors, also led to the impossibility of 
launching any serious peace-making effort, that would have changed the scenario 
for other actors trying to play a role in it, in terms of tools, actions, patterns of 
interactions, etc.103  
The origins of the Algerian crisis date back to early January 1992, when a military 
coup was staged by the ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), to 
overturn the outcome of the first round of parliamentary elections, held in 
December 1991 and won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, from the “French 
Front Islamique de Salut”), an Islamist political force, with a majority of 
approximately 47% of votes (Mortimer 1996: 25). The second round of elections 
was called off, the military dissolved the National Assembly and took power, 
forcing FLN’s President Chadli Bendjedid to resign, FIS was banned from 
political life and many of its members were arrested (Addi 1996: 94). A series of 
Islamist radical groups – more extremist than the FIS in almost all cases – were 
soon set up to occupy the political vacuum left by the disbandment of FIS. One of 
the most prominent among them was the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA, 
from the French ‘Groupe Islamique Armé’); another major group was the Islamic 
Salvation Army (AIS, from the French ‘Armée islamique du salut’), that 
considered itself as the ‘armed wing’ of the FIS (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997). 
Clashes between the ruling coalition, especially the so-called ‘éradicateur’ 
(“eradicator”) wing of the army, and opposition factions, including militant 
splinter groups of the FIS, started out with low intensity, also because the 
government appeared to be in control of the radical Islamist groups. By the end 
of 1994, however, violence increased up to a level that state authorities were not 
able to manage the situation anymore: from 1992 to 1994, the turmoil in the 
country had already claimed at least 30,000 lives (Mortimer 1996: 18). Terrorist 
attacks and brutal massacres were repeatedly carried out, also against civilian 
population (de Courten 2003; Impagliazzo 2010). A few attempts were made in 
1992 and 1993 to start a dialogue between opposing parties, but to no avail; also 
the effort to negotiate with all parties, launched in January 1994 by the newly 
appointed ‘President of the state’, the former Minister of Defence Liamin Zéroual, 
                                                 
103 ‘Le Pouvoir’ (in English ‘the Power’) is the term commonly used by Algerians, since the 
country’s independence in 1962, to refer to “the real ‘constitution’, the real system of power […] 
that had already taken firm shape behind the nascent institutions of the new state”, essentially 
represented by the military and the FLN (McDougall 2017: 244). 
 144 
was short-lived (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 29). The unrest went on for six more 
years. In short, terrorist attacks perpetrated by GIA spilled over also in France, 
with the hijacking of flight Air France 8969 in 1994 and the Paris metro bombing 
in 1995. The level of violence continued to be very high until 1999, when an 
amnesty bill was passed after the election of FLN’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika. After 
claiming approximately 45,000 lives (Roberts 2003; Hagelstein 2008), the 
conflict approached its resolution in 2000 with a government peace plan, and 
GIA was destroyed in 2000-2002 by military operations conducted by the 
Algerian army. The crisis resolution process, however, was essentially a domestic 
one, Algerian-owned; no significant external actor got involved in crisis 
management efforts (Roberts 2003; McDougall 2017).  
The actions taken by the Italian government and the Community of Sant’Egidio 
during the Algerian crisis are here divided in three stages: 1) first initiatives by 
the CSE (1994); 2) Sant’Egidio’s “Rome Platform” and the government playing a 
waiting game (1994-1995); 3) Italian authorities turning down any conflict 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management initiative (1996-1998). 
  
5.3.1 Eruption of the crisis and first initiatives (1994)  
 
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, frequent meetings and 
interreligious exchanges and initiatives had taken place in Algeria during the 
1980s between Sant'Egidio members, Catholic groups based in the country, and 
Muslims and Jewish communities, also after the archbishop Henri Antoine Marie 
Teissier had succeeded Duval as the head of the Algerian Church in 1988 
(Impagliazzo and Giro 1997). Building on such a track record of good ties with 
these Algerian actors, the initiative by Sant’Egidio to try to solve the crisis 
materialized at the end of 1994. Unlike the case of Mozambique, when, as it will 
be explained in Chapter 6, a specific request was made by parties to the conflict 
for the CSE to intervene first as an observer, and then as mediator, in the case of 
the Algerian crisis Sant’Egidio took the lead of the initiative autonomously, as the 
result of an independent decision. According to the members of the CSE, the idea 
was triggered by two events: a) the assassinations by GIA of father Henri Vergès 
and sister Paule-Helene Saint-Raymond, two close associates of Sant’Egidio 
based in Algiers, and b) a proposal submitted informally to the community’s 
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founder, Andrea Riccardi, by some Algerian Muslims during one of the annual 
interreligious conferences for peace organized by the CSE (see Chapter 4), held 
in September 1994 in Assisi, Italy (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 49). In a press 
conference during the meeting, Riccardi stated that “some Algerian Muslim 
friends [of the CSE, had, added] repeatedly asked us: ‘Why the Christians, who 
often rally to defend human rights, stop when a Muslim country is involved?’ It 
seemed to me a challenge to take up” (Impagliazzo 2010: 61). The CSE was said 
to be particularly concerned by the deteriorating situation for both civilians in 
general, and religious minorities.  
A working team was set up on the issue in September 1994, to explore possible 
options on the table; it was staffed with four CSE members: father Matteo Zuppi, 
who had already participated in the negotiating team in the Mozambican peace-
making process in 1990-1992, Marco Impagliazzo, an academic who would 
become the President of the Community in 2003, Mario Marazziti, a journalist 
and spokesperson for the organisation and Mario Giro, who became in 1998 head 
of CSE’s international relations. An intense flurry of activity took place to resume 
and/or open new channels of communications with the main Algerian 
government members and political forces, and in a relatively short period of time 
– two months – the first meeting was held in Rome in November 1994.  
The Italian government, during the time frame going from the launch of the idea 
by the CSE in September 1994 to the first meeting in November 1994 and then 
the second in January 1995, was not involved in the process, let alone was 
considering to take any autonomous initiative on the Algerian issue (interviews 
a104, b105, h106 and i107). In July 1994, a few months before the first meeting held 
by the CSE in Rome, Antonio Martino, the Foreign Minister of the center-right 
cabinet led by Silvio Berlusconi, had stated during the G7 summit held in Italy 
that talking to the FIS was necessary to solve the crisis in Algeria. With this 
declaration, the first slow transformation of the Italian stance towards Algeria 
had been set in motion, at least in public statements. Rome had started to 
gradually move away from the French position, that was rather similar to that of 
the government in Algiers, to get closer to the US idea of engaging in a dialogue 
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with all political forces, starting from the Islamist groups. The time seemed 
indeed ripe for such a political readjustment not only from the CSE’s point of 
view, but also from the perspective of some state actors involved in the crisis 
(namely the US and Italy), as yet another attempt to launch a national dialogue 
had just failed in Algiers during the summer of 1994. 
 
5.3.2 Sant’Egidio’s “Rome Platform” and the government in a ‘wait-
and-see’ mode (1994-1995) 
 
On 21-22 November 1994, representatives of the most important Algerian 
political parties met in Rome, at the Community’s headquarters in Trastevere, for 
a dialogue session organised by the CSE to assess political options to solve the 
crisis. Actually, the term ‘dialogue’, used in this thesis as a synonym, was not 
employed by the organisation, in order not to irritate the government in Algiers, 
as the word could have brought to mind a more structured form of negotiations, 
that according to Sant’Egidio should have taken place, if ever, in Algeria 
(Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 48-49). The French term ‘colloque’, in English 
‘symposium, colloquium’, was preferred, and the CSE spokesperson used every 
occasion to underline that the Community merely wished to offer a neutral 
physical space where all the parties could exchange their views (Impagliazzo 
2010: 66).  
Somewhat surprisingly, a wide array of political forces was represented in Rome 
during the “Colloque sur l'Algérie” (in English “Dialogue on Algeria”), from the 
nationalist party FLN to the disbanded Islamist group FIS, to other smaller 
secular and religious groups, with the exclusion of GIA. Only the Algerian 
government declined the invitation. Participants included: Anwar Haddam from 
the FIS, endorsed by its two main political leaders, the shuyukh Abbasi Madani 
and Ali Belhadj; FLN’s secretary, Abdelhamid Mehri; Aït Ahmed, president of the 
FFS (from the ‘French Front de Force Socialistes’); Ahmed Ben Bella from the 
MDA (from the French ‘Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie’; Abdallah 
Jaballa, president of the movement Islamic rebirth - Ennahda; Ali Yahia, lawyer 
and president of the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH); 
Mahfoud Nahnah, head of the Movement for Islamic Society-Hamas; 
Noureddine Boukrouh, founder of the Party for Algerian Renewal (PRA); Ahmed 
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Ben Mohammed from Jeunesse Musulmane Contemporaine (JMC); Louisa 
Hanoune, the spokesperson for the Worker’s Party (PT, from the French ‘Parti 
des Travailleurs’) and only woman in the group (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 53). 
Unlike most of the meetings during the Mozambican negotiations (see Chapter 
6), the event was extensively covered by the press, as more than 250 international 
journalists flocked to the entrance of CSE’s headquarters in Trastevere (Hegertun 
2010: 26). As it will be explained later in this Chapter, such a great exposure to 
the international media spotlight probably proved a risky move, arousing even 
more resentment among members of the Algerian government. During the 
session a certain degree of consensus seemed to coalesce among the participants 
on the condemnation of violence and the need for dialogue, and limited optimism 
emerged on concrete proposals for democratic reforms to implement in the 
country.  
Reactions from other actors, on the contrary, were mixed. While certain 
European countries welcomed the news of the gathering in Rome with 
moderately positive remarks, Algiers’ military government immediately reacted, 
publicly criticizing the Community for facilitating the meeting, and accusing the 
NGO of ‘external interference’ in Algerian domestic affairs, a harsh criticism that 
it would frequently reiterate on following occasions. Prime Minister Mohammad 
Sifi, interviewed by an Italian journalist, commented that “Algeria [was] not like 
Haiti, the Algerians [would] never [have] allow[ed] anyone to interfere” 
(Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 84). Algerian authorities staunchly opposed any 
kind of dialogue with Islamist forces, and believed that political conditions for 
dialogue among all political forces were already present in Algeria, therefore 
meeting up for discussions in another country was not necessary (Scuto 1994). In 
greater detail, they declined CSE’s invitation claiming that there actually was a 
previous dialogue effort already ongoing in the country, although the last attempt 
of this kind had failed only a few weeks earlier, in October 1994 (Impagliazzo 
2010: 7).  
Government-controlled media in Algiers defined the participants as terrorists, 
traitors and mercenaries (Hegertun 2010: 27), and the initiative was often linked 
by the press to both the US and the Vatican policies, beyond being mocked as “a 
Christian intervention in an Islamic nation” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 78). 
Concerns over supposed connections between the Holy See and the CSE on this 
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dossier were raised also in private diplomatic circles: “[s]ome ambassadors from 
different countries went to the Vatican, the Algerian ambassador as well. He was 
received […] by officials from the Vatican, and he asked them to stop their people 
[emphasis added], Sant’Egidio” (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 83). The Vatican 
quickly replied also in public to these accusations, with his spokesman Joaquín 
Navarro Valls stating that “Sant’Egidio’s initiative [was] autonomous and in no 
way linked to the Holy See” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 91). Replying to harsh 
comments coming from Algeria, for his part, Ahmed Ben Bella from the MDA 
declared that “[t]he government ha[d] scolded us for coming to Rome ‘in the 
Vatican’s shade’ […]. We have not come here to plot against someone, but because 
we believe in the necessity of dialogue, which we have not been able to establish 
for months” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 79). All parties, except for the Islamic 
Movement for Islamic Society - Hamas and the PRA, signed the final 
communiqué, including a declaration on the need to convene more dialogue 
sessions and a formal request to the CSE to host further meetings in its 
headquarters (Roberts 1995: 259). Algerian parties, indeed, led by Ait Ahmed 
from the FFS and supported by the leaders of FIS, asked for another session to be 
held in Rome to draw up a plan to eventually trigger, if conditions were met, real 
negotiations (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 109). 
Despite the first negative reactions from Algiers, Sant’Egidio decided to accept 
the request coming from the Algerian groups and its activities carried on, with a 
second meeting being held in Rome in January 1995. Neither on this occasion 
was the Italian government involved in the initiative (interviews a108, b109, h110 
and i111). On 8 January, the parties met again at the CSE in Rome, this time behind 
closed doors and without press coverage, probably to avoid drawing unnecessary 
attention, as it had happened during the first round112. In an animated but 
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constructive atmosphere, participants discussed possible ways to negotiate with 
the government, new elections, civil society engagement in the reconciliation 
process, etc. (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 28). FIS was clearly one of the most 
important Algerian groups attending the sessions – and at the same time the less 
desirable for the Algerian government. Its very involvement and attitude during 
the meetings probably were the most important added value provided by 
Sant’Egidio in the whole initiative. Urged by the CSE, FIS’ leaders Madani and 
Belhadj put forward their requirements for negotiations and their representative 
in Rome, over the days, was talked into accepting more conciliatory positions on 
a number of issues, for instance the inclusion of explicit references to democratic 
principles and human rights. The CSE had reissued an invitation for the 
government to attend the second meeting, but unsuprisingly the government 
refused again to show up in Rome (Roberts 1995: 261; Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 
121). 
After a week-long talks marathon, the leaders of eight parties (representing, in 
total, over 80% of the ballots cast in 1992) agreed on a common plan to put 
forward to the government (Impagliazzo 2010: 59). The political forces that 
signed the document during the ceremony, held on 13 January 1995, were the 
nationalist party FLN, the Islamist group FIS, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), 
the Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA), the Workers Party (PT), the 
Algerian League for Human Rights (LADDH), and the Islamist parties Ennahda 
and the Contemporary Muslim Algeria (JMC). In sum, all the parties convened in 
Rome agreed on the text except for the Movement for Islamic Society - Hamas 
and the PRA. The document, the only political proposal to solve the unrest ever 
submitted during the entire crisis, defined the “Rome Platform for a Peaceful 
Solution of Algeria’s Crisis”, called for an end to the massacres, the release of all 
political prisoners, the convening of a national conference, composed of members 
from both the government and the opposition, leading to new elections, every 
step to prevent foreign entities from intervening in the Algerian crisis, and the 
legal rehabilitation of the FIS, including the release of its members in prison 
(Rupesinghe 2007: 179-180). In greater detail, Section A of the Platform 
addressed basic democratic principles, Section B dealt with preparatory 
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measures for negotiations (and not only mere dialogue with the government), 
Section C focused on restoration of peace, Section D centered on the return to the 
constitutional order and rule of law, Section E called for returning to popular 
sovereignty and Section F set out mutual guarantees for all the signing parties 
(Impagliazzo 2010: 82-85). A final attempt was made by the CSE to persuade the 
Algerian government to show at least a limited form of adhesion or support. The 
draft text of the Platform was sent to Algiers for the government to make 
comments on it, but the cabinet dismissed again the invitation (Giro quot. in 
Hegertun 2010: 82). 
Predictably, also in this case the military cabinet in Algiers publicly reacted very 
negatively to the initiative. Even before the conclusion of the meeting, on 9 
January, the government spokesman, Ahmed Attaf, stated that they had “proof 
that the Sant’ Egidio initiative was in fact a cover up, behind which foreign forces 
hid” (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 166). He then officially declared in a press 
conference – only five days after the signing of the Platform, on 18 January – that 
the government rejected it “on the whole and in detail”, and even defined the 
meeting in Rome as a “non évènement” (‘a non-event’, in English) (Garçon 1995). 
The Algiers regime then insisted on carrying on with the organization of its own 
presidential election later that year, “as a way of disarming the democratic 
critique the Platform represented” (Roberts 1995: 237).  
After the signing of the “Rome Platform” on 13 January 1995, some 
commentators reported at that time that conjectures had started to circulate 
among Algerian officials that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was behind 
the scenes of CSE's initiatives (Scuto 1994; interviews b113, c114, h115 and i116). 
However, there is no evidence that some structured form of cooperation was in 
place between the Community and the Italian government, neither in the 
preparatory phase of the initiative, nor during the sessions in Rome (interviews 
                                                 
113 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
114 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014). 
 
115 Former top aide, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome, 20 October 2016). 
 
116 Senior journalist (Rome, 15 November 2016). 
 151 
b117, c118, h119 and i120). Of course the government was informed of the meetings, 
but the role of the Italian state institutions, also in formal terms, was limited to a 
diplomat attending the signing ceremony of the “Rome Platform” in the audience, 
together with other informal observers – also two representatives from the US 
and French embassies in Rome were among the attendees (Scuto 1995, interview 
a121). Italy, together with the US, France, Spain and the European Union, warmly 
greeted the submission of the proposal; an official declaration was made by the 
head of the Italian Senate Foreign Affairs committee, endorsing the Community’s 
efforts (Scuto 1995). The US State Department, on the same day the Platform was 
announced, issued a statement praising “the results of the St. Egidio reunion, 
[which] seem[ed] to be a serious attempt to help re-establish the process that 
[could] lead to a non-violent solution of the Algerian crisis”. The official 
declaration seemed to further encourage the CSE’s work, when affirming that the 
US “hope[d] that concrete steps [would] be taken by all sides to reduce the level 
of conflict (US State Department 1995). On 13 January, French Foreign Minister 
Alain Juppé underlined France “interest” in “a number of initiatives” going on in 
that period, hinting of course at the “Rome’s Platform”, and a few days later 
affirmed that “France regard[ed] with great interest the dialogue which ha[d] 
opened in Rome”. The spokesman of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs made 
an official statement on 16 January, calling on “all the actors in the Algerian 
political life” to engage in a dialogue after the “peace offer” put forward in Rome 
(Le Monde 1995; Roberts 2003: 175). International media (the New York Times, 
The Economist, Le Monde) also welcomed the document signed in Rome with 
careful optimism (Hegertun 2010: 83).  
However, expressions of support for the “Rome’s Platform” by the international 
community never really transformed into something that was politically more 
effective, later on, when it came to concrete steps to be taken. The inflexible 
reaction of the military government in Algiers, mentioned before, absolutely 
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prevented the “Rome Platform” from being further discussed and implemented. 
In addition, after the Algerian government’s complete rejection of the CSE’s 
initiative triggered some kind of readjustment of international actors’ positions 
on the issue, despite their initial public – albeit hesitant and vague – 
endorsement, the most important governments with a stake in the crisis did not 
follow up on the Community’s efforts. Absence of substantive support from 
European countries, especially France, the former colonial power, turned out to 
be particularly striking and damaging for the CSE’s exercise. In the first months 
of 1995, the French President, François Mitterrand, and the German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, put forward even the idea of a multilateral conference on Algeria 
sponsored by the EU, taking stock of the activities carried out by the CSE in Rome, 
but backed off from this suggestion only a few days later (Akacem 2004: 158). 
Despite a phase of initial ambivalence in its policy, during the next years of the 
crisis, Paris proved indeed to be one of most supportive countries for Algiers, 
through financial and military aid (Roberts 2003: 175-77), and according to the 
CSE France openly hampered Sant’Egidio attempts to work on Algeria also later 
(Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 87). 
 The United Kingdom and Germany preferred to water down their initial 
constructive public statements, declaring that they preferred to act in 
coordination with other EU partners. The European Union as a whole, however, 
never really showed to have an actual interest in getting involved in the crisis, 
although it could have leveraged the huge volume of aid earmarked to Algeria and 
the strong economic bonds to persuade the government to participate in the talks, 
at a time when the country was going through a crippling financial crisis. To give 
an idea of the country’s financial problems, the nationalist government in Algiers 
had indeed been forced, a few months earlier, in April 1994, to sign a deal with 
the International Monetary Fund in an unprecedented move, dismissed more 
than once in the past for preserving its political independence from abroad, 
(Impagliazzo and Giro 1999: 121-122 and 197; Hegertun 2010: 84).  
Also the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who two years earlier, in 
1992, had welcomed with enthusiasm the successful outcome of the CSE-led 
Mozambican peace-making process (Boutros-Ghali 1993; see Chapter 6), clearly 
conveyed to Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi his discouraging point of view on 
the matter, trying to advise the Community against continuing to work on the 
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issue (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 123). It soon become apparent that while the 
Mozambican conflict, in its final stages, was not at the top of the agenda of any 
prominent state actor, and therefore was a matter on which broad international 
consensus was rather easy to build, the Algerian crisis was a highly contentious 
issue for many in the international community. 
With no state and/or international organizations in sight, willing and/or able to 
channel the process in a track one format and push it forward towards its effective 
implementation, and exerting pressure on the Algerian government, the Platform 
was doomed to fail shortly after being publicly announced. It cannot be argued 
that it was the CSE’s intention to keep the process in a track two setting: on the 
contrary, they were probably eager to receive a formal political endorsement by 
at least some track one actors, sooner or later (interviews b122, d123 and h124).  
Another important aspect of the crisis management effort concerned terrorism. 
Some media and intellectuals in Italy and in France started to fiercely criticize the 
CSE for reaching out to terrorists, an allegation that of course the Community 
strongly condemned. However, FIS and other Islamist political groups were 
apparently perceived in Europe, by some sections of public opinion, as too closely 
associated with terrorist groups like GIA in any case (Giro quot. in Hegertun 
2010: 88). This was another aspect that may have discouraged the Italian 
government to get closer to the project launched by Sant’Egidio (interviews b125, 
h126 and i127). 
The CSE’ initiative on Algeria was probably genuinely based on the best of 
intentions (interviews b128, d129, h130 and i131). In the words of Mario Giro, who 
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was part of the working team dealing with the issue, “[o]ur proposal was very 
simple: it was not possible to speak about peace publicly in Algeria. Come to 
Rome or Paris! We offer you the possibility to have an open colloquium with 
journalists, media etc. to speak openly, freely and authentically about the crisis 
in Algeria, and to try to find possibilities for a peaceful settlement. The only 
condition we put forward is that the talks will only be about peace; don’t come to 
Rome to talk about war” (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 64). On other occasions, 
however, like in the Mozambican or in other cases (see Chapter 6 and 4), the 
decision of the Community to get involved had originated from at least a certain 
degree of (previously received) political support – if not a formal request asked 
by parties to the conflict and/or other international stakeholders. In the Algerian 
case, on the contrary, not enough consensus had emerged, not even behind the 
scenes, to suggest or ask them to take an active role in facilitating preventive 
diplomacy/crisis management initiatives, let alone fully fledged peace-making 
efforts, neither during or after the signing of the “Rome Platform”. The whole 
process, from beginning to end, was completely track two, with all team members 
coming from the CSE, and no formal or informal cooperation of any kind with 
the Italian state authorities, other governments or international organizations 
(interviews a132, b133, c134, h135 and i136; Magister 2003). In sum, the launch of the 
project, as mentioned earlier in this Chapter, was prompted by a) informal 
suggestions received by Andrea Riccardi from Algerian Muslim friends of the CSE 
(Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 49), and possibly by b) the positive track record of 
the Mozambican success of 1990-1992, and/or c) an inaccurate assessment of the 
crisis and its international context combined with an overestimation of the 
Community’s possible role. A few comments can be made on c). Apart from 
receiving only “some verbal support from the US and tacit support from some 
European nations in relation to the first [emphasis added] round of negotiations, 
Sant’Egidio operated alone” (Raffaelli quot. in Hegertun 2010: 65). When asked 
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about the reasons for embarking in such a ‘solitary’ and somehow risky 
enterprise, Giro replied: “[b]ecause we did it. My impression is that no one really 
seriously tried to do this gathering, because others only wanted to gather a part 
of them: for example, not the fundamentalists. Really, no one wanted the whole 
picture”. It is probably true that they had no clear idea of what they should have 
expected from engaging in such an effort (Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 65), but 
they were to realize soon how the international context could impact on their 
initiatives, the importance of Algeria as an economic and energy partner for the 
main European states, France and Italy first of all, and the pivotal role that the 
‘Pouvoir’ played in the management of the Algerian economy (Impagliazzo and 
Giro 1997: 225). Even a limited form of cooperation with the Italian state 
institutions, at least in terms of exchange of views, may have added useful details 
to the CSE’s assessment of the situation (interviews b137, h138 and i139). Finally, it 
appears that once the process had been set in motion with the first meeting, and 
Sant’Egidio was by then fully on-board, although in the meanwhile it had become 
apparent that the chances for Dialogue to transform into official track one 
negotiations were very low, the CSE was not really in a position anymore to 
disentangle itself from the initiative, and therefore it just decided to take a gamble 
and see what the outcome could be (interviews b140, d141, h142 and i143).  
During 1995, the level of violence only partially diminished in the country, while 
the GIA started to organise terrorist attacks also abroad, namely in France 
(Impagliazzo and Giro 1997; Roberts 2003). The government announced new 
elections, held in November 1995 and won by Liamine Zéroual, who was therefore 
‘reconfirmed’ in his post; the political impasse continued also over 1996, and a 
new constitution was adopted in November, strengthening presidential powers. 
A new wave of violence towards civilian population hit Algeria, beginning with 
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the massacre of Thalit in April 1997, when the entire population of a village was 
assassinated with brutal methods, and lasting until the end of that year. Despite 
the difficulties faced by the CSE when announcing the “Rome Platform” in 1995, 
during the next years the Community continued to publicly support the 
importance of the meeting held in Rome and of the document, in an attempt to 
revive the initiative. 
 
5.3.3 The government weighs in: “no preconditions for parallel 
diplomacy” (1996-1998) 
 
In the meanwhile, in Italy Berlusconi’s center-right government (1994-1996) had 
collapsed and the general election of April 1996 were won by the center-left 
coalition led by the Prime Minister Romano Prodi, from The Italian People’s 
Party144, with the centrist Lamberto Dini appointed as Foreign Minister. With a 
new political leadership in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two competing 
political positions emerged concerning Algeria. The first was supported by the 
Undersecretary responsible for African Affairs, Rino Serri, from the Movement of 
Unitarian Communists145, who opposed any type of initiative by Sant’Egidio that 
could damage Italy’s relations with the Algerian government. The second was 
backed by the Undersecretary Piero Fassino, from the Democratic Party of the 
Left146, and, to some extent, by the Minister Lamberto Dini, who had initially been 
more open towards the Community’s activities in the country (de Courten 2003; 
Impagliazzo 2010; interviews a147, b148 and c149). Yet, advocates of these two rival 
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political stances were all aware of the importance of Algeria for Italian foreign 
policy in energy and economic terms. The issue was clearly perceived by all people 
working on it in the Ministry – both in political and administrative posts – as 
being so crucial that everyone was inclined to act very cautiously, whatever the 
policy option or the attitude they may decide to pick vis-à-vis the crisis and 
Sant’Egidio’s actions (interviews b150, c151 and h152). In the meanwhile, the 
Community continued to publicly advance the feasibility and political value of the 
“Rome Platform”, and in 1998 it even suggested the idea of convening an 
international conference, to no avail (Impagliazzo 2010: 72; de Courten 2003; 
Impagliazzo and Giro 1997). 
The story of the Italian Ambassador who took up his posting in September 1996, 
Franco de Courten, was a litmus test of these divergences among top politicians 
dealing with foreign affairs at the time, with the diplomat eventually falling 
‘victim’ to these tensions. Before leaving Rome, the senior diplomat was 
summoned for receiving the instructions, usually given to an ambassador before 
taking his post abroad, from the Undersecretary Rino Serri and two other 
diplomats serving in the two top positions of the diplomatic bureaucratic 
machine: the Secretary General of the Ministry, Boris Biancheri, and the Head of 
Cabinet of the Minister, Umberto Vattani. The three all reaffirmed the 
importance of Algeria for Italian foreign policy, and urged de Courten to closely 
monitor the evolving situation and to make every possible effort in order to 
further strengthen bilateral relations, on both the political and economic side. No 
in-depth discussion took place on the “Rome Platform” or on Sant'Egidio 
initiatives on Algeria in general (interview a153). After a few weeks in Algeria, the 
diplomat realised that actually the Community did not have the same level of 
presence and activity on the ground they had been (and would be, later) able to 
establish in other countries where they had worked (and would operate), in the 
fields of preventive/crisis management and peace-making, such as Albania, 
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Kosovo, Burundi and Mozambique. According to the ambassador, at that time the 
Community did not maintain strong relations neither with the Italian embassy in 
Algiers; in the country, Sant’Egidio maintained regular contacts only with 
Teissier. Also the archbishop, however, after a first phase of cautious support, 
stopped promoting the Community’s activity concerning the conflict, considered 
too risky, and his relations with the CSE began to worsen (interviews a154, b155 and 
i156; Magister 2003). The head of the Algerian Church, in March 1997, even 
complained with the ambassador about the overambition of Sant’Egidio, and 
bluntly asked the diplomat “whether the Italian government was behind the 
Community’s ‘foreign’ policy”. de Courten strongly turned down the archbishop’s 
speculations, because on the one hand he was trying to follow the instructions on 
keeping sound relations with the Algerian government, received before leaving 
Rome, and on the other he was personally convinced that the CSE’s initiatives 
were not politically appropriate, also because its Catholic orientation was not, in 
his view, appreciated by Algerian interlocutors at that time (de Courten 2003: 
143). The CSE, after the end of the unrest, reacted to de Courten’s remarks on its 
involvement in the crisis, with Giro affirming that the ambassador was among 
those “officials who tried to undermine our mode of mediation and get the 
political environment against us” and, on a bitter note, that the diplomat “was 
used or threatened by the Italian oil or gas industry that was against any 
agreement. Because they were deeply worried that the military government of 
Algeria would retaliate against Italy because we are Italian, and stop the oil and 
gas delivery from Algeria. When you fiddle with these things…” (Giro quot. in 
Hegertun 2010: 87).  
A few remarks on the question of the religious inspiration of the CSE and the 
possible role of Catholic faith in this case are needed here. As mentioned also 
earlier in this Chapter, unsurprisingly also the Algerian government criticized the 
meetings in Sant’Egidio and the “Rome Platform”, also on the grounds of religion, 
blaming the NGO – and even the Vatican, for supposedly leading the initiative 
from behind – for being an unsuitable actor to engage with the issue at stake, also 
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because it was a Catholic group trying to reach out to parties that were 
overwhelmingly Muslim, in a Muslim majority country. On a similar note, even 
archibishop Teissier started to publicly criticize the very idea of dialogue and 
possible negotiations (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 91-92), although, according to 
the CSE, he did so after receiving personal threats by the Algerian government 
(Giro quot. in Hegertun 2010: 84). Undoubtedly, the crisis had a strong (Islamic) 
religious component (Roberts 2003), and it cannot be denied that the Christian 
minority was a target for attacks by extremist groups like the GIA157 (Appleby 
2000: 382), but whether Sant’Egidio’s Catholic orientation was a decisive factor 
for the failure of its crisis management efforts or not is a disputable question. 
Although this debate falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to look 
at it as far as similar reflections may have been included in calculations made by 
the Italian government when assessing if and how responding to Sant’Egidio’s 
moves in the different stages of the process. In this thesis I think that 
explanations slightly downplaying the role of religion in the Algerian crisis – and 
in the Sant’Egidio-led project – are better suited to understand the evolution of 
the entire sequence of events (Appleby 2000; Roberts 2003; Hegertun 2010). The 
very fact that a number of Algerian Islamic-oriented formations had agreed to 
convene in Sant’Egidio’s headquarters in Rome, clearly shows that its openly 
stated Catholic leanings were not considered as an obstacle, when assessing the 
CSE’s credibility as a neutral observer and/or mediator. In addition, the 
Community received public statements of encouragement for its activities on 
Algeria also from Muslim political actors from Muslim countries, like Egypt and 
Morocco (Impagliazzo and Giro 1999: 187; interview b158 and c159). It is not 
possible, of course, to imagine what would have happened, had a non-Catholic 
non state actor based in Italy – or in another foreign, probably still European 
country – come up with the idea of engaging in a preventive diplomacy/crisis 
management efforts concerning the Algerian crisis, as no other similar initiatives 
were taken on this issue. However, it is rather clear that the decisive flaw of the 
CSE’s initiative was of a different nature: the absence of one of the two belligerent 
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parties from the meeting table, the Algerian government. Had Algiers’ cabinet 
showed even limited signs of willingness to at least consider the possibility of 
joining the dialogue in Rome, the Italian government attitude towards the NGO 
would have probably been more open, cooperative and less conflicting. Indeed, I 
believe arguments claiming that the crisis was essentially political in nature –  
albeit with additional ethnical, identity-based and religious nuances – are pretty 
convincing (Appleby 2000; Roberts 2003; Hegertun 2010). Such a feature of the 
Algerian unrest further contributed to the perception, by the Italian state 
authorities, of the events as being part of an extremely complex and delicate 
foreign policy dossier. This, in turn, has certainly impacted on the decision of the 
government not to consider any form of active cooperation with the CSE on the 
issue, unlike in the Mozambican case, and to openly challenge Sant’Egidio 
activities, from a certain phase of the process onwards (interviews a160, b161, c162, 
and h163). 
In any case, implementing the guidelines received in Rome before his mission, 
based on the idea of maintaining – and possibly also strengthening – political and 
economic ties with the government in office turned out to be a tall order for the 
ambassador and its 2-person diplomatic staff164. Adding to the confusion, public 
declarations and press interviews by top officials in Rome, between 1996 and 
1998, were sometimes contradictory, although de Courten clarified some years 
later that despite these uncertainties, directives issued from the Ministry in Rome 
to him in Algiers had never officially changed during his entire stay in the country 
(interview a165).  
Such ambiguity, of course, was not well-received by the Algerian authorities. In 
January 1997 bilateral relations between Rome and Algiers deteriorated when, 
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commenting on a visit to Italy by an FFS leader, Undersecretary Fassino 
mentioned the “Rome Platform” as a sign of the Italian willingness to work on a 
political solution. The reaction of the government in Algiers was immediate: Italy 
was again accused of ‘interference’ in the domestic affairs of the country, like in 
the case of the submission of the “Rome Platform” in 1995, and the ambassador 
was summoned to officially protest with the Italian government at the 
Undersecretary’s declarations (Impagliazzo 2010: 68; interviews b166, d167, h168 
and i169).  
At the end of April 1997, confusion over the Algerian issue in the Italian foreign 
policy machinery was concisely summarized by the ambassador in Algiers, pretty 
much reflecting the same political preferences expressed in the Ministry in 1996, 
shortly after the change of government. According to the diplomat, who was 
trying to figure out the reasons for Rome’s inertia, one the one hand, “Rino Serri, 
Undersecretary for African affairs, and Boris Biancheri, Secretary General of the 
Ministry, [were] certainly still shoring up the early government’s policy, [on the 
other, added] Piero Fassino, Umberto Vattani and Amedeo De Franchis appear 
to me, very influenced by CSE’s positions, while the Democratic Left Party [was] 
probably divided internally because Aït Ahmed [was] much appreciated within 
the Socialist International [of which the party was member, added]. Dini, maybe, 
[had] not made a decision yet, and ENI believe[d], and I think they [were] wrong, 
that they [could] do business regardless of politics” (de Courten 1998: 165).  
At this point, the scenario started to change, again in an erratic way. Suddenly, in 
April 1998, the Foreign Ministry decided to recall the ambassador to Algeria, and 
replace him with ambassador Antonio Armellini (taking office in August 1998), 
without providing de Courten a detailed explanation; it was only said in 
diplomatic and press circles that the Minister Dini in person had made the 
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decision (Veronese and Vinci 1998; interviews a170, b171, h172 and i173). The move 
appeared all the more unusual because, according to the Ministry rules, an 
ambassador cannot be removed during the first two years of his mandate, and de 
Courten had been appointed only 20 months before the decision (Veronese and 
Vinci 1998; interviews b174, h175 and i176). Apparently, the political line in favour 
of Sant’Egidio, advocated within the Ministry by the Undersecretary Piero 
Fassino and the Secretary General Umberto Vattani (the former Head of Cabinet 
of the Minister, until 1997), had won over the Minister, who had therefore decided 
to remove from the scene one of main opponents of the NGO’s conduct in Algeria. 
It appears that the Community and other diplomats, politicians and experts, 
supporting Sant’Egidio for domestic political reasons, had probably put pressure 
on the Ministry leadership to strengthen its cause (de Courten 2003: 370-371; 
interviews a177, b178, c179, h180 and i181).  
But the story was not over yet. Such an accommodating attitude towards the CSE 
was to remain an isolated event indeed, or at least to be balanced by another 
move. Shortly after, signalling once more the volatility of Italian foreign policy 
orientations on the issue at that time, the Foreign Minister readjusted again his 
policy towards Algeria. This was probably because of a more careful assessment 
– and/or pressure received by ENI and other economic actors – of the high-
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priority Italian energy and economic interests in the country, that discouraged 
every political position vis-à-vis the crisis that could hamper bilateral relations 
with the Algerian government (interviews b182, d183, h184 and i185). When a long 
due official visit to Algiers was finally arranged in July 1998, Dini tried everything 
to convince its irritated counterparts that the “Rome Platform” belonged to the 
past. “Today there are absolutely no preconditions for parallel diplomacy”, the 
Minister declared in a press conference organised at the Italian Embassy in 
Algiers, hinting of course at Sant’Egidio’s activities. Although he expressed its 
consideration for the useful work of the Community, he assured the Algerians 
that similar initiatives would not occur again (Cianfanelli 1998). A few years later, 
Dini explained that “[t]he agreements proposed by Sant’Egidio were not part of 
Italian foreign policy [emphasis added]” 186. Sant’Egidio tried, in good faith, a 
sort of reconciliation, but through a legitimation of parties that Algiers ha[d] 
never been willing to accept. My visit was meant to explain our government’s 
stance towards Algeria. We also offered our help for the reconstruction [of the 
country, added] and support for the victims of violence. But, most of all, we 
offered Algeria to restart relations with the European Union. That was the new 
starting point” (Dini and Molinari 2001: 77). When asked for his opinion on 
Sant’Egidio ‘diplomacy’ in general, he praised its success in the case of the 
Mozambican peace process (1990-1992) (see Chapter 5) and its efforts 
concerning Kosovo, but clearly stated that the mediation attempt in Algeria had 
completely failed. Furthermore, he candidly affirmed that the CSE members “can 
play a useful role in the resolution of even complex situations, but cannot act as 
the diplomatic arm of a state”. After returning from Algeria, Dini discussed with 
Vincenzo Paglia from the Community about his official visit, and “from that 
moment on the Community of Sant’Egidio was discouraged to deal with Algeria” 
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(Dini and Molinari 2001: 78; interviews b187, h188 and i189). From that moment on, 
no further Sant’Egidio initiatives on the Algerian crisis were organised or even 
conceived, and Italy-Algeria bilateral relations gradually returned at pre-1995 
levels. 
 
5.4 Conclusions. Competitive relations 
 
In the case of the Algerian crisis, the Italian institutional machinery and the 
Community of Sant’Egidio maintained relations that were moderately positive at 
the beginning, then predominantly competitive and, ultimately, overtly 
conflicting.  
As Hill (2003) has argued, in the grey, halfway ‘intermestic zone’, responsibilities 
of states and non state actors are often confused and overlapping. “[S]tates tend 
to overstate and TNAs to understate their respective roles; the one not to have 
their responsibilities diminished, the others not to attract unnecessary attention”. 
If asked how the attempt at mediation started by Sant’Egidio should be 
interpreted, a realist may argue that the NGO “was probably a convenient front 
for the Italian government, and possibly behind them other western governments 
which could not afford to be seen as publicly active”. An advocate of international 
civil society, by contrast, “would stress the autonomous will and capacity of 
Sant’Egidio in the vacuum created by the cynicism and ‘prudence’ of the 
neighbouring states” (Hill 2003: 214-215). Hill concludes that “[m]ore likely than 
either of these competing interpretations, however, is the one which combines 
the two and accepts the messy character of events like these”, as in such delicate 
and dangerous contexts all actors are, to a certain extent, interdependent.  
The interpretation suggested here completely agrees with Hill’s position, but 
develops it further by arguing that the nature of events was not only messy, but 
also competitive and, in the end, clearly conflicting, because the respective 
agendas of the Community and of the Italian government – or, at least, of a part 
of the latter, that in the end prevailed on the other – turned out to be clearly 
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irreconcilable at some point. Furthermore, it seems that in the first phase the 
Italian government did not openly oppose Sant’Egidio’s conduct, because it was 
possibly waiting to see whether the situation on the ground could evolve towards 
a scenario in which the “Rome Platform” could be further developed. In that case, 
the government would have probably made the most of the NGO’s initiative 
endorsing it and playing a proactive role for itself, like in the Mozambican case, 
at least with a certain degree of support and involvement (see Chapter 5). 
In addition, it should be noted that the analysis of the events has demonstrated 
that the concept of informal and/or accidental ‘delegation’, proposed in the early 
phases of this thesis, could not work in this case. What the Community did to try 
to defuse tensions among the different Algerian parties, undoubtedly was not the 
consequence of an informal ‘delegation’ of tasks by the Italian government. As it 
appears clearly, in this case the top level of the institutional machinery dealing 
with foreign policy (namely the Foreign Minister, the most senior career 
diplomats and the Prime Minister), decided to craft a policy on Algeria that at the 
beginning was uncertain but in any case not cooperative, apart from vague, initial 
public statements, and then in contrast with the positions of the Community; 
therefore ‘delegation’ could not have been possible in any case. Neither evidence 
of accidental ‘delegation’ can be found when tracking the events occurred. On the 
contrary, when the government started to realize that Sant’Egidio’s activities 
could have had a negative impact on Italy’s policy towards Algeria, also in the 
light of the tough reactions of the Algerian government and of the evolution of the 
events on the ground, it made every possible effort to explicitly distance itself 
from the Community’s positions and to discourage its actions, even in absence of 
any kind of ‘delegation’. 
Again, relations between the two actors in this case fall within the category of 
‘normal’ – competitive and, in the end, openly conflicting, as we have seen – 
relations between a state and an NGO based in its territory, on a foreign policy 
issue, with both actors acting, in principle, on an equal footing, without any 
‘delegation’ mechanism at work. After all, this also in line with what the literature 
now widely suggests on the increasing role of non state actors in international 
politics, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Hocking 2011; Reinalda 2012, to name just a 
few).  
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Chapter 6. Italy, the Community of Sant’Egidio and the 
Mozambican peace process (1990-1992) 
 
 
6.1. Chapter outline 
 
In line with the theme-based subdivision into two different issue-areas (‘sub-
policies’) of foreign policy, this Chapter presents the empirical research 
conducted on a case pertaining to the second subfield, peace-making. It focuses 
on the interactions between the Italian state and the Community of Sant’Egidio 
in the case of the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992). 
First, the Chapter briefly presents the essential features of Italian foreign policy 
towards Mozambique from the early 1970s until the launch of the peace process 
(with some insights also on the following period), and the activities performed by 
the Community concerning the country. Second, it elucidates how relations have 
unfolded between the two actors during the three main stages of the peace 
process: 1) first initiatives taken by the Community (1988-1990); 2) multiparty 
negotiations with the participation of the Italian government; 3) signing of the 
peace agreement and launch of the UN mission ONUMOZ. Third, the Chapter 
takes stock of the material presented and argues that relations between Italian 
institutions and Sant’Egidio were essentially cooperative in this case. 
 
6.2 Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio in the Mozambican 
peace process (1990-1992) 
 
6.2.1 Mozambique in Italian foreign policy 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, the core business of Italy’s foreign policy in the 
Republican era has historically included the transatlantic bond, the European 
Community/European Union integration process and the Mediterranean/Middle 
East. Sub-Saharan Africa was a geographical area traditionally neglected in 
Rome’s international agenda, with the exception of the Horn of Africa, especially 
Somalia, an Italian colony from the end of the eighteenth century to 1941, and 
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Ethiopia, occupied by Italian troops between 1936 and 1941. Bilateral ties with 
other Sub-Saharan countries have never been very strong because of the 
extremely limited Italian colonial presence, and because until the 1970s-1980s, 
these countries have not been particularly attractive for Italian economic 
expansion. In contrast to what has been argued concerning Algeria in Chapter 5, 
relations with Mozambique have indeed never occupied a high ranking position 
among the priorities of Rome’s international agenda, at least until the 1970s-
1980s (Borruso 2014). 
Only in the 1970s did Portuguese colonies emerge as a privileged area for Italian 
development cooperation in Africa. Italian governments encouraged civil society 
initiatives in support of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and 
Guinea-Bissau. During that decade, Italian interests began to strengthen, 
especially in Angola and Mozambique, with Italian companies, first of all ENI, 
starting to gradually carve out a significant market niche in the oil and gas sectors 
of both countries (Carbone G., Bruno et al. 2014: 26). As far as Mozambique is 
specifically concerned, during the decade-long liberation war from the 
Portuguese colonial rule (1964-1974), Italian civil society organisations and local 
governments190 ushered in the establishment of the first informal contacts and 
partnerships, especially from a political point of view, with the FRELIMO army 
and the northern areas of the country that had just been liberated (FRELIMO, as 
it will be explained later in this Chapter, was the centre-left nationalist group 
leading the liberation war). After the country gained complete independence in 
October 1975, the Italian government immediately recognised the new state and 
appointed an Ambassador to the capital Maputo a few months later (Ferraris 
1998: 298). Mozambique immediately entered the top ten of countries receiving 
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 168 
Italian development aid (Quartapelle 2012: 1), and Italy soon became one of the 
most important foreign donors for the country, also during the ensuing civil war 
(Gianturco 2010: 28). Consistent with a typical trend in Italian development 
cooperation policy, that lasted until the end of the 1980s, ties with the newly 
independent state adopted a clear political nuance since the onset (Seton Watson 
1991; Fossati 1999 and 2008)191. The Italian Communist Party and left-leaning 
civil society organisations were indeed at the forefront of this engagement with 
Mozambique because of their support for FRELIMO, that was on the same side 
of the political spectrum. This ‘special relationship’ fostered by the Communist 
Party was of course very useful not only from the perspective of political ties 
between the two states at the top level, and in terms of the party’s international 
politics, but also for the bureaucracy of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
its daily management of bilateral relations and development aid earmarked for 
Mozambique (Fossati 1999; Quartapelle 2012).  
At the beginning of the 1990s, because the huge corruption scandal disclosed by 
the major judicial investigation ‘Mani Pulite’, mentioned in Chapter 2, involved 
also politicians and diplomats who had dealt with development cooperation 
activities, foreign aid funding was heavily reduced (Ferraris 1998: 507-508; 
Carbone 2007: 914)192, therefore bilateral aid to Mozambique decreased 
significantly. A judicial inquiry was conducted also into some aid activities carried 
out precisely in Mozambique by the municipality of Reggio Emilia (Cancellieri 
1986). The events described later in this Chapter took place exactly in this phase 
of ‘transformation’ of relations with the African country. While ties in the 
development cooperation field came to a standstill that lasted at least until the 
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end of the 1990s, economic relations inaugurated in the 1970s in the oil and gas 
domain, especially by ENI, further consolidated in the following decades. 
It is interesting here to take a look at how Italian-Mozambique relations 
developed from the 1990s onwards, although this goes beyond the time frame of 
events illustrated later in this Chapter. As it will be showed, the role of the Italian 
government and of the Community of Sant’Egidio in the Mozambican peace 
process yielded an important return for Italy in terms of political capital and 
credibility, that after a few years produced a positive impact also on economic 
relations. First of all, it should be noted that, as a further sign of political 
friendship – and of the closely related determination to step up economic 
opportunities – in 2002 the Italian government decided to cancel 100% of 
Mozambican public debt, as part of G7 commitments responding to the IMF-
World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Like on many 
other occasions, ENI then led the way, starting to operate in the country in 2006. 
Massive investments in Mozambique soon began to bear fruit, and the company 
announced in 2011 the discovery, in Mamba, of the largest natural gas field in the 
company’s exploration history up to that date (ENI 2011). It is clear that such an 
event, together with the other two discoveries of 2012 and 2014, represented a 
game-changer both for the significance of the African country for ENI – and, as a 
consequence, for Italian foreign policy – and for Mozambique itself. According to 
some estimates, in 2014 Mozambique was already the third-largest proved 
natural gas reserve holder in Africa, after Nigeria and Algeria (EIA 2014). Oil and 
gas is not the only sector Italian business firms have started to invest in, since the 
end of the 1990s. Approximately thirty large companies, plus a growing number 
of small and medium enterprises, are active in the fields of construction, 
infrastructures, mining, transport, rails, telecommunications, food and tourism. 
It seems reasonable to argue that ties between Rome and Maputo will further 
consolidate in the next years, as ENI’s presence in the country is expected to 
remain constant and even to increase. According to an estimate by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, thanks to the huge investments planned by ENI and its smaller 
subcontractor firms, operating especially in the energy infrastructure sector, Italy 
could become the leading foreign investor in Mozambique in the near future 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).  
 170 
A final note on the presence of Italian nationals in the country. Unlike the case of 
Algeria, and as another proof of the limited importance of the country for Rome’s 
foreign policy, the community of Italian citizens living in Mozambique on a 
permanent basis has always been very small in size and unimportant in terms of 
influence. It has been growing a little since the 1970s, with the arrival of a number 
of development cooperation experts and staff employers of Italian firms working 
in the country; yet, it cannot be considered a significant community of Italian 
nationals abroad (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2009). 
 
6.2.2 The Community of Sant’Egidio and Mozambique 
 
The history of ties between the CSE and Mozambique dates back to the early 
1970s: a young Mozambican priest, Jaime Gonçalves, living in Rome in that 
period to complete his religious studies, got in touch with the Community and 
started to cooperate on a series of activities, although he was not a full member.  
After the country’s independence, the Holy See appointed Gonçalves as bishop of 
Beira, the second-largest city after the capital Maputo (Bartoli 1999: 256). During 
his tenure he gained first-hand experience of the harsh difficulties that Catholics 
were facing under the new leftist government, led by FRELIMO, as they were 
perceived as being associated to the Portuguese colonial rule. In 1977 he conveyed 
these reflections to Sant’Egidio, although he was fully aware of the fact that the 
CSE was not directly associated to the political stances of the Vatican, that at that 
time did not enjoy good relations with Mozambican state authorities. In turn, the 
Community realised that a window of opportunity for dialogue could be opened 
leveraging the good relations between FRELIMO and the Italian Communist 
Party, that turned out to agree on the idea of getting in touch with Mozambican 
Catholic groups. Sant’Egidio organised two meetings in 1982 and in 1984 at its 
headquarters in Rome between bishop Jaime Gonçalves and the Communists’ 
secretary Enrico Berlinguer (Hume 1994: 17; Gianturco 2010: 28; Perry 2014: 
79). 
At the same time, Sant’Egidio was working also on its ‘traditional’ charity 
activities, i.e. food and medicine distribution for internally displaced persons 
fleeing areas particularly stricken by heavy fighting. In 1984, the Community set 
up a committee, called “Friends of Mozambique”, in order to manage a charity 
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fundraising campaign, involving different donors throughout Italy, to deliver aid 
to the African country through a humanitarian flight (Corriere della Sera 1984). 
On that occasion, Andrea Riccardi and father Matteo Zuppi from the CSE joined 
the crew travelling to Mozambique, upon their arrival were greeted by three 
cabinet ministers and had the opportunity to visit some areas of the country. This 
trip to the country further strengthened Sant’Egidio’s ties with Mozambican 
government figures (Ferraris 1998: 479). In 1986 and in 1988, “Friends of 
Mozambique” organised two “ships of solidarity”: after a fundraising campaign 
launched in Italy by the CSE and other civil society organisations, approximately 
11,000 tons in total of staple foodstuffs, medicines and farming equipment were 
dispatched to various parts of Mozambique and distributed on the field by CSE 
staff, working with the Caritas local branch. When the first ship left Italy in 1986, 
the then Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs for African affairs Mario Raffaelli, 
who would later join the negotiating team (see next sections), attended the 
ceremony on behalf of the Italian government (Dragosei 1986; La Repubblica 
1986; Hume 1994: 18; Gianturco 2010: 29). Even if Italian state institutions were 
not directly involved in the project – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only provided 
the initiative with some form of political ‘blessing’ and part of the logistical 
support – the presence of a government member on that occasion can be 
interpreted as an early sign of the more broad-ranging cooperative and 
synergetic relations that the government and the CSE would establish on 
Mozambique a few years later. In addition, although it is worth stressing again 
that the Community was not coordinating its projects concerning the country 
with the Vatican (Giro 1998: 87; interview b193 and d194) it must be noted that also 
the process of normalization of relations between Mozambique and the Holy See, 
set in motion in 1985 by an unexpected, last minute meeting in Rome between 
the President Samora Machel and the Pope John Paul II, facilitated also by the 
CSE itself, probably contributed to the positive perception of Sant’Egidio as a 
reliable, – albeit Catholic – non state actor, in the eyes of the secular political 
leaders in Maputo, who were rather wary of all things related to the Mozambican 
Catholic Church. 
                                                 
193 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
194 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014). 
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Connections with RENAMO (the main opposition party, a right-wing militant 
organization, as it will be explained later) were instead established later, in 1987. 
When at the end of the 1980s FRELIMO came to realize that a political agreement 
was the only viable option to bring the civil war to an end, Gonçalves (and 
Sant’Egidio) facilitated contacts between the ruling party and RENAMO, acting 
as a coordinator of a composite group of Mozambican religious figures in favour 
of peace.  
It was precisely building on this positive track record of relations with the main 
political and religious actors in Mozambique that at the beginning of the 1990s 
the Community was able to weave its web for conducting a negotiating process, 
as it will be explained later in this Chapter. It is important to note that ties 
between Sant’Egidio and Mozambique were built in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
while simultaneously relations between Italian institutions and the African 
country developed on political and economic grounds, sometimes crossing their 
respective paths in the ‘intermediate’ zone of the international activity of political 
parties – in particular the Communist Party and the Socialist Party – but never 
clashing with each other.  
As argued above when discussing Mozambique in Italian foreign policy, the 
successful experience of the peace process of 1990-1992 ‘rewarded’ also the CSE 
later on – and it still does today – with a new mediation role for one of its 
members, again on an issue concerning Mozambican politics. In July 2016, 
indeed, at the request of the Mozambican President, Filipe Nyusi, the European 
Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica 
Mogherini, appointed the CSE’s international relations chief, Angelo Romano, 
and Mario Raffaelli (not representing the Italian government this time, but as an 
independent expert and President of the Italian branch of the NGO AMREF 
Health Africa working), as mediators on behalf of the EU in the negotiations 
between the Government of Mozambique, led by FRELIMO, and RENAMO, 
together with other international and Mozambican Church mediators.  Tensions 
in Mozambique had arisen again as of late in 2014, after RENAMO had refused 
to accept the results of the general election in six provinces of the country, 
levelling accusations of vote rigging against the FRELIMO-led government. The 
two parties are up to this time the main actors in the country’s contemporary 
political arena, and RENAMO is still headed by Afonso Dhlakama, who already 
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was the party secretary during the negotiations of 1990-1992 (Club of 
Mozambique 2016b). Although Angelo Romano and Mario Raffaelli have been 
chosen formally by the EU, of course their previous experience in the peace 
process of 1990-1992, respectively with the CSE and the Italian government, as 
well as their first-hand familiarity with some of the same Mozambican leaders 
they had worked with almost two decades earlier, have played in their favour 
(Club of Mozambique 2016b).  
 
6.3 Relations between Italy and the Community of Sant’Egidio 
during the Mozambican peace process 
 
The Italian government and Sant’Egidio played a mediating role on the 
Mozambican dossier in a context including of course also other state and non 
state actors. Other main actors involved in the issue were the following: 
- Government of Mozambique, led by President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, who 
was also leader of left-wing FRELIMO (The Liberation Front of Mozambique, in 
Portuguese ‘Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique’); 
- RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique, in Portuguese ‘Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana’), the main opposition party, a right-wing militant 
organization, headed by Afonso Dhlakama; 
- United States, Portugal, United Kingdom, France and the UN (as observers). 
The civil war in Mozambique broke out in 1977, shortly after the country's 
independence from Portugal. Two fronts opposed each other in this conflict: on 
the one side there was FRELIMO, a centre-left nationalist group that had led the 
war of independence from Portuguese control in 1975, and had come into power 
right after defeating the colonial rule195. On the other there was RENAMO 
(National Resistance of Mozambique, in Portuguese ‘Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana’), a right-wing armed group opposing the new government, 
founded in 1975 with a strong anti-Communist stance. The conflict was 
particularly bloody, leaving approximately one million dead, over five million 
displaced and/or refugees out of a total population of approximately 14-15 million 
                                                 
195 After the country’s independence, achieved on 25 June 1975, the first appointed President was Samora 
Moises Machel, who had been the leader of FRELIMO during the 10-year struggle against the colonial rule. 
He passed away in a plane crash in 1986, and was succeeded by the Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano 
(Newitt 1995: 569). 
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at that time, and a huge number of landmines (Hanlon 2020: 78), completely 
cleared only 23 years after the end of the war196. In addition, it was exacerbated 
by Cold War rivalries and their reflections on the African regional politics. In line 
with other contemporary proxy wars, also in the Mozambican civil conflict the 
two confronting ‘coalitions’, at least in its early phases, partially mirrored, in 
ideological terms, the Cold War international scheme: the socialist movement 
FRELIMO received significant military and financial assistance from the Soviet 
Union, while white minority governments of Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and 
South Africa supported the center-right party RENAMO. However, the US 
government never officially sanctioned RENAMO or gave it support. On the 
contrary, at a later stage the Americans, together with France and the United 
Kingdom started to support FRELIMO. With the classic bipolar confrontation 
scheme already petering out in the Mozambican case – even before the Cold War 
itself came to an end – the international context was possibly increasing the 
chances of a feasible attempt to resolve the conflict (Barnes 1998: 120-121). The 
international agreement that brought the 15-year old civil war to an end was 
signed on 4 October 1992, after a 2-stage peace process. The first phase was based 
on negotiations held in Rome from 10 July 1990 and 4 October 1992; the second 
consisted of a United Nations peace-keeping mission, ONUMOZ, launched 
shortly after the peace agreement was signed, that operated until 1994, when 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano, FRELIMO’s leader, took power after the first free and 
fair general election ever held in the country (Bartoli 1999: 248). In this Chapter 
I will focus mostly on the first stage of this process. The role of Italian institutions 
and of the CSE in the peace negotiations is further split here into three phases: 1) 
preliminary initiatives taken by the Community (1988-1990); 2) multiparty 
negotiations with the full involvement of the Italian government; 3) signing of the 
agreement concluding the process and the launch of ONUMOZ. 
 
 
 
                                                 
196 According to UNDP data, Mozambique was considered as “one of the most mined countries in the world, 
alongside Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia and Iraq”, the result of both the war of independence and 
the civil war (UNDP Mozambique: 2015). 
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6.3.1 Sant’Egidio’s preliminary steps on the Mozambican dossier 
(1988-1990) 
 
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, at the end of the 
1980s/beginning of the 1990s the Community could already count on rather 
strong relations with FRELIMO, built from the second half of the 1970s onwards. 
With RENAMO, on the contrary, first contacts were established only in 1987, 
when CSE’s Matteo Zuppi met in Rome Juanito Bertuzzi, an Italian national who 
had lost some private assets and properties in Mozambique after the post-
independence nationalization, and had maintained contacts with some 
RENAMO’s leaders in the country, through a mutual friend, Bertina Lopes, a 
Mozambican artist living in the Italian capital. Thanks to Bertuzzi, Zuppi got in 
contact with Artur Da Fonseca, a RENAMO’s foreign branch representative based 
mostly in West Germany, who turned out to be a key figure when, one year later, 
in 1988, the Community managed to set up a secret meeting in Mozambique 
between archibishop Gonçalves and RENAMO’s leader Afonso Dhlakama 
(Gianturco 2010: 31).  
Between 1988 and 1990 FRELIMO had indeed realized that a political agreement 
was the only viable option to bring the civil war to an end. Before 1990 different 
national and regional state and non state actors had tried and failed to launch 
negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO: Mozambican Catholic Church, 
Protestant leaders, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, etc. The last regional meeting 
on the issue to fail was due to be held in Malawi on 12 June 1990 (and then 
cancelled), only one month before the first direct contacts between the two parties 
in Rome (Hume 1994). In April 1990, the Mozambican FRELIMO government, 
through the Minister of Work, Aguiar Mazula, established preliminary contacts 
with Sant’Egidio to explore if the Community was willing to set up secret 
meetings in its headquarters in Rome to start peace talks. Mazula, in addition, 
had previously consulted with the Vatican on the involvement of the CSE; the 
Holy See had not objected to this option, but had decided to remain out of the 
scene. For an almost fortuitous coincidence, also RENAMO, through its senior 
member in charge of international affairs, Raul Domingos, turned to the CSE for 
the same reason shortly after. Only three days after the cancelled meeting in 
Malawi, on 16 June 1990, Raul Domingos travelled to Rome on behalf of 
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RENAMO to formally request Sant'Egidio to organise a first round of talks, and 
ask the Italian government to participate as an observer and to cover the financial 
costs associated to meetings and delegates’ travel expenses. Both parties to the 
conflict, starting from different perspectives, ended up approaching the same 
third party to ask for mediation (Gianturco 2010: 34). Since the very beginning, 
notwithstanding the Community’s familiarity with Mozambican issues, the 
involvement of Sant’Egidio in the peace process appeared (also to CSE members 
themselves) as something unexpected and interesting because the Community 
was not at the time – and it has never become, to some extent – an organisation 
professionally dedicated only to conflict resolution (see Chapter 5 for more on the 
nature of its activities) (Riccardi 1997: 98). However, the CSE decided to fully 
commit itself to the mediation efforts and started to work to facilitate early 
contacts between the ruling party and RENAMO, together with Gonçalves, who 
could act, for his part, as a coordinator of a composite group of Mozambican 
religious figures in favour of a resolution of the conflict. The peace process had 
therefore been set in motion.  
It is important to underline that the Italian government, between 1989 and the 
first quarter of 1990, did not show any particular interest in what was happening 
in Mozambique at the end of the 1980s, from a political point of view. The conflict 
appeared as one that would slowly head towards some form of settlement, sooner 
or later (Ferraris 1998: 478-480; interview d197 and e198). As explained in previous 
sections, the country had of course gained significance in the government's 
international agenda during the 1970s and the 1980s, but mostly only as far as 
development cooperation policy was concerned. For historical and geographical 
reasons, on the contrary, it remained out of the picture in purely international 
political terms, at least from the perspective of the cabinet and the institutional 
machinery (political parties are not included here). This held all the more true for 
the government in office at that time, led by the Christian Democrat Giulio 
Andreotti199, whose foreign policy in that period was extremely focused on other 
                                                 
197 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014). 
 
198 Former MP with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014). 
 
199 For the sake of accuracy, it must be clarified that in 1988 Giulio Andreotti, then Foreign 
Minister, had met with Gonçalves to discuss the situation in the country. The encounter, however, 
basically amounted only to a routine bilateral diplomacy meeting (Hume 1994: 47).  
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issues, such as the attempt to come to terms with the tremendous effects of the 
demise of the Cold War on Italy, the participation in the First Gulf War, and the 
negotiations of the crucial Treaty of Maastricht, in the framework of the European 
Economic Community (Varsori 2013). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Socialist Gianni De Michelis, was not involved in any way in the preliminary 
contacts between the Community and the Mozambican counterparts, let alone 
did he imagine a role for Italy as part of this peace process (Veronese 1994; 
interviews b200, c201, d202 and e203). To be sure, in February 1990 RENAMO’s 
Dhlakama met secretly in Rome with Bruno Bottai, the Secretary General of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the top post in the Italian diplomatic career and the 
most important non political position in the Ministry) (Perry 2014: 78), but “the 
Italian government not want to be officially involved at that time”, as confirmed 
later, in 1995, also by the CSE’s Matteo Zuppi (Chartroux 1998: 30).  
 
6.3.2 The Italian government steps in: multiparty negotiations in full 
swing (1990-1992) 
 
The process unexpectedly gathered speed in a matter of just a few days, between 
12 and 16 June 1990. Immediately after the cancellation of the meeting in Malawi, 
scheduled for 12 June, CSE’s Andrea Riccardi quickly resumed contacts with 
FRELIMO, RENAMO and Gonçalves, to explore the possibility of bringing the 
parties to Rome for a meeting, with the Community offering its headquarters as 
a venue. Sant’Egidio’s efforts achieved their goal, as the Mozambican parties 
agreed to travel to the Italian capital (Hume 1994: 32). Therefore, on 16 June 
1990, Raul Domingos travelled to Rome on behalf of RENAMO to formally 
request Sant’Egidio to organise a first round of talks, and ask the Italian 
government to participate as an observer and to cover the financial costs 
associated to meetings and delegates’ travel expenses. It was crucial for the CSE 
to persuade Italian institutions to take part in the process, and it was not 
                                                 
200 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
201 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014). 
 
202 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014). 
 
203 Former MP with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014). 
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particularly difficult for the Community leaders to reach out to the Italian 
government to ask for their formal involvement for the process, as “cooperation 
[italics added] between the NGO and the government level was created by the 
proximity of the Community to the political and diplomatic circles” in Rome 
(Bartoli 1999: 261; interviews b204 and d205). 
Hence it was only during those days that Italian foreign policy institutions 
seriously considered – and then agreed to – some form of participation in the 
talks. As mentioned before, “[s]upport from the Foreign Minister [De Michelis, 
added] was not as first as complete as it could have been. […] There was no open 
resistance, certainly at first there was a perplexed attitude on the part of 
professional diplomats […]” (Chartroux 1998: 32). Italy’s good ties with 
FRELIMO were indisputable, as showed by the immediate establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Mozambique when it gained independence in 1975, 
after the FRELIMO-led war of liberation, and by the ensuing level of Italian 
development aid contributed to the country (see earlier in this Chapter). On the 
contrary, smooth relations between Rome and RENAMO could not be taken for 
granted. Although it was RENAMO that had requested the involvement of the 
Italian government in the talks, the level of mutual diffidence between them was 
still rather high, especially on their part. “RENAMO had an absolute mistrust for 
the international community, which it felt did not understand its struggle for 
freedom against a Marxist regime, and especially for Italy, Mozambique’s largest 
donor country” (Chartroux 1998: 31). The CSE, recognizing the importance of a) 
welcoming the early gestures of goodwill by RENAMO and, at the same time, b) 
bringing the Italian government on board in the process, was key to overcoming 
this hurdle. Sant’Egidio pledged indeed to RENAMO that if the movement had 
confirmed its serious commitment to the peace talks, it would have helped them 
to gain support from Italy. The Community, therefore, managed to break the 
deadlock establishing itself as an actor trusted by both Mozambican parties: 
“FRELIMO accepted it because the Community was backed by Italy, and 
RENAMO accepted Italy because it trusted the Community” (Chartroux 1998: 31) 
(Perry 2014: 78; Riccardi 1997: 100). In addition, at least to some extent, Rome’s 
attractiveness – for both Mozambican parties – as an appropriate setting for 
                                                 
204 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
205 Former MP with working experience in the Mozambican peace process (Rome, 30 July 2014). 
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negotiations was probably due to its ‘double status’ of capital of Italy and, at the 
same time, of the Vatican and the Catholic world (Giro 1998: 86).  
The Italian government, in the end, despite some initial hesitations, made 
apparent by the Foreign Minister De Michelis, decided to give the process – and 
its contribution to it – a chance. Prime Minister Andreotti played a decisive role, 
making the final decision to get Italy officially involved206 (although, at the 
beginning, only as an observer and a financial sponsor), because of the confidence 
he had in the Community’s reliability, and especially because of the previous 
successful cooperation on the more limited activities already carried out by the 
state institutions and the CSE on Mozambique (i.e. the development cooperation 
initiatives of the 1980s mentioned earlier in this Chapter) (interviews b207, c208 
and d209). In addition, the government may have also realized that it was worth 
betting on a low-risk foreign policy dossier in which the main traditional 
stakeholders – the US, Portugal and the UK – were not particularly interested, as 
they were possibly paying more attention to other issues and areas of the world, 
at a time when the Cold War was drawing to a close (Hume 1994: xi).  The non-
applicability of the classic bipolar confrontation scheme to the Mozambican 
conflict, and the relative absence of the US, a traditional ally of Italy, from the 
scene, made it all the more feasible for Rome to try to play a leading role in the 
Mozambican peace negotiations. A similar view on the changing international 
context and its impact on the Mozambican issue, although from a different angle, 
was of course shared also by the CSE: “[t]he Mozambique conflict was the last of 
Cold War conflicts, that is, with two ideologically opposed contenders. At the 
same time, it was the first non-traditional "post-1989" conflict, with its 
ambiguities, nuances and obscurities” (Giro 1998: 89). Last but not least, there 
was no risk of the Mozambican conflict ever becoming a contentious issue in the 
Italian political debate: bipartisan political support could be easily achieved as 
the Communist, the Socialist and the Christian Democratic Party had no 
                                                 
206 It is interesting to observe here that this initial inconsistency between the positions of the 
Foreign Minister and those of the Prime Minister points to what has been suggested in Chapter 3 
on the somehow blurred division of competences and powers between the two figures in Italian 
foreign policy decision-making, defined as “varying ‘polycentric’” by Ferro and Leotta (2011). 
 
207 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
208 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014). 
 
209 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014). 
 180 
incentives to oppose the process, either for previous ties with FRELIMO, as 
explained earlier, or for some sort of loose but ideological proximity to a Catholic-
oriented actor such as the CSE and/or the Mozambican Catholic Church 
(Marchetti 2013: 108-9; Gianturco 2010: 33). With the Italian government 
agreeing in June 1990 to provide the initiative with at least some limited kind of 
political and financial support, mutually beneficial synergies for Italy and the 
CSE were thus put in place already in the preliminary stages of the peace process. 
Rome also named a Socialist MP, Mario Raffaelli, to assist with the process as an 
‘observer’. He was then joined by Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi from the 
CSE and archbishop of Beira Jaime Gonçalves (Hume 1994: 32). However, it 
seems that the Italian government opted at the beginning for a cautious approach, 
i.e. accepting to bear the financial costs of the negotiations, but appointing at the 
same time a representative, the MP Mario Raffaelli, who did not hold any official 
position in the government at that time, and was officially only a ‘personal’ 
representative of the Foreign Minister. Raffaelli's somehow ‘ambiguous’ 
assignment even raised some doubts among practitioners and commentators, in 
the aftermath of his appointment (interviews b210, c211 and d212; Veronese 1994). 
The reason for this low profile political attitude, at least in the first phases of the 
process, was probably a mix of simple distraction –  or rather lack of attention by 
a cabinet that, as said before, was focusing its attention to other issues – and 
willingness to avoid a possible failure on a dossier that was not considered as the 
most urgent for Italian foreign policy (Veronese 1994; interviews b213, c214 and 
d215). 
It was indeed at the specific request of one of the parties to the conflict, and upon 
the invitation by the CSE, that the Italian cabinet agreed to step in, therefore 
transforming the talks scheme in a multiparty format. The concept of ‘multiparty 
mediation’ – although during the first round of meetings were still termed as 
                                                 
210 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
211 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014). 
 
212 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014). 
 
213 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
214 Senior journalist (Rome, 6 February 2014). 
 
215 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014). 
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‘observers’ – refers to simultaneous interventions by more than one mediator in 
the conflict, interventions by composite actors such as regional organizations or 
contact groups, as well as sequential mediated interventions that again involve 
more than one party” (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999: 10). As far as rules of 
the game to be applied, the team decided to work on the basis of parameters 
traditionally applicable to ‘track-one’ diplomacy, although only one out of the 
three members of the mediation team was acting on behalf of a state (Raffaelli). 
Bartoli (1999: 271) argued that “[t]his may have been the result of Sant’Egidio’s 
strong presence in Rome”, probably referring pointing to the Community’s 
familiarity with Italian political leaders and bureaucrats. 
On 24 June the Mozambican President Joaquim Alberto Chissano informed the 
Italian Ambassador in Maputo, Manfredi Incisa di Camerana, that FRELIMO had 
agreed to send a representative in Rome to meet with RENAMO representatives 
(Hume 1994: 32). The first round of direct talks between FRELIMO’s government 
officials and RENAMO representatives took place on 8 July 1990 at Sant’Egidio’s 
headquarters in Trastevere, but the first difficulties arose immediately as the two 
Mozambican sides disagreed over the role and prerogatives of third parties’ 
participation (namely the Community, the Italian government and the 
archibishop of Beira) (Gianturco 2010: 34-35). FRELIMO preferred to have 
direct talks with its counterpart, with the three actors staying simply as observers, 
while RENAMO suggested the idea of transforming them in fully-fledged 
mediators (Hume 1994: 33-34). It is precisely within that uncommon 4-member 
negotiating group – defined by the Washington Post as “an unlikely team of 
mediation peace brokers” (1992) – that relations between Italian institutions and 
Sant'Egidio developed on a daily basis during the whole duration of the peace 
process. Already at the end of the first meeting, Riccardi and Zuppi drafted a 
report for the Prime Minister Andreotti to keep him updated on the outcome of 
the talks, inform him about the financial costs to be covered by the Italian 
government, and let him know that the United States had promised their full 
support to Italy and to Community in their mediation efforts through the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman J. Cohen, they had just 
met with, an important development in the eyes of the Italian government, as it 
came from one of its most important international partners (Hume 1994: 35). 
Only during the second round of talks, in August 1990, the two parties decided to 
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recognize the group of observers as the official mediation team (Venancio and 
Chan 1998: 34).  
A closer look at the mediators’ team is useful here. Mario Raffaelli, however, was 
not a newcomer to Mozambican issues, as it had already dealt with this topic on 
previous assignments. During his tenure as Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in 
charge of African affairs (1983-1989), he had worked with the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti to provide the CSE with the necessary political 
and logistical support for the organisation of the two “ships of solidarity”, in 1986 
and in 1988, to deliver humanitarian aid to Mozambique (see previous sections). 
Apart from Raffaelli, coordinating the group, the negotiating team was composed 
of the CSE founder Andrea Riccardi, who in the meanwhile had become a 
university professor, focusing on history of Christianity, Matteo Zuppi, a priest 
member of the CSE, and Jaime Gonçalves, who was still serving as archbishop of 
Beira (he was bishop at the time of previous contacts with the Community), and 
played a crucial role acting as an intermediary between the two Mozambican 
parties and the CSE/Italian side. The pick of a representative of the Mozambican 
Catholic Church like Gonçalves, was a well-advised move to win the confidence 
of RENAMO, while the presence of a Socialist MP like Raffaelli was of course 
appreciated by FRELIMO. A fifth person, who was not part of the official 
negotiating team, also performed a decisive role: the ambassador Manfredi Incisa 
di Camerana216, serving in Maputo217, (Ajello 2010: 19; Gentili 2013: 7), assisted 
only by a small staff of diplomats, including his deputy, Pierluigi Velardi, and a 
junior diplomat, Diego Ungaro, replaced in 1991 by another junior official, 
                                                 
216 In the witty words of the journalist who covered the negotiations for a major Italian newspaper, 
the success of the peace process was the outcome of the work of a ‘weird’ combination of three key 
people. One of them, the ambassador, was not even part of the official negotiating team: “[...] 
Father Matteo Zuppi, a thirty-seven-year-old Catholic priest, leading the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. Mario Raffaelli, a socialist MP from Trentino [a region in the north of Italy, added]. 
Manfredi Incisa di Camerana, the ambassador in Maputo. These three men – a priest who was 
not exactly 'orthodox', a socialist not really supporting Craxi [the most important Italian Socialist 
leader from mid-1970s to the 1993, added], an ambassador not exactly diplomatic [...]” (Veronese 
1992). 
 
217 Probably confirming that Mozambique was not on the top of the list of priorities of the Foreign 
Minister, some commentators suggested that shortly after taking office, the Minister had decided 
to appoint ambassador Incisa di Camerana, then serving in the headquarters in Rome, to Maputo, 
considered at that time an unimportant posting for the Italian diplomatic career, as a sort of 
‘punishment’ for supposed, previous disagreements on other issues (Veronese 1994). 
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Roberto Vellano218 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2016). Finally, as it will be 
mentioned later in this Chapter, other state actors and international 
organizations participated in the process, with varying degrees of commitment 
and at different stages: United States, United Nations, Portugal, France, United 
Kingdom, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa and the 
Organisation for the African Unity all acted as observers, although with a low 
profile, less active role. 
In November 1990, a third round of talks was first cancelled, and later re-
scheduled for December after the United States made their – albeit indirect 
– support for the process explicit, and a series of meetings between the mediators’ 
team and leaders of regional states involved in the Mozambican crisis took place 
(Hume 1994: 47; Bartoli 1999: 259). During the third round of meetings, the first 
step forward was finally taken, with an agreement reached on maintaining a 
partial cease-fire along major transportation routes, and on granting 
humanitarian aid agencies access to conflict areas. The parties also set up a Joint 
Verification Mission (JVC), with FRELIMO’s government suggesting Congo, 
France, the USSR, and the UK as members of the mechanism, and RENAMO 
Kenya, Portugal, the US and Zambia. During its first meeting, the JVC appointed 
the Italian Ambassador in Maputo, Incisa di Camerana, as its chairman. The role 
of the diplomat within the JVC in Mozambique, who worked also with CSE 
members based in the country, proved very useful as he could have first-hand 
knowledge of what was happening on the field, and was another sign of 
complementarity and synergy between Italian institutions and the Community 
(Hume 1994: 47; Ajello 1999: 620 and 2010: 19). 
Four more rounds of talks followed, between January and October 1991, focusing 
on political and electoral reforms, but with a faltering pace and amid frequent 
accusations of breaching the ceasefire levelled by both parties. Tongue-in-cheek 
comments started to circulate in the early months of 1991 among international 
diplomats, especially Portuguese, on the slow pace of negotiations, underlining 
“mediators’ weakness. Someone suggested the option of resuming negotiations 
elsewhere” (Morozzo della Rocca 1993a: 78-9). At some point, during the slowing 
down phase of the process of 1991, RENAMO even tried to gain support from 
                                                 
218 Interestingly, Vellano returned to Mozambique from 2012 to 2016, serving as ambassador 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2016), when the country had become much more relevant for Italian 
foreign policy, mostly for energy-related reasons, as described in previous sections.  
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Portugal and the United Nations, but both refused to step in the process, arguing 
that all stakeholders had sanctioned the Rome talks as the only official forum for 
negotiations (Hume 1994: 65). While such rumours and behind-the-scenes 
attempts were probably aimed at possibly benefiting actors playing a secondary 
role the process, like the Portuguese, inaccurate and confusing reactions on this 
issue by Foreign Minister De Michelis were all the more ill-timed and unsuitable. 
He declared indeed that Rome would probably get involved in negotiations “in 
the observers’ group, moving from an unofficial role to an official one”, at a time 
when Italy had already been officially upgraded from the status of ‘observer’ to 
that of ‘mediator’ in the process, raising doubts also among the two Mozambican 
delegations (Ferraris 1998: 479; Morozzo della Rocca 1993a: 78-79; Chan and 
Venancio 1998: 36). On the one hand, this episode signals, at least to some extent, 
a certain degree of confusion and/or poor communication on the dossier within 
the Italian foreign policy machinery, between the bureaucrats working daily on 
the issue, and the top political level of the Ministry (see also Chapter 3 on this). 
On the other, it also further points to the initial, low interest of the government 
in the negotiations argued earlier in this Chapter, even after Rome’s appointed 
representative was included in the mediation team.  
In order to overcome the impasse of January-October 1990, during the eight and 
ninth rounds of talks, held from October 1991 to March 1992, the mediation team 
drafted a series of Protocols dealing with specific issues. Protocol I focused on 
basic principles, such as the the commitment of the Mozambican government not 
to pass any law in contrast with provisions set by the Protocols, and RENAMO’s 
pledge to refrain from armed struggle after the end of the war (Hume 1994: 70 
and 75). Protocol II, signed in November 1991, focused instead on criteria to 
establish and recognise political parties, basically preparing the ground for 
RENAMO to transform in a fully fledged political party after the end of the 
conflict (Hume 1994: 79). Negotiations for Protocol III, dealing with electoral 
reform, on the contrary, were on the verge of paralysing again the whole process. 
Yet, pressure from all the three mediators and the US convinced the parties to 
postpone discussions on the matter, and an agreement on the issue was then 
reached in March 1992 (Hume 1994: 92; interviews b219 and d220).  
                                                 
219 Senior journalist (Rome, 14 July 2014). 
 
220 Senior think-tank researcher (Rome, 20 January 2014). 
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With the tenth round, negotiations finally gained momentum and entered the last 
part of the process, going from June to September 1992. By June 1992, if all 
parties had agreed to formally include the US and Portugal in the peace process, 
other problems were still on the table to be solved, such as military issues, while 
the humanitarian situation on the ground was deteriorating (Hume 1994: 107). 
 
6.3.3 “Italian formula, Mozambican peace”. The signing of the 
“General Peace Agreement” (1992) 
 
The final breakthrough finally materialized during the summer of 1992. In order 
to unlock another stall in negotiations in Rome, a summit was organized in July 
by Tiny Rowland, a British business executive active in the resolution of the crisis, 
between President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, President Quett Masire of Botswana, 
RENAMO’s Afonso Dhlakama. The meeting proved key to persuade Dhlakama to 
hold face-to-face talks with FRELIMO’s President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, 
that eventually took place from 5 to 7 August in Rome (Hume 1994: 134). During 
what was defined as an ‘African’ summit, Chissano and Dhlakama met in the 
presence of Mugabe and Masire, negotiated the last details and agreed to meet 
again in October to sign the peace agreement (Gianturco 2010: 45). While at the 
negotiating table time seemed ripe for reaching a comprehensive peace deal, 
behind the scenes there were still many doubts, especially on the part of 
RENAMO. Final, limited but hectic meetings were held between the mediators 
and the delegates to solve still contentious questions such as the future of the 
army and the reform of the police (Hume 1999: 124; Gentili 2013: 7). In addition, 
the Italian government pledged 15 million USD to RENAMO, in order for the 
movement to transform into a fully-fledged political party (Vines 1998: 74).  
After ten rounds of talks and three summits, the “General Peace Agreement” 
(GPA) for Mozambique was finally signed in Rome on 4 October 1992, by 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Mozambican President and FRELIMO’s leader, and 
Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO’s president. At the final ceremony, held in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two parties signed the agreement under the 
chairmanship of the Italian government and in the presence of the Foreign 
Minister Emilio Colombo, a symbolic setting that underlined the importance of 
the role of Italy in the peace process. Participants in the ceremony included: 
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President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, President Quett Masire of Botswana, the 
vice-president of Kenya, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, 
the Malawian Minister in the Office of the President John Tembo and Assistant 
Secretary General of the UN, James O.C. Jonah, representatives of the US, 
Portuguese, French and British governments (Gentili 2013: 8). Thanks to the 
innovative multiparty mediation activity, a deal was reached on a declaration of 
cease-fire, the recognition of political parties, the organisation of general 
elections, the set up of a unified army, the presence of international monitors in 
the country to oversee the implementation of the accords, the involvement of 
regional and international actors, with a specific mention of the role of Italy in 
supporting the Mozambican government in the electoral process (information 
collected from the original text of the agreement). The Agreement tasked United 
Nations with overseeing the implementation of the accords. Therefore, 
immediately, the day after the signing ceremony, the UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Aldo Ajello, a senior Italian UN official with a 
previous experience as a Radical and then Socialist MP, and as MEP in the 
European Parliament, as Interim Special Representative to Mozambique – his 
appointment as Special Representative of the Secretary General (SGSR) was then 
confirmed by the Security Council Resolution 782 a few days later, on 13 October 
1992. The fact that an Italian senior official was chosen to head the UN mission 
is a sort of further testimony to the fact that the UN and the international 
community had acknowledged the contribution of Italy to the resolution of the 
conflict and, in other words, that cooperating with the CSE had proved a good 
choice for the Italian government (Ajello 2010: 19-20; interview b221). 
On 13 December 1992 the Security Council passed a resolution establishing the 
creation and deployment of a peace-keeping mission to the country (ONUMOZ), 
which operated in the country between December 1992 and December 1994. Italy 
deployed the largest share of troops (Operation Albatros was the name of the 
specific Italian contribution) in one of the first international military operations 
the country had ever participated in after the Second World War (Ignazi et al. 
2012). As it would occur in the following years also on other occasions (see for 
instance the case of the 2006 Lebanese war, described earlier in this thesis), 
Italian foreign policy combined efforts in peace-making with the tool of 
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international military operations and managed to to strengthen its role and 
prestige on the international scene and/on in a specific area of the world.  
On the whole, relations between and Sant'Egidio developed smoothly during the 
2-year negotiating process, despite towards the end of the talks two different 
Ministers took responsibility for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Christian 
Democrats Vincenzo Scotti and Emilio Colombo, first because of the formation of 
a new government at the end of June 1994, led by the Socialist Giuliano Amato, 
and second due to a cabinet reshuffle only one month later. As stressed in 
different points of earlier sections of this Chapter, in such a multiparty peace-
making effort, it soon became clear that cooperation between the two actors was 
mutually beneficial for both of them (Hume 1994; Bartoli 1999; Gianturco 2010). 
Also the attitude of the Italian press (despite the limited coverage of the process 
before the final months) and of the general public was positive towards the joint 
effort made by the CSE and the Italian government, although from February 1992 
onwards the major corruption scandal disclosed by the judicial investigation 
"Clean Hands" almost 'monopolised' the public debate on the vast majority of 
political issues in Italy (interview b222, c223, d224, e225 and f226).   
Over the entire duration of the process, constant updates and views were 
periodically exchanged between the Italian government institutions – the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, first of all – and the CSE members involved in the 
activities, especially through the presence of Raffaelli in the team. The General 
Directorate for Political Affairs of the Ministry, in particular senior diplomats 
Maurizio Melani and Enrico Guicciardi, closely followed the whole process, 
providing technical and diplomatic advice to the team when necessary (interview 
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b227, c228, d229 and g230). The role of the Italian government was indeed even 
reinforced at some point: in March 1991, the evolution of the peace talks required 
the advice of military experts among the mediators that only Italy was in a 
position to provide, also at the request of the US Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Jeffrey Davidow. 
“The amount of less visible work – collecting and sharing information, decision-
making, analysing, brainstorming, creative thinking to resolve crises as well as to 
determine long-term goals – constituted the bulk of the mediation’s team 
labour”, conducted especially by Matteo Zuppi and Mario Raffaelli together 
(Bartoli 1999: 262; interviews b231 and d232). Ensuring confidentiality to the whole 
process was also a crucial issue, because both parties, and especially FRELIMO, 
were facing internal opposition from hard-liners strongly resisting any form of 
dialogue with their counterpart, therefore they needed to prevent information on 
the talks and details of negotiations from circulating out of the negotiations 
channels (Giro 2011: 96). The limited international press coverage of the issue, 
due to a general lack of interest in Mozambican affairs, was of course another 
feature helping the mediating team to keeping the talks secret. Only in the final 
months of the process, a spokesperson for the talks was appointed (Mario 
Marazziti, from the CSE) (Bartoli 1990: 263; Gianturco 2010: 37). Also in this 
regard, cooperation between the Community – offering the physical facilities for 
meetings, its low-key headquarters in the historical centre of Rome, relatively 
shielded from press and public scrutiny – and the Italian government – 
facilitating discreet delegates’ trips from and to the city, and granting RENAMO’s 
members entry to the Italian territory although they did not hold passports  
(Riccardi 1998: 99) – seemed to go smoothly (Nigro 1990; Bartoli 1999: 263; 
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interview b233, c234 and d235). The fact that the four mediators and all the other 
members of Sant’Egidio staff were working on their mediation efforts (together 
with administrative and logistical support) was perceived as a sign of sincere 
commitment by Mozambican parties and international observers (Bartoli 1999: 
263). Also in this case, synergic relations between the Community and the Italian 
government seemed to have developed. If on the one hand Sant’Egidio was able 
to contribute its volunteers’ work and its premises for both the meetings and back 
office activities, on the other Italian state institutions – through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs – were able to cover the lion’s share of all other unavoidable 
expenses incurred, with minor contributions coming from the Swiss government, 
international foundations and NGOs and the Italian network of Catholic parish 
churches (Hume 1994: 32; Gianturco 2010: 39). In greater detail, Italy 
contributed 20 million USD236 in total to finance the costs of the process, plus 
30,000 USD to cover part of Sant’Egidio’s expenses. (Chartroux 1998: 33; Vines 
1998: 73). On the issue of funding, it should be noted that if the Italian 
government had decided to decline to financially support the negotiations, 
probably the CSE would have found an alternative state sponsor – maybe the 
United States, or Portugal – or an international organisation willing to bear the 
costs – perhaps the United Nations or the Organization of the African Unity. In 
other words, the Italian financial contribution was important but not necessarily 
vital for the mediation work by Sant’Egidio; this should be taken into account 
because it means that it did not actually affect significantly the Community’s 
policy autonomy. In addition, it is important to underline that although Italy 
funded most of the Rome expenses, the US government was always present 
behind the scenes throughout the negotiations, becoming an official observer and 
providing technical advice (legal, military). Political supervision for the whole 
process, in Washington, was assigned to the State Department Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, and his Deputy, Jeffrey 
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236 The amount of money spent turned out to be rather high because it included also the costs for 
both delegations of keeping their leaders and colleagues in Mozambique constantly updated on 
every step of the negotiations. For instance, RENAMO’s telephone bills alone, from January to 
July 1992, amounted to 60,000 USD.  
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Davidow, while the Deputy Head of Mission of the US Embassy to the Holy See, 
Cameron Hume, was tasked with closely monitoring the activities and offering 
concrete, daily support to the mediators in Rome (Bartoli 1999: 258-259). 
The success of the process, dubbed as “Italian formula” (Boutros-Ghali 1993), 
rested on a negotiating format combining non state actors and state actors, with 
a NGO spearheading and coordinating the process (Sant’Egidio), a government 
fully on board providing mediation efforts with traditional statecraft diplomatic 
tools (Italy) and, in their capacity of observers, a number of other international 
state stake-holders supporting the process outside of the negotiating team 
(Boutros-Ghali 1993; Giro 2011: 96). Set in motion by a (rather neophyte) ‘track-
two-diplomacy’ actor as the CSE, probably negotiations would not have reached 
their goal, if a sound synergy between Sant’Egidio and other ‘track-one 
diplomacy’ actors had not been achieved. In other words, “[t]he winning formula 
of the Mozambican mediation was confidence building coupled with power 
diplomacy. It was power diplomacy that ensured that the political arrangements 
in the GPA were not left in the vague or undefined and that democracy was to be 
supported by adequate political and economic incentives” (Gentili 2013: 8). At 
the same time, the added value provided by a non state actor such as Sant’Egidio 
– nicknamed “UN of Trastevere” (Man 1995) –  in this context was that “non-
official diplomacy can create the conditions for taking up contacts and picking up 
threads within national communities in crisis, but above all for reconstructing 
links to isolated realities that have slipped out of the control of the state system 
and international institutions” [i.e. with actors located on a sub-state level, 
added] (Giro 1998: 89). In the words of Mario Raffaelli: the process “starts from 
a commitment of solidarity and evangelization on the ground [on the part of CSE, 
added], mediation occurs, because the ongoing war prevents the very 
commitment from being fulfilled in the wake of the diplomatic success, the 
government gets involved in an ‘unusual’ military engagement, and in any case 
synergic with Vatican policy” (Raffaelli 1992: 107). 
 
6.4 Conclusions. Cooperative relations 
 
Relations between Italian institutions and the Community of Sant'Egidio in the 
case of the Mozambican peace process were on the whole cooperative. The 
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initiative (and the management of) the mediation initiative was clearly in the 
hands of the Community, but because it soon became clear that some form of 
state commitment was useful, if not necessary, both actors realised that working 
in synergy237 was the best option to achieve their goals. The latter, all differences 
considered, were rather similar for both the Italian state and the Community: a 
good quality mediation work, possibly a successful outcome of the talks, prestige 
and the reputation gained on the international scene even only for the mere fact 
of being able to launch a peace process, regardless of the final result of the 
negotiations. The two actors were largely interdependent on this occasion: on the 
one hand the NGO Sant'Egidio was deeply rooted in the Italian society, had 
always valued its ‘Italian-ness’, also in the eyes of other actors, and was partly 
dependent on the Italian government for political, technical and financial 
support. On the other, Italian institutions had the chance of stepping in a process 
already set in motion by an NGO and play a significant role Rome had probably 
not even envisaged before, making the most of political and diplomatic room for 
Italy cleared by the fact that in that period the attention of the US, Portugal and 
the UK was mostly focused on other areas of the world. It can be argued that Italy 
obtained an even higher ‘profit’ from the events, as it was involved in a process in 
which most of the initial, demanding ‘investments’ had been already made over 
many years by another actor, i.e. the Community. In addition, even if the Italian 
government had showed a specific interest in the resolution of the Mozambican 
issue – a pure theoretical speculation, as we know that this was not the case –, 
being on the front line of the initiatives, instead of a non state actor such as 
Sant’Egidio, would not have probably been actually fruitful for the success of the 
peace process. “Characteristic of the mediation in Mozambique was the paradox 
that the weaknesses of the negotiating team reduced the possibility of imposing 
outside solutions (through coercive diplomacy, military threat, and so forth), 
which forced the parties to negotiate to for themselves. […] The paradox is that, 
positioned weakly, the mediation team established a strong and effective direct 
negotiation almost by default” (Bartoli 199: 249). It can probably be argued that 
“Sant’Egidio was able to succeed as a conduit of negotiations because of the very 
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the actions of the actors involved in the process and to proceed appropriately. 
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weakness [emphasis added] that made it such an unlikely leader – its lack of 
international prestige and power, which prevented it from being cast into and 
constricted by the formalities of more traditional efforts" (Bartoli 1997: 248). 
At the same time, the CSE required the formal engagement of a state actor, that 
in turn, at a later stage, facilitated the ensuing involvement/support by other 
states and international organizations. In the words of Giro, one of the 
Community’s members, commenting on the Mozambican talks: “[t]he diplomacy 
of civil society is no substitute for national diplomacy. The state and its official 
institutions have a role to play and it is important that they play it. The ideal 
solution involves synergy between the “institutional” and the “informal”, in which 
the greater flexibility of the informal is complemented by the necessary 
“officialness” of the institutional” (Giro 1998: 89). In conclusion, “this unique 
mixture of governmental and non-governmental peace-making activity”, as 
summarized by the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1993), 
and the cooperative relations that the Italian government and the Community 
enjoyed during the process, were key to both the favourable outcome of the peace 
negotiations, and the success of the single diplomatic efforts made individually 
by the two actors. 
The assessment of the events occurred has showed that the idea of informal 
and/or accidental ‘delegation’, originally suggested in the early stages of this 
thesis, was not applicable in this context. The role of Sant'Egidio in launching the 
peace-making efforts cannot be considered as the result of an act of 'delegation' 
by the Italian foreign policy institutional machinery, neither informal, nor 
accidental. First, the analysis of how the Community got involved in the peace 
process has demonstrated that this occurred exclusively thanks to its activism 
and its good track record of relations with the parties to the conflict, in a 
completely autonomous way from the Italian government that, on the contrary, 
at the onset of the process was not even considering the option of playing a role 
on that foreign policy case. Second, the special formula of multiparty mediation 
used in the Mozambican case, that was in turn a consequence of the emergence 
of new actors in the international arena after the end of the Cold War, clearly 
showed that far from being an activity still confined to the 'exclusive domain' of 
states (and therefore possibly ‘delegated’ from them to non state actors), the 
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peace-making field was open to different actors and could greatly benefit from 
cooperation between state and non state actors. 
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Part III - Conclusions and implications for further 
research 
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Conclusions. ‘Coopetition’? 
 
 
This thesis was aimed at throwing light on a specific aspect of Italian foreign 
policy after the demise of the Cold War, using different insights from 
International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. In particular, its goal was to 
assess what kind of interactions – and why – developed in the 1990s between the 
Italian state foreign policy machinery and the Community of Sant’Egidio, a very 
proactive Catholic-oriented NGO based in Italy with a pronounced activity in the 
international arena. In addition, this work was intended to understand the 
reasons for variation in their relations, in terms of nature of foreign policy 
subfields, domestic and external actors involved, perceived national interests at 
stake, etc. In order to do so, I have analysed the two foreign policy issues on which 
the role of both of them, simultaneously, was most evident: the Algerian crisis 
(1994-1998) and the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992).  
 
Before conducting the assessment of these two events, in Part I of this thesis I 
have examined other four aspects. 
1. In Chapter 2, I have illustrated the gaps in the underdeveloped literature on 
Italian foreign policy, in order to place the contribution that this thesis has 
attempted to offer in the broader picture of existing works. I have also tried to 
understand why literature on this topic is limited, and tried to track the history 
of the belated and difficult establishment of IR in Italy, to understand its effects 
on the study of Italian foreign policy. Clearly, a) the late establishment of the 
discipline in Italy and its current academic status have not facilitated the creation 
of the best conditions for well-grounded research to flourish. In addition, b) the 
general lack of attention for Italy’s international affairs by scholars, policy 
analysts, think tankers and (on some occasions) the very foreign policy 
professionals, has further hampered the emergence of a well-established 
tradition of studies on this topic. Such indifference, to some extent, is also due to 
the fact that this is an object of inquiry which turns out to be more complex, 
nuanced and challenging than common stereotypes often suggest. Finally, and 
partially as a consequence of the elements abovementioned, c) the availability of 
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primary and secondary sources is often extremely limited, especially on events 
occurred in the last three decades, therefore researching Italian foreign policy is 
all the more difficult. Over the last fifteen years, there has been a significant rise 
in academic studies on Italian foreign policy. If this trend is to be confirmed, it 
could hopefully contribute to the further development of Italian foreign policy 
studies in Italy and on Italy, enhancing not only the scientific understanding of 
the topic, but also a public and media debate on these issues that is still 
lamentable. In the medium and long term, the current state of the art has indeed 
also another important policy implication: indirectly, it produces negative 
consequences also on the quality of the political and administrative, daily 
management of Italian foreign policy, especially in comparison with similar 
Western European countries. I have come to believe that it is precisely the 
cultural, general indifference to this topic, particularly – and paradoxically – 
within Italy, that is ‘hazardous’, in intellectual, policy and political terms, 
considering the nature and level of challenges posed by today’s world. 
 
2. In Chapter 3 I have described the Italian Foreign Policy Community, starting 
from the model developed by Hilsman (1971, 1987 and 1993), and then partially 
modified and applied by Santoro (1990 and 1991) to the case of Italian foreign 
policy between 1861 and 1990, in order to locate institutional foreign policy actors 
and non-state actors within the bigger framework of the Italian foreign policy 
landscape, taking into account the evolutions occurred with the end of the Cold 
War. Such mapping has showed that the Italian foreign policy institutional 
setting is quite fragmented, and that it features a) centres of power and influence 
scattered along different “rings”, according to the different issues at stake, sub-
policies, and on a specific case-by-case basis; and b) an institutional “inner ring” 
with a relatively high number of “access points” for external actors, for instance 
for a proactive NGO such as Sant’Egidio, which is situated in the “second ring”.  
 
3. In Chapter 4 I have looked in greater detail at the Community of Sant’Egidio, 
tracking its evolution from a rather ‘classic’ Catholic-inspired NGO, dealing with 
religious and social voluntary activities, to its arrival on the international scene 
after the end of the Cold War. Such an assessment is probably one of the few 
attempts to take a closer look at the CSE in a rather comprehensive way (at least 
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in terms of time frame considered and heterogeneity of activities analysed) made 
by an author who is not also member – or associate, affiliate, or friend – of the 
Community. It is worth noting indeed that most of the works produced on this 
topic are written by persons who work or have worked with the group. Coupled 
with a tendency to keep some of the details on the inner workings confidential, 
especially in the past, this has made the collection of data on the CSE and its 
activities not always an easy task. However, an interesting, albeit certainly 
incomplete, portrait of the Community – and of its critics, too – has emerged, 
confirming and/or throwing new light on a number of issues: a) the fact that 
Sant’Egidio both performs a host of autonomous initiatives on the international 
scene and plays a remarkable role in Italian foreign policy, on different issues and 
in different phases of the foreign policy process; b) its ‘double’, complementary 
and mutually beneficial nature of a ‘traditional’ Catholic-oriented NGO, working 
in Italy on fighting poverty, etc., and of an NGOs with an established presence 
abroad, dealing on the international scene with promoting peace and providing 
humanitarian assistance; c) its autonomy from both the Italian and the Vatican 
policies and, at the same time, its capacity to smartly make the most of its 
location, halfway between the capital of Italy and that of the Catholic world, in 
the eyes of third parties abroad; d) its prominence in the Italian landscape of 
internationally active NGOs; e) its complete embeddedness in Italian society and, 
more recently, politics. A final remark on e): it is interesting to realize that when 
this work was in its early stages, the Community had not entered yet the Italian 
political arena, did it one year later, somehow ‘confirming’ that the CSE was 
probably a topic worth ‘keeping an eye on’, after all. 
 
4. Precisely because the foreign policy landscape emerged in Chapter 3 is rather 
fragmented, and there are various “access points” for external actors to get close 
to the institutional “inner ring”, I have observed at the end of Chapter 4 that 
policy subsystems, i.e. situations in which policy autonomy is enjoyed by a small 
number of state and non state actors in a specific policy field (Verbeek and van 
Ufford 2001), are slowly emerging in two foreign policy subfields, i.e. a) 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management and b) peace-making. In the a) 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management domain, a policy subsystem seems to 
be consolidating, despite being still in an early phase and including, for the time 
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being, only two actors – the Italian government and Sant’Egidio –, or other two, 
or three at most NGOs. The latter are for instance “No Peace Without Justice” or 
“Hands off Cain”, although they are more involved in advocating human rights 
protection as a tool to reduce tensions in the long run, than in setting up specific 
preventive short and medium run diplomacy/crisis management initiatives. 
Although it is not possible to draw general conclusions from the limited set of 
events analysed, it can be argued that the policy subsystem in this field is 
probably mostly competitive, i.e. with actors (or coalition of actors) constantly 
competing with each other, and with a playing field that is open to new actors. 
However, despite being always open and relatively easy to access, at least in 
theory, additional actors seem not to have entered yet this policy subsystem. Also 
in the b) peace-making domain, the policy subsystem gradually taking shape 
appears to be still in a preliminary phase of formation. Differently from 
preventive diplomacy/crisis management, however, for the time being, only two 
actors – the Italian government and the Community of Sant’Egidio – seem to be 
actively engaged in this policy subsystem. This is a far cry from the multifaceted 
scenario of NGOs working on these issues thriving in other Western countries like 
Germany or Norway, for example. Despite general conclusions cannot be reached 
due to the small number of events studied in this thesis, it can be suggested that 
the policy subsystem gradually emerging is dominant, with well-established 
relations among the actors and usually a notable level of control – or, at least, of 
‘non-opposition’ – of issues by the state institutions. The fact that new actors have 
not accessed yet the policy subsystem until now, despite being open and relatively 
unchallenging to enter, could be explained by the very type of subsystem 
coalescing. According to the definition of policy subsystems by Verbeek and van 
Ufford (2001), new actors are expected to join more often competitive policy 
subsystems than dominant ones. Finally, it cannot be excluded that, in the future, 
the emerging policy subsystem in the domain of peace-making will overlap with 
that gradually materialising in the subfield of preventive diplomacy/crisis 
management, at least to some extent. It is not straightforward indeed, in some 
cases, to draw a clear-cut line between the two set of activities, and the relatively 
small number of (the same) actors active in both sub-policies is another element 
pointing towards that direction.  
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In Part II I have presented the assessment of the two cases chosen, drawn 
respectively from the a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management and b) peace-
making sub-policy domains.  
In the case of the Algerian crisis (1994-1998), (a) preventive diplomacy/crisis 
management), described in Chapter 5, relations between the Italian state and the 
Community of Sant’Egidio were cautiously positive at the beginning, then became 
mostly competitive and, in the end, openly conflicting. The Italian government 
did not overtly oppose Sant’Egidioìs action until the situation on the ground and 
the reaction of the Algerian government significantly changed. It was probably 
waiting on the side-ines, in order to see whether the Algerian scenario could 
evolve in such a direction that Italy could play a role in the possible 
implementation of Sant'Egidio’s political proposal, like in the Mozambican case. 
But when it appeared clear that the government in Algiers was pursuing a 
different political agenda, and that therefore the CSE’s efforts did not have any 
chances of being further followed up by state institutions, the Italian government 
readjusted its policy towards Algeria, and as a consequence, vis-à-vis the 
initiatives of Sant'Egidio on the crisis. In other words, the respective agendas of 
the Italian government and of the Community clearly became at some point, 
completely incompatible and the government openly renounced any kind of 
support for the CSE’s activities on Algeria. 
 
In the case of the Mozambican peace process (1990-1992), (b) peace-making sub-
policy), presented in Chapter 6, interactions between Italy and Sant’Egidio were 
overall cooperative. The initial peace-making driver of the process – and, later, 
its management – was completely an initiative of the CSE, with no pressure or 
even encouragement by the Italian government. However, when both actors 
realised that a certain degree of government’s involvement was necessary to build 
a credible and effective peace process – as one the two Mozambican parties itself 
had started to request at some point – the state foreign policy machinery agreed 
to work together with the NGO. The two actors were largely interdependent in 
this case: Sant’Egidio was significantly dependent on the Italian government for 
political, technical and financial support, while Italy was an important part of the 
process, but not a decisive one in terms of ‘ownership’ of the initiative, and 
probably would never have been politically willing and/or able to organise it on 
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its own. Italian institutions seized indeed the opportunity of ‘jumping on the 
bandwagon’ of a process already launched by another actor, an NGO (in terms of 
preparation of the talks, as the CSE could make the most of its long-standing ties 
with the Mozambican society). In other words, the government ended up being 
able to play a role on a rather important foreign policy matter it had probably not 
even imagined before. Probably Italy gained also an additional ‘benefit’ from the 
events, as it was involved in a process in which most of the initial, exacting and 
time-consuming ‘investments’, in terms of building contacts and relations, had 
already been made over many years by another actor, and where the latter, and 
not the government itself, would have borne the majority of the ‘costs’ in case of 
failure of the peace-making process. From the perspective of the government, 
even the mere fact of contributing to initiate the peace-making process in Italy, 
earned it prestige and reputation on the international stage, regardless of the final 
outcome of the talks. Effective synergies, however, were made possible first and 
foremost by the fact that, unlike the Algerian case, the positions of the Italian 
government and of the CSE on the Mozambican affair were compatible, as they 
were both interested in trying to bring the conflict to an end, pursuing good 
quality mediation efforts and possibly reaching a successful conclusion.    
 
The outcome of the assessment of events occurred in the two cases analysed in 
this thesis has showed that the concept of informal and/or accidental ‘delegation’, 
originally put forward in the early stages of this work, is not appropriate for 
explaining relations between the Italian state institutions and the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. The same holds true for the findings emerged when briefly assessing 
other foreign policy events in which both actors played a role, mentioned in other 
Chapters. No elements of ‘intentionality’ or ‘unintentionality’ were found that 
were supposed to steer the action of both actors, in case of informal and/or 
‘accidental’ delegation. In the Algerian case (Chapter 5), for instance, the 
Community’s activities were not at all the outcome of an informal ‘delegation’ of 
tasks by the Italian government. On this occasion, political leaders in charge of 
foreign policy (i.e. the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, supported by 
civil servants), decided to craft a policy on Algeria that at first was hesitant and 
uncertain, but in any case not cooperative, and subsequently in open contrast 
with the positions of the CSE: therefore ‘delegation’' could not have been possible 
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in any case. Neither evidence of accidental ‘delegation’ was found when assessing 
the events occurred. On the contrary, when the government realised that 
Sant'Egidio’s activities could have had a negative impact on Italy’s relations with 
the Mediterranean country, also considering the harsh reactions of the Algerian 
government and the evolution of the situation on the ground, it made every 
possible effort to explicitly distance itself from the Community’s positions and to 
discourage its action, even in absence of any kind of structured cooperation on 
the issue, let alone any form of ‘delegation’. 
Similar considerations can be suggested also on the Mozambican case (Chapter 
6). The activism of the Community in initiating the peace-making process cannot 
be seen as the result of an act of ‘delegation’ by the Italian state institutions, 
neither informal, nor accidental. First, the analysis of how the Community has 
become involved in the peace process has showed that this has happened only 
thanks to its work and its positive track record of relations with the parties to the 
conflict, in a completely autonomous way from the Italian government. The 
latter, on the contrary, at the beginning was not even considering the option of 
playing a role whatsoever on that foreign policy issue. Second, the special formula 
of multiparty mediation used in the Mozambican case, clearly showed that far 
from being an activity still confined to the ‘exclusive domain’ of states – and 
therefore possibly ‘delegated’ from them to non state actors – the peace-making 
arena was open to other types of players and greatly benefited from cooperation 
between state and non state actors. 
 
The two cases analysed have therefore showed that relations between Italy and 
the Community of Sant’Egidio fall within the scope of ‘normal’ relations – 
competitive, if not openly conflicting, or cooperative – between a state and an 
NGO based in its territory, on a foreign policy issue. No ‘delegation’ mechanisms 
are therefore in place, there are no roles of ‘principal’ and ‘agent/actor’, but both 
actors, in substance, play on an equal footing. In general terms, this is in line with 
what the academic literature today extensively argues on the post-Cold War 
increasing role of non state actors in international politics in general, and in 
democratic systems in particular, as described in Chapter 1 (see for instance 
Hocking 2011 and Reinalda 2012).  
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In greater detail, this also confirms the hypothesis mentioned in Chapter 1 that 
NGOs that can employ some influence tools – expertise, resources, closeness to 
target groups, domestic political constituencies, access to the media – can be 
interesting partners for governments (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150-151). It 
clearly emerges from the analysis of the events that Community of Sant’Egidio 
had at its disposal in its toolbox all these assets, both in the Algerian and the 
Mozambican cases, and that the combined use of them made it – or would have 
potentially made it – an interesting possible partner or, in any case, a non state 
actor to watch for, for better or for worse.  
In addition, findings from the two cases validate also the hypothesis that although 
national NGOs try to seek autonomous freedom for manoeuvring from their 
national governments, in order to put pressure on them through an international 
route, they remain largely dependent on their national governments for 
regulation, funding, politico-diplomatic and technical support in specific cases. 
In this respect, unlike international NGOs, NGOs with a strong ‘national’ 
connotation can never fully ignore national government’s interests, strategies and 
actions (Reinalda and Verbeek 2001: 150). Both in the Algerian and the 
Mozambican case, the Community’s set of options was indeed constrained by the 
Italian government agenda. In the Mozambican case, goals of both actors 
overlapped and this resulted in cooperation; in the Algerian one, on the contrary, 
Italy ended up practically stopping any kind of further moves by the CSE, because 
it was seen as conflicting with its foreign policy objectives. The NGO’s scope of 
action was therefore extremely limited by the national government in that case. 
On the issue of the pronounced ‘national’ (Italian) feature of Sant’Egidio, the 
findings of this work can add further reflections to the assumptions offered by the 
existing literature. The fact that the NGO was clearly perceived by third parties 
abroad as closely associated to the Italian state institutions in a broader sense 
(politically, but also in cultural-religious terms, as it embodied common features 
of the Italian social fabric), was an important element both in a positive and in a 
negative way. In the Mozambican peace-making process, it had a mutual, 
synergetic, ‘multiplier effect’ on the credibility capital of both the government 
and the CSE, in the eyes of the parties to the conflict, and of other international 
actors and observers. In the context of the Algerian crisis, in contrast, this close 
association between the two actors only worsened the odds of both the 
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Community and the Italian government of pursuing their own, already 
conflicting policies on Algeria. The CSE, on the one hand, at some point lost 
indeed the favour – albeit hesitant from the very beginning – of the Italian 
institutions for its proposal for the resolution of the crisis, and therefore lost 
support also vis-à-vis the Algerian political forces, in a context where track one 
support by states could have been decisive to try to sustain and then, after the 
failure, to revive its crisis management effort. The Italian government, on the 
other, as soon as it decided to craft a different policy on the matter, had a hard 
time trying to distance itself from the activities of the Community in the eyes of 
Algerian actors, and explain the Algerian government that it was not behind 
Sant’Egidio’s conduct. 
Finally, the hypothesis that the two cases confirm only in part is that the 
cooperative model of NGO has somehow prevailed over conflicting patterns of 
relations (for instance Tvedt 1998; Hemmati 2002; Langhorne 2005 and 2007; 
Cooper et al. 2008; Khagram 2006; Murray 2008). While the Mozambican events 
can certainly substantiate this assumption, the Algerian one cannot validate it, as 
competitive and then conflicting relations were observed in that case. 
 
A few important remarks must be made on what has emerged from the 
assessment of relations between Italy and the CSE, as far as the Italian Foreign 
Policy Community (presented in Chapter 3) is concerned. In both cases, Italy’s 
conduct was a reaction to a first move made by the Community, a further sign of 
its activism and its ability to carve out a niche for itself in the Foreign Policy 
Community of the country (the same holds true also in other cases touched upon 
in this thesis, for instance Kosovo and Albania, mentioned in Chapter 4). On both 
occasions, the CSE managed to gain access, from the ‘second ring’, to the 
institutional ‘inner ring’, using one of the different ‘access points’ for external 
actors. In the Mozambican case, the ‘access point’ was provided by its long-
standing personal contacts with the then Christian Democrat Prime Minister, the 
political constituencies associated with the Socialist and the Communist parties, 
and a few senior bureaucrats working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During 
the Algerian events, ‘access points’ were again offered by personal ties already 
existing with some top politicians and diplomats, although in the end they did not 
turn out to be useful for advancing the CSE’s agenda. The ability of Sant’Egidio 
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to establish significant ties – and in the Mozambican case also to cooperate, 
taking the lead of the initiatives – with the institutional ‘inner ring’, before the 
Italian government started even to imagine to devise a position or crafted a clear 
policy on the issues at stake, is a further proof of the level of fragmentation of the 
Foreign Policy Community and its decision-making process, as argued by Santoro 
(1991) and suggested also in this thesis, with reference to the post-Cold War 
period. It should also be noted that the CSE’s capacity of enjoying policy 
autonomy in an arena with a small number of actors, including the government, 
ultimately feeds into the assumptions of policy subsystem theory itself. Finally, it 
should be added that probably the fragmentation of the Foreign Policy 
Community and Sant’Egidio’s activism were probably facilitated also by the fact 
that the top political level of the foreign policy institutional machinery, in the case 
of Mozambique, was entering at that time the first stages of the turbulent and 
huge political transformations epitomized by the ‘dual crisis’ (international and 
domestic), while, in the case of Algeria, it was trying to come to grips with the 
urgency of finally seriously reflecting on its post-1989 foreign policy.  
 
If relations between Italy and the Community of Sant'Egidio can be included in 
the category of ‘normal’ relations between a state and an NGO based in its 
territory, in the realm of foreign policy, when and why were these relations 
cooperative, competitive, or overtly conflicting in the cases analysed?  
First, on the basis of the findings of the two cases, it can be argued that in the 
Algerian dossier (a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management subfield), the 
issues at stake – and therefore the related risks – were higher than in the 
Mozambican case, in political terms, for the Italian government. As described in 
Chapter 6, Algeria has always been a very important country for Rome’s foreign 
policy, in political, security and economic (especially energy) terms, while 
Mozambique had started to draw a certain level of attention only in the 1970s, 
from a development cooperation point of view238. The Italian government was 
                                                 
238  On a side note, it is interesting to underline that the scenario is different today, as the African 
country has become an important player in Italy’s international agenda, because of the huge gas 
discoveries and investments made by ENI in the energy domain (see Chapter 6). Probably the 
Italian company is currently taking advantage also of the political credibility that Italy had gained 
with the peace-making process in 1990-1992, in the eyes of the Mozambican leadership: this is a 
further positive spill over of those negotiation efforts that certainly the Italian government could 
not have imagined at that time. 
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indeed all the more interested in avoiding any tensions with Algiers, and 
therefore decided to openly countering CSE’s initiatives, that were in turn 
strongly opposed by the Algerian government. Therefore, it can be reasonably 
argued that in similar cases, when the issues of interest are particularly sensitive 
in political terms, the government is probably less willing to cooperate with 
Sant’Egidio, and it is ready to compete, counter and even block its activities, if 
their respective goals diverge. On the contrary, when the matter is politically less 
delicate, their plans are less likely to be conflicting and cooperation is possibly 
more frequent, also because it can bear unexpected and low-cost benefits for the 
government’s foreign policy, on matters that sometimes, at first, are not really at 
the top of its agenda.  
Second, cooperative interactions occurred when the events fell within the scope 
of the b) peace-making sub-policy. In this domain, issues at stake are generally 
less politically sensitive because the conflicts have usually already entered a phase 
in which most parties have already agreed at least on the political lowest common 
denominator, i.e. the basic necessity that some form of negotiations should be 
pursued. The Mozambican scenario was the typical one in which a middle-sized 
country like Italy, in constant search for visibility and prestige, as described in 
this thesis, would step in looking for a role, should the chances of a peace-making 
efforts arise, especially if mostly managed by Sant’Egidio or another non state 
actor. On the contrary, in the a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management sub-
policy domain, reality on the ground is usually more uncertain and the risk of 
political failure and/or to deteriorate relations with other international actors 
involved is higher for a country like Italy, lacking the capacity of imposing its 
political will on conflicting parties. This is exactly what happened in the case of 
Algeria. Therefore, in such cases, the Italian government is probably expected to 
wait on the sidelines, not to rush into supporting the activities of Sant’Egidio or 
another NGO, nor to establish fully fledged synergies with it. 
 
The examination of these events has showed that it is not possible to single out a 
unique type of relations developed between the two actors, in the two foreign 
policy cases in which they were simultaneously more proactive (Algeria and 
Mozambique). Cooperation or competition (or even conflict) depend on a 
number of factors, mainly the political sensitiveness of the issues at stake, the 
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sub-policy of interest, the level of access to the government and civil service that 
the Community (or another non state actor) enjoys. This is where the concept of 
‘coopetition’ kicks in. As explained in Chapter 1, the term “co-opetition” refers to 
the fact that “[...] optimal governance requires a flexible mix of competition and 
cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between governmental and 
non-governmental actors” (Esty and Geradin 2000: 237; mentioned also in 
Hocking 2011: 231). The expression is used here in inverted commas because, like 
the idea of informal/accidental ‘delegation’, it is borrowed from another body of 
literature, i.e. that on regulation theory in domestic policies and at the 
international level. In addition, it is used in this thesis without the prescriptive 
nuance that Esty and Geradin have attached to it in their original application. I 
argue that the concept of such a mix of competition and cooperation is, all things 
considered, probably the more accurate definition to capture the nature of 
interactions Italy had with the Community of Sant’Egidio in the cases analysed 
here. In addition, I think that models of interactions between the two actors, and 
therefore “optimal governance” (in the words of Esty and Geradin), at least in the 
two sub-policies analysed, a) preventive diplomacy/crisis management and b) 
peace-making, could benefit from this mix of cooperation and competition for 
two reasons. First, as shown in both cases, both cooperative and competitive 
relations, developed after the government reacted to the Community’s first move, 
have served, in general, as a constant stimulus for the Italian foreign policy 
apparatus, often ‘distracted’ by domestic politicking and/or internal bureaucratic 
turf wars, to think more carefully about foreign policy issues and problems it had 
not even devoted its attention to, at the beginning. Second, on the one hand 
cooperative relations in the Mozambican case (but also in the cases of Kosovo 
and Albania), a) were (and would be also in the future) extremely useful to build 
reciprocal trust between the two actors; b) mutually benefited the state 
institutions and the Community in a foreign policy effort in which the two were 
interdependent; c) enabled the Italian government to capitalise on the positive 
track record of activities performed by the CSE on the international scene, in 
order to carve out a role for itself on a foreign policy issue it had not even 
imagined before; d) ultimately made possible the very peace-making process and 
its successful outcome. On the other, competitive relations, in the Algerian case, 
although in the end did not result in a foreign policy activity, because they became 
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openly conflicting, proved useful at least to stir some form of debate within the 
foreign policy establishment, and to some extent also in the media, on a crisis 
striking a country rather close to Italy, on the opposite shore of the 
Mediterranean. Considering the underdeveloped state of the public debate on 
foreign policy in Italy, mentioned in Chapter 1, 2 and 3, this effect should not be 
underestimated. In addition, a certain degree of competition, together with the 
evolutions of the situation on the ground, pushed both actors to rethink, readjust 
and fine-tune their policies on the crisis, in a constructive way. Third, a good mix 
of cooperation and competition between the government and the CSE, has 
avoided in the two cases analysed that Sant’Egidio, an NGO with a pronounced 
international vocation that, however, depends on the state it is based in for a 
number of reasons previously described in this thesis, ended up in a subordinate 
position, vis-à-vis the government, that would distort the nature of state-NGO 
relations in a democratic political environment.  
In conclusion, a few remarks with policy implications should be made. This 
combination of cooperative and competitive relations between Italy and the 
NGOs based in Italy (of which Sant’Egidio is probably the most important 
representative), should it occur again on other foreign policy issues, could 
produce positive effects, in the medium-long run, on the nature of the Italian 
Foreign Policy Community and of the quality of Italian foreign policy in general. 
The mutual engagement of state and non state actors, in a ‘coopetitive’ way, may 
indeed a) help rekindle the attention of the general public for foreign policy 
matters; b) strengthen a Foreign Policy Community that, especially in its “second 
ring” is not as vibrant, open and developed as it is in other similar European 
countries; and c) improve the quality and level of current foreign policy actions 
pursued by the government, by introducing fresh contributions from civil society 
organisations active on the international scene. All these developments could 
undoubtedly make the Italian foreign policy process and Italian foreign policy in 
general more inclusive and pluralistic. 
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Implications for further research 
 
 
As in every thesis, topics analysed and research tracks followed in this work have 
of course left out of the picture a number of issues, in some cases also due to the 
problem of the lack of primary sources (described in Chapter 2) that affect most 
of the research topics related to Italian foreign policy issues occurred in the last 
three-four decades.  
 
In possible further research paths, it could be interesting to expand the focus also 
to the Italy-CSE relations in the domain of development cooperation. As 
explained in Chapter 1, however, this policy subsystem seems to feature a higher 
level of consolidation, to the point that it is so dominant that it could hardly exist 
without the government institutions, that provide the majority of funding for aid 
activities implemented by Italian NGOs. Unlike other Western countries, the 
amount of private donations for development cooperation activities managed by 
NGOs is not very high in Italy. Such aspect, differentiating development 
cooperation from other sub-policies, should be dealt with before comparing it 
with other sub-policies such as preventive diplomacy/crisis management and 
peace-making. As far as policy subsystem theory is concerned, further in-depth 
analysis, over a longer time frame, of the two policy subsystems assessed in this 
thesis, i.e. preventive diplomacy/crisis management and peace-making, could be 
fruitful to understand whether such emerging policy subsystems are 
consolidating or are just an expression of “muddling through” (Lindblom 1959 
and 1979), i.e. of policies that tend to evolve according to more or less erratic 
incrementalist patterns. 
 
Another thought-provoking research track would be expanding on the 
fragmented nature of the Italian Foreign Policy Community, for two reasons. 
First, it would help clarify how this fragmentation impacts on the foreign policy 
process, and especially on the relations between the ‘inner ring’ and the ‘second’ 
and the ‘outer’ rings. Second, in more theoretical terms, starting from the 
compelling idea that Italy is probably “a society without a state” (Cassese S. 2011), 
these reflections could possibly feed into one of the most urgent debates in FPA 
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scholarship, that I have briefly touched upon in the thesis, i.e. the lack of a clear-
cut definition of ‘state’ and of the boundary between the state and the society it 
rules, that makes it extremely difficult to articulate how the state enjoys some 
form of autonomy from social actors (undoubtedly, this happened frequently in 
the case of this thesis). The contribution of Historical Sociology to International 
Relations, for instance, may offer possible solutions to this theoretical impasse. 
 
Many other issues related to the Italian Foreign Policy Community would deserve 
closer attention, also in connection with NGOs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, for 
instance, the role of the political parties is one of the less studied areas of the 
Italian foreign policy process. It would be very fruitful to try to understand 
whether political parties still play in the post-1989 era, the crucial role of ‘filters’ 
between the ‘inner ring’ and the ‘second ring’, elucidated by Santoro (1991). This 
issue would be interesting also from the perspective of the state-NGO relations, 
as the Mozambican case (and, to some extent, also the Algerian one) has showed 
that the ‘access points’ used by the CSE to reach the ‘inner ring’ were facilitated 
also by long-standing ties Sant’Egidio had established with the three main Italian 
political parties, i.e. the Christian Democracy Party, the Communist Party and the 
Socialist Party during the Cold War, and with their successors after 1989-1992. 
 
Finally, as far as the Catholic feature of the Community is concerned, at some 
point in this research I have decided not to treat is as a decisive factor. The 
preliminary desk research showed that the Catholic orientation of Sant’Egidio, in 
the two cases selected, could be considered only as a sign of its being steadily 
rooted in the Italian national, social and cultural fabric, and not necessarily as the 
proof of an encumbering role played by the Vatican in those matters, that would 
have possibly, heavily interfered in the state-NGO relations. Adding the Vatican 
to the picture in future research efforts building upon this thesis, however, could 
be very interesting. The topic appears indeed to have started to draw the attention 
of scholars in recent years: a work published in 2015 argued that “Italy could 
represent a special case of religious engagement in foreign policy because of its 
unique geo-religious position: in the context of the current epoch-making 
changes in the international society, there is a sense in which Rome has become 
again, religiously-speaking, caput mundi — the center of the world — as a unique 
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hub of a transnational network of religions connections” (Petito and Thomas 
2015: 40-41; Ferrara and Petito 2016). For interesting as it may be, however, such 
research development would be extremely challenging at the same time. First, in 
theoretical terms it would entail a series of problems related to the role of the 
Vatican in Italian foreign policy (and in Italian politics in general), that is a topic 
almost missing from political science and IR academic research, and would push 
the focus of this work well beyond its original scope, that from the very beginning 
was intended to deal first and foremost with the Italian state foreign policy 
machinery and its interaction with non state actors well-grounded in the Italian 
society, regardless of their religious orientation. Second, from the point of view 
of research feasibility, the problem of primary sources would be even more 
difficult to tackle.  
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